University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Books

Faculty Scholarship

1914

Private Corporations
Horace La Fayette Wilgus
University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/books/48

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/books
Part of the Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wilgus, Horace LaFayette. Private Corporations. Chicago: La Salle Extension University, 1914.

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Books by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

':'

,

PRIVATE CORPORATIO NS

HORACE LAF AYE'fTE WILGUS,

S. B., S. M. (Ohio State University)

LASALLE EXTENSION UNIVERSITY
CHICAGO

_,:
'

1914

Copyright, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913,
LASALLE EXTENSION UNIVERSITY

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
BY

HORACE LAFAYETTE WILGUS,
S. B., S. M. (Ohio Bt:ate University)

Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

--

\()

§ 1.

O>

tO

N

z:
<

~

Outline. This subject will be treated in the following order: Chapter I. The general nature of a corporation: 1. Definition and history. 2. The corporation as a person. 3. ~ The: :c.or-po-l'fiti®: -as·. ~ coU~3tion
of individuals. 4. The: cio"~pdiatioii: hS :a: f~anchi~~. 5.
Corporations and other i4~tHritr~s.;~· ~~ :t.r~t!-. of corporate existence. 7. Class~s of :~-i!>.o ~ations. Chapter
II. Creation of corporations:~ .. ~?f~e'.~tate'!l; functions.
2. The promoter's functions. 3. The corporate charter.
4. The association agreement. 5. Organization. Chapter III. The body corporate: 1. Members and organs
of action. 2. Internal relations. 3. Corporate funds.
4. Corporate name. 5. Corporate life. 6. Corporate
death- dissolution. Chapter IV. Corporate powers and
liabilities: L Powers in general. 2. Classes of cor-
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porate powers. 3. Particular powers. 4. Ultra vires.
5. Torts and crimes. Chapter V. The corporation and
the state: 1. The state and its own corporations. 2.
The state and national corporations. 3. The state and
foreign corporations. 4. The national government and
state corporations. Chapter VI. Special relations: 1.
The corporation and its promoters. 2. The corporation
and its officers. 3. The corporation and its shareholders.
4. Corporate creditors.
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CHAPTER I.
GENBB.AL NATURE OP A OORPO&ATIOlf.
SECTION

§ 2.

1.

DEFINITION AND HISTORY.

Definitions. In a recent opinion Judge Baldwin

says: "A private corporation may be defined as an association of persons to whom the sovereign has offered a
franchise to become an artificial, juridical person, with
a name of its own, under which they can act and contract,
and sue and be sued, and who have accepted the offer
and effected an organization in substantial conformity
with its terms" (1). There are three leading ideas in
the definition of a corporation, each of them being important in certain circumstances. These ideas are: A
person-"a corporation is an artificial being invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law;"
a collection of persons-a corporation aggregate is a
"collection of many individuals united into one body,
under a special denomination, having perpetual succession in an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the
law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an
individual;" a fran chise-" a corporation is a franchise
possessed by one or more individuals, who subsist as a
(1)
088,

~

Baldwin C. J . 1n .Mackay
(Conn).

T.

New York AN. B . R. Oo., 72 Atl.
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body politic, under a special denomination, and are vested
by the policy of the law with the capacity of perpetual
succession and of acting in several respects, however
numerous the association may be, as a single individual" (2).
§ 3. Theories of the corp<>rate personality. There are
three of these, viz: (a) The fiction theory, i. e., that
the corporate personality is not real but artificial only:
"The abstract idea of a corporation, the legal entity, the
impalpable and intangible creation of human thought is
itself a fiction, and has been appropriately described as a
figure of speech" (3). This is the currently accepted
American view, and is specially insisted upon by Mr.
Morawetz and Mr. Taylor.
(b) The organic theory: This is the German doctrine. This view is that the corporation has a personality
as real as that of the state; that in law a person is anything that is a distinct subject of rights and liabilities.
"Juristic persons are no more fictitious than, say, the
conception of ownership is fictitious. In the eye of the
law they are in the fullest sense persons, that is, subjects
of legal rights and duties, and to that extent 'real,' as
far as modern law is concerned" (4).
( c) The representative theory: This may be summarized as follows: The rights held by a corporation are
not the rights of any physical person, but those of the
corporation as a distinct person in the law; the act of the
(2) 2 Kent, Commentaries, 257.
(3) Judge Floch, in People v. North River Sugar Reflnlng Co., 121
N. Y. 582.
(4) Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law (2d ed.), 204, note.
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majority is accepted as the act of all and those who act
bind those who are silent; in other words, the majority
vote of the quorum is the representative of al~ and this
is true whether the vote has been by A to X, inclusive, or
by B to Y, inclusive, in a corporation composed of A to Z.
'.Any group that is the majority of the quorum is the representative of the corporation and is no unreal thing; the
will of this representative body duly expressed is the
corporate act or win, whether it be of knowledge, ignorance, error, good or bad faith, or wrong doing or commendable action. This makes up the unity of the corporation, which it is convenient, if not entirely necessary, to
treat as a person in the law (5).
Theory of the collective body. Mr. Morawetz says:
"The word corporation is but a collective name for the
corporators or memi>ers who compose an incorporated
association" (6). Mr. Taylor says: "A corporation considered as a legal institution has two meanings : ( 1) The
sum or mass of the legal relations subsisting in respect
to the legal enterprise among the various parties-the
state, the shareholders, the officers, and the creditorsresulting from the operation of the rules of law embraced
in the corporate constitution; (2) the shareholders, vested
with the corporate powers, since it is through their acts
or the acts of their predecessors that incorporation is
caused" (7). Mr. Trapnell analyzes the subject and concludes: "A corporation is an association of individuals,
§ 4.

(5)
(6)
(7)

Professor Ernst Freund, The Legal Nature of a Corporation.
Private Corporations (2d ed.), § L
Corporations (3d ed.), H 36, 37, 49, 50, 51.
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formed under the sanction of the state, for the accomplishment of a distinct and definite purpose "-these being
the three essential elements. The associl:ltion originates
in an ngreement between individuals, which becomes
effective only by the express sanction of the state; this
association is peculiar in that its rights and liabilities
persist unchanged without regard to changes in membership; membership is acquired by original subscription, or
agreement, or subsequent ownership of stock, and is terminated by assignment of stock; the association is dissolved, voluntarily with the consent of the state, or, on
complaint of shareholders or creditors, for various improper acts. The states 's sanction is essential, and is expressed in a general or special legislative act, which
operates as a grant of corporate power to the associates,
constituting a contract with them, and a law prescribing
the form and mode of exercising these powers, and the
results thereof. These powers are given only for the
purpose of accomplishing the expressed objects, through
the forms prescribed, by means of the funds authorized (8).
§ 5. Theory of the franchise. Blackstone says: ''Franchises are a royal privilege or branch of the king's prerogative subsisting in the hands of the subject;'' and ''it
is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be incorporated and subsist as a body politic, and each individual member of such corporation is also said to have
a franchise or freedom." Mr. Justice Bradley, after
quoting this, says: "Generalized and divested of the
(8)

The Logical Conception of a Corporation, by Benjamin Trapnell.
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special form which it assumes under a monarchical government based on feudal traditions, a franchise is a right,
privilege, or power of public concern, which ought not be
exercised by private individuals at their mere will or
pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and
administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, acting under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose in the public interest
and for the public security. No persons can make themselves a body corporate and politic without legislative
authority. Corporate capacity is a franchise" (9). The
state in its political capacity is the holder of all franchises, in trust for the public welfare; and when it makes
a grant of any such franchises they do not lose their public
character, but are yet to be exercised in advancing the
public welfare; this is an essentia~ though implied, condition of the grant; if not performed the state can resume
the grant as for a condi tion broken. The right to be and
act as a corporation, mainly based upon historical
reasons, is considered, and wisely so, as a right or privilege of public concern. TIP.s is true even though. the business to be done is of a private nature;·>such as'"""'refining
sugar or oil. The business ii! neither more nor less public
than if done by individuals in their private cai}acity, but
the privilege consists in bringing into existence and using
in the business the valuable, efficient, impersonal, and in
many ways less responsible agency, known as the corporation; this is the matter of public concern, which is
the essence of the corporate franchise.
(9)

Cnllfornla v. Oentral Pacific Ry. Oo., 12'T U. S. 1, 40.
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The corporate franchises are frequentJy said to be primary and secondary. The primary franchise is the privilege to be, to exist and act as a corporation; the secondary
franchises are such other franchises or special privileges,
such as the right to take property by eminent domain,
as may be conferred upon the corporation, just as they
might be conferred upon naturaJ persons.
§ 6.

History of these ideas. The corporate personality.
Hearn and Coulanges trace the idea of corporate personality to the ancient family group, which was a permanent body, enduring forever, with rights and duties distinct from those of its individual members, who included
both the living and dead, and whose representative and
managing director was the house father. In the earliest
stages of human development, the existence of tribes,
village communities, families, clans, and nations was
recognized in such a way as to imply they were collective
entities with corporate rights and duties. In the ancient
Babylonian and Egyptian law, the Temple was personified (10). Long before Justinian, the rule of the Digest,
"All the members are considered as a single unit or
being," had thoroughly penetrated the fabric. of Roman
law. Churches and boroughs and guilds, even in Anglo.
Saxon times, were personified as owners of lande, franchises, and privileges, in a way different from the ownership of the individual persons who were members of the
same. Braeton (about 1260), likened a corporation to a
flock of sheep, which remains the same flock although
(10) Johns, Babylonian Laws,
I, 173, 376.

~8;

Simcox, Primitive Civilizations,
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particular sheep successively depart. By 1311 a borough
is called a "corps," a body. In 1349 the courts said, "the
corporation is invisible, incorporeal, and cannot be arrested or assaulted;" and in 1461 said, "a corporation
aggregate of several is invisible, immortal, and rests only
in intendment and consideration of law"-words frequently repeated ever since. By the reign of Edward IV
(1461-83) the term "corporacion" bad come into general
use. In the register of names of persons recognized by
the private law of Rome, the names of corporations were
entered in precisely the same way as those of natural
persons. So too, Lord Coke, followed by Lord Hale, and
by Blackstone, says: "Persons are of two sorts-natural,
created by God, and persons incorporate, created by the
policy of man."
Ao the family grew into the clan, the clan into the tribe,
and the tribe into the city, nation, or state, the corporate
idea of the family seems to have been applied to the state,
particularly in its external and public relations, and every
sovereign and independent government or society claimed
for itsel_f the attributes of perpetuity and personality.
Such an idea early took shape in the Roman law, and, by
the end of the Samnite wars (B. C. 282), Rome bad become a government of a city over cities throughout Italy.
For a long time the property of the city was treated as a
public matter, standing outside the domain of private law
and commerce; but, during the Empire, it was brought
within the range of private law, and the cities began to
be treated as persons capable of having private as well as
public rights and duties. Societies created by the con-

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

90

ventions of individuals, but without proprietary capacity,
had long existed; these were quick to solicit and secure
from the state, as lawful societies (collegia licita), proprietary capacity after the example of the cities; and in
this way "Roman law contrived to accomplish a veritable
masterpiece of juristic ingenJJity in discovering the notion
of a co1lective person, distinguishing from its members
the collective whole as the ideal unity of the members
bound together by the corporate constitution, in raising
the whole to the rank of a person (a juristic person), and
in securing it a place in private law as an independent
subject of proprietary capacity, standing on the same
footing as other private persons" (11). Yet it took nearly
a thousand years after the time of Justinian for these
same ideas to be appropriated or worked out again by
the English law.
§ 7.

Same: The corporate franchise. The legal ideas
involved here are traceable to the doctrines of both the
Roman and the feudal law. From the Roman law comes
the doctrine that a corporate franchise is a privilege of a
public nature conferred by the state; from the feudal law
comes the view that this privilege is not merely a personal
privilege or liberty, such as the right to move about, but
a privilege in the nature of a property right. We have
just seen bow the idea of a corporate personality was
traced to the public law of Rome-to sustain a juristic
personality was originally exclusively the privilege of
public corporations and institutions. In the Roman law
(11)

Cb.IL

Sobm•s Institute& ot Roman Law, Ledlle's Translation (2d ed.)
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"a corporation was an organized body of persons governing themselves." The Romans were jealous of combinations of individuals for any such purpose. The law recognized no general freedom of association'; a lawful selfgoverning society could not be the creation of individuals;
many laws were passed from the time of the Twelve
Tables ( 450 B. C.) down to the Empire against illicit companies. Only such societies were ]awful as owed their existence to a special public law. Being constituted by
public law, they became thereby institutions of the state,
partook of its nature, and acquired thereby a corporate
personality and proprietary capacity. Julius Caesar and
Augustus both dissolved ma~ corporations that had become nurseries of faction and disorder ( 12). Based therefore upon political instinct as well as upon legal theories,
it became a maxim of the Roman law that to usurp the
franchise of being a corporation without due authority
was unlawful.
Similar ideas early obtained in the English law. In
Saxon and early Nonnan times the nobles exercised the
power of conferring corporate privileges within their
demesnes. Yet, in the time of Henry II (1154-1189), 18
guilds were fined for being set up without lawful au.
thority. In the time of Bracton (c. 1260) the right to
grant franchises and liberties was considered the exclusive
prerogative of the king. In 1349 it was held that the right
to sue and be sued as a person could be conferred on a
guild only by the king, and the absolute necessity of the
king's assent to the institution of any corporation was
(12)

2 Kent Ciomm. 268.

Tol. Vlll-8

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

92

held in 1376 to have been previously settled as clear law,
or, as elsewhere stated, by the fourteenth century "the
foundation is being laid for a rule which will require
a royal license when a new corporation is to be
formed" (13). The king, because of political expediency
and for financial reasons, had begun to interfere with the
creation of voluntary associations and guilds, for they
had given trouble in France and might do so in England.
"Besides, men will pay for leave to form clubs," and
the medieval guild was not content with the purely private
status of a club, but aspired "to exercise some jurisdiction and coercive power over its members and perhaps over outsiders." In the time of Henry I (11001135 ), the weavers of London, and in the time of Henry
II (1154-1189), the weavers of York, Lincoln, Huntingdon, and Oxford; the fullers of Winchester; the men of
Marlborough; and the bakers of London, all pay for the
privilege of having their guild.
By the time of Edward I (1272-1307), English boroughs
had acquired five characteristics- " the right of perpetual
succession, the power to sue and be sued as a whole and
by the corporate name, the power to hold lands, the right
to use a common seal, and the power of making bylaws" ( 14); but the theory of their personality was not
yet entirely worked ont. And, when they first appear
as ideal persons, they still appear not in the character
of mere private persons, but rather as governmental
officers. "Their lands, their goods are few, what they
(13)
(14)

Po11ock and Mattland, Hist. Eng. J,aw (2d ed. ), 600.
Maitland, Const. Hist., 54.
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own is jurisdiction, governmental powers, and fiscal immunities;" in other words they were "the owners of
fran chises." Thi~ is so also with the mercl1ants' guilds;
they seemed to be voluntary associations of traders on
one hand, and organs of municipal government on the
other; they had no property engaged in trade, but their
''property consisted not of lands and goods but of franchises, jurisdictional powers, and fiscal immunities." All
such franchises or liberties (as they were called in the
Great Charter, c. 29) "covered feudal rights and incidents of too intangible a nature to be appropriately described as 'holdings,'" and were treated by the medieval
Jaw as private property (15). And so, in this capacity of
private ownership of franchises, "we may well suppose
that the juristic person made its appearance at a comparatively early time in the guild hall of the brethren.''
By the time of Edward IV (1461-83), it was considered
that in the grant of all franchises there is" a tacit condition annexed to them that an abuse forfeits them." In
the argument of the great quo warra.nto case against
the city of London in 1692, it was said: "A corporation
is an artificial body, the ligaments of which body are the
franchis es which bind and unite all its members together;
and the whole essence and frame of the corporation consist therein," or, as expressed by Comyn (c. 1745), followed by Blackstone (1765), "a corporation is a franchise created by the king." This theory was made the
(15) McKecbnle, Magna Carta, 445. Holdsworth, Hist. of Eng. Law,
Vol. 1, 63.
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basis of Mr. Justice Washington's opinion in the Dartmouth College case in 1819 (16).
§ 8. BisU>ry of corporations: In Europe. As already
seen, both public and private or trading corporations existed under the Roman law; under the convenient cloak
of the latter, patricians were enabled to engage in remunerative trade and business, from which they were
otherwise excluded by public sentiment. After the fall
of Rome, most of the commercial corporations disappeared, and only those connected with the church survived. A little later, guilds of workmen and traders
began to be formed, which gradually took on the corporate form, growing in strength and power until "in
merchant guild, and church guild, and craft guild lay
the life of Englishmen who were doing more than knight
or baron'' to preserve 01· bring safely across ages of
tyranny or win back the right of self government, free
speech, and equal justice at the hands of one's equals.
Lord Coke claimed to have seen ''a charter made by
Henry I (1100-1135) by which he granted them gildam
mercatornm, and a confirmation by Henry II (1154-1189)
by which charters they were incorporated." The Brotherhood of St. Thomas a Becket was authorized in Burgundy
before 1250, and a century later transferred to England,
confirmed by Edward III and Henry VII who changed
its name to the Merchant Adventurers of London, under
whose monopoly, in the time of Elizabeth, it had gathered
five-sixths of the foreign trade of England into the port
of London and into the hands of two hundred share·
(16)

4 Wheat.

~18,

607.
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holders. Other guilds and brotherhoods were formed
early also; the "Weavers Company" goes back to Henry
II, if not to Henry I; the Goldsmiths date from 1327;
Mercers, 1373; Haberdashers, 1407; Fishmongers, 1433;
Vintners, 1437; Merchant Tailors, 1466.
The Italian states were engaged in extensive commerce
in the time of Charlemagne, and about 1150 organized
a Chamber of Loans which grew into the Bank of Venice
by 1171, and became the model of later institutions and
of the custom of paying by cheques. The Company of St.
George- the Bank of Genoa-dating about 1402, consolidated the public loan into one capital stock to be managed
by eight directors annually elected by the stockholders
and creditors. The discovery of America made the world
larger and soon led to the formation of great companies
for exploring and exploiting it. The Russian company
dates from 1566; the Eastland, 1579; the Turkey, 1581;
the famous East India Company dates from 1600; the
Plymouth Company, known as the Merchant Adventurers,
that colonized N~w England, was chartered in 1606, with
a capital stock of £7000, and the Hudson Bay Company,
still operating in the Canadian northwest, in 1670. When
the East India Company was formed, each member traded
on his individual stock, taking such shares in each voyage
as he chose, according to the rule laid down by the company, but in 1612 the stock was converted into a joint
stock- the aggregate subscriptions of the members-to
be managed by the governor and directors. The Bank ot
England was incorporated in 1694.
§ 9. Same: In America. During colonial days it is

96
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said there were but six business corporations of American
origin: the New York Company "for settling a fishery in
these parts," chartered in 1675 by Governor Andros,
under his patent of 1664, with a capital stock divided into
shares of £10 each; the Free Society of Traders in Pennsylvania chartered in 1682 by vVilliam Penn, with a capital stock of £5400, subscribers for fifty pounds to have
one vote, one hundred pounds two votes, three hundred
pounds or over three votes ; the New London Society for
Trade and Commerce, dating from 1732; the Union Wharf
Company in New Haven, 1760; the Philadelphia Contributership for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire, 1768;
and the Proprietors of the Boston Pier, 1772. Before
the formation of the United States Constitution there
seems to have been only 21 business corporations formed
in the United States. The Constitution put commerce
and vested rights on a solid footing, and, before 1800,
200 more corporate charters bad been granted. Before
1830, the improvident increase of corporations was looked
upon as an evil. In 1822 President Monroe vetoed extensive projects of national internal improvements; the
states took up the matter and disastrously failed; then
the era of private corporations began about 1840 under
liberal general incorporation laws. Prior to 1870 there
were few corporate combinations. Railroad consolidation
began about 1869, and before 1870 scarcely any system
was over 1000 miles; by 1890, 5000 mile systems existed; by 1900, 10,000 mile systems, and now Mr. Harriman dies in oontrol of 70,000 miles of railroad-one-third
of all in the country. Before 1870 industrial oombina-
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tions were small, two trusts having been formed with
capital of $13,000,000; but by 1904 it was stated 445
trusts existed, formed out of 8664 original companies,
with a capitalization of over $20,000,000,000-tbe United
States Steel Corporation alone having $1,100,000,000 in
stock and nearly $400,000,000 in bonds.
SECTION

2.

THE CORPORATION AB A PERSON.

When a. corporation is considered as a person.
Rights and duties. For most purposes it is so considered,
and especially: (1) As having rights of property and
reputation protected at common law, and under constitutional provisions, very much as natural persons. (2) As
having duties, arising both from its charter provisions
and fixed upon it by the common law. Illustrations:
Where the state grants to a university corporation all
the property that hereafter escbeats to the state, it cannot repeal the law so as to divest the university of its
title to all property that bas escbeated to the state before
the repealing law takes effect. To do so would violate the
provision of the Bill of Rights, taken from Magna Cbarta,
that "no freeman shall be disseized of bis freehold, or
bis liberty, but by the law of the land" (17). D falsely,
orally, and publicly accused C, a coal company, during
the coal famine of 1902-3, of charging exborbitant prices
for coal and refusing to sen at all to those who were sick
and suffering. No special damage was alleged. Such a
charge violates the company's right to its business reputation, and is actionable slander without showing special
§ 10.

(17)

Trustees of University v. Foy, 1 Murphy (N. U) !SS.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

98

dalll8ge (18). Where the state constitution provides that
individuals shall be taxed on their property, after deducting the amount of unpaid mortgages upon it, but also
provides for taxing the property of railroad companies
without such reduction, such provision violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution that "no
state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws" (19). Where a railroad
is authorized to build a bridge across a navigable river,
the state may compel it by mandamus to construct it ao
as not to obstruct navigation and to remove such obstruc.
tions as have been erected. Where a canal company is
bound by its charter to construct its canal deep enough
to accommodate rafts of a specified size, and negligently
fails to keep its canals in proper condition therefor, the
company is liable in damages to one whose raft of the
proper size is grounded and later destroyed by a stormthe charter having placed this duty on the company for
the benefit of persons wishing to use the canal, upon payment of the proper toll (20).
Sa.me: Statutory construction. (3) Statutes,
conferring rights or placing obligations upon persons,
generally include corporations, though not specially
named. Corporations, however, are not citizens entitled
to all the privileges of citizens of the several states under
the United States Constitution; but they are citizens
within the clause giving the United States jurisdiction in
§ 11.

(18)
(19)
(20)

GrOBS Coal Co. v. Rose, 126 Wis. 24.
The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. ll. 722.
Riddle v. Proprietors, 7 Maas. 169.
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suits between citizens of different states. For example,
where a judge was required to order an election to determine whether a court house should be removed, "upon
applications of persons paying one-third of the taxes on
real property in the county;'' one-third of the taxes were
$3333; of this individual owners paid $1300 and corporate
owners the balance; it was held the judge was justified.
in ordering the election, as corporations were persons
within the meaning of the law (21). So statutes allowing persons to appea~ or take notes, or their property to
be attached or taxed, or forbidding persons from banking
or taking usury, apply to corporations. So a corporation
is a living person within the meaning of the statute allowing the party to testify when the adverse party is a living
per.son. On the other hand, where the statute defines
homicide as the killing of one human being by another,
and manslaughter in the second degree as a killing due
to the culpable negligence of any person, etc., a corporation cannot be indicted for manslaughter, since' another'
means another human being (22). And where the statute
says "any number of persons may incorporate," persons
here does not include corporations, for it is contrary to
the policy of the law to allow one corporation to be formed
from others. So too the constitutional provision that
''no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself," does not protect a corporation from the production of its books before the grand
jury on the charge against a corporation for violating the
(21)
(22)

Craft'ord v. Supervisors, 87 Va. 110.
People v. Rochester Ry. Co., 190 N. Y. 102.
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anti-trust act (23). Neither is a corporation of one state
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the several states, and so another state may exclude
it from doing business altogether within that state ( unless the business is interstate commerce), or make various
discriminations against it, such as charging a higher license fee than is charged to its own corporations, or allowing a preference to domestic corporations. But if C company is incorporated in state A, with X, Y, and Z, as
members, all living in state B, C can sue X, or Y, or Z, or
be sued by them in the Federal courts, which have jurisdiction of suits when the parties are citizens of different
states; for the corporation is presumed to be a citizen
of the state where it is incorporated, without regard to
the citizenship of its members.

Same: Ownership of property. ( 4) In the ownership of its property, a corporation is considered as a
person, it O'wns its property, and its members do not own
its property. If the property is to be conveyed or recovered, it must be done in the corporate name, and not
in that of the members. Suits must be brought by and
against it in the corporate name. For example: Where
the statute provided that ''no vessel should be registered
which shall not wholly belong to her Majesty's subjects,''
a vessel owned by an English corporation is entitled to
registry, although a large part or all of its members were
J.i,rencbmen (24). So where A conveyed land to B and
covenanted that be would not convey any of his remain§ 12.

(23)
(24)

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43.
Queen v. i\.rnaud, 25 L. J. R. 00.
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ing land to any person of color, he did not violate this
covenant by conveying his land to a corporation composed entirely of colored persons (25). P, having acquired all the stock of C company, brought a suit to replevy from D property formerly belonging to C. Held,
P could not maintain such a suit, for the property belonged to a corporation and not to the sole shareholder (26).
SECTION

3.

THE CORPORATION AS A COLLECTION OJ'
INDIVIDUALS.

§ 13. When a corporation is considered as a oollection

of persons: (1) In the management, the majority controls.
(2) When justice requires, the corporate personality
will be ignored, and the rights and duties of the members
composing it be considered. This appears usually:
(a) In matters relating to changing the constitution.
(b) In determining the rights of members among themselves in equity. ( c) When corporate sins result from
the concerted but apparently individual acts of members.
(d) When the corporate organization is used as a cloak
to aid in the commission of fraud. As an old case says,
"where an act is to be done by a corporation all of the
members ought to be assembled together to consent, but
this cannot be separately and apart by them at several
times." Again where C sued D on a note given for a
subscription to stock in C company, which was organized
to engage in life insurance, and later the company's
charter was amended, authorizing it to engage in fire in(2ts)

(26)

People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 61 S. E. 794 (Va.).
Button v. Hotl'man, 61 Wis. 20.
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surance also, to which D did not consent, D was held not
liable (27), for this is an organic change that requires
unanimous consent, unless otherwise provided in forming the corporation. Where the corporation, through its
directors, after a shareholder makes a proper demand,
refuses to resist the payment of a tax levied against it
under an invalid law, a shareholder may sue in equity to
enjoin payment, for such payment is a breach of trust
toward the individual shareholder. So too, where A and
B, doing business as a partnership, which is in debt, transfer all their partnership property to a corporation, the
shares of which they cause to be issued to their wives
without payment, and without making any provision to
pay the debt, the court will ign:0re the corporate existence
so far as may be necessary to have the property applied
to pay the debts of the partnershjp. And again, where
all the members of several corporations together agree
to transfer their shares to trustees, who are to issue trust
certificates in return to the shareholders, for the purpose
of vesting the management of all the corporations in the
same bands in order to prevent competition among the
corporations, the court will treat the acts of the shareholders as equivalent to formal acts of the corporations
themselves, and will dissolve the combining corporations
for becoming members of the trust. So too, when one
corporation is organized by the officers and stockholders
of another corporation, making their int~rests identical,
the court may treat them as identical, if justice so requires; and generally the notion of the legal entity will
(27)

Aehton v. Burbank, 2 Dillon (U. S.) 435.
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not be permitted "to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime" (28).
SECTION

§ 14.

4. THE

CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

When a corporation is considered as a franchise.

It is considered as a primary franchise mainly in its relation to the state, and particularly: (1) In the methods
by which the state retains control over it-by the writs of
scire facias or quo warranto. (2) In its incapacity to
alienate its franchise, without the consent of the state.
These two are based on the doctrine that the franchise to
be a corporation is granted upon the implied condition
that the grantees will faithfully carry out the purposes for
which it was formed. (3) In the power of the state to
tax corporations, the franchise may be considered property. ( 4) In the state's incapacity to change the charter
without the consent of the members. (5) In the limit on
the power of the majority to change the constitution of
the corporation without the consent of all the members.
These last three are based on the doctrine that a franchise, once granted and accepted, is a vested estate or interest in the members, of which they cannot be deprived
without their consent.
From the earliest times, as Lord Holt said, ''a corporation may be forfeited, if the trust be broken, and the
end for which it is instituted be perverted;" the state
does this by a direct proceeding in court to call the corporation to account for "misuser, abuser or non-user."
It was very early ruled that "royal franchises never pass
(28) United States v. Milwaukee Retrlg. Co., 142 Fed. R. 247; In re
Rieger, etc., 157 Fed. R. 009.
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by assignment, without special words in the king's grant,''
and that A could not inherit a right t-0 hold a market
from his father, to whom King John had granted the
right, unless the grant itself so provided. Such a rule
still obtains as to primary franchises, and often as to
others also. Where C company made an assignment of
all its property and effects of every kind to A for the
benefit of its creditors, A petitioned to be allowed to sell
the "franchise to be a corporation," as part of the property assigned, but the court ruled that this primary franchise really belonged to the members and could not be
assigned unless expressly provided in the grant (29).
So the franchise-the right to be a corporation-may be
taxed by the state, as where the constitution provided for
taxing all property at its actual value, including
"moneys, credits, stocks, franchises, and all other things
capable of private ownership "-the right to be a corporate bank is a franchise, and is capable of private
ownership, and may be taxed to the corporation itself,
upon a valuation equal to the difference betwe.e n the
assessed va.lue of its tangible property and the market
value of its outstanding shares (30). While the franchise is intangible, the ownership of it is a vested interest
in the corporation and the shareholders, analogous to the
ownership of interests in land under the same grantneitber the grantor, nor the grantees can change it without the consent of all.
(29)
(30)

Fietsam v. Hay, 122 I11. 293.
Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276.
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CORPORATIONS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS.

Corporation and pa.rtnership. These differ: ( 1)
In origin: the i~a of corporations is traceable to the
§ 15.

public law of Rome, as above pointed out, while the partnership notion is traceable to the customs of merchants
in England and on the Continent and back to Roman
traders. (2) In creation: corporations can be created
only by express authority of the state; partnerships, by
mere contract of parties. (3) In franchise: a corporation
has at least <>ne franchise, a partnership none. ( 4) In
management: a corporation is managed only through its
duly appointed officers and agents; in partnerships, each
partner or member can act for the partnership. (5) In
powers: the corporation can lawfully exercise no powers
except those expressly conferred or necessarily implied
from those granted; these cannot be enlarged except by
the state's consent; the members of a partnership may
do anything lawful that they agree to. (6) In duration:
the corporation is perpetual unless expressly limited;
the death, resignation, or insolvency of members does
not dissolve; but either of these dissolves a partnership.
(7) In ownership of property: the title to the corporate
property is in the corporation; that of the partnership in
the members of the partnership-they are all considered
part owners. (8) In litigation: a corporation sues or is
sued in its corporate name; the partnership, in the names
of its members. (9) In transfer of interest: the transfer
of his interest by a member has no effect on corporate
existence; but a transfer of interest dissolves a partnership. (10) In liability of members: in absence of
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statute, a member of a corporation is not liable beyond
the amount to be paid for bis shares; but in partnership,
there is an individual liability to the extent of its debts.
(11) In dissolution: a corporation can be rightly dissolved only by or with the consent of the state; partners
may dissolve a partnership at any time. (12) In theory
of existence: a corporation is a legal entity; a partnership is not so considered in English law, except in a few
cases, though business men treat it so.
From the foregoing it will be seen that there are many
advantages in the corporate organization: continuous
succession, indefinite duration, limited liability, unlimited
division of transferable shares of capital that can be used
as collateral security, with a uniform and uninterrupted
management, if found efficient, which readily secures large
capital from numerous contributors. On the other hand,
however, there may be less opportunity to scrutinize
carefully the management, than in the case of a partnership; the chances of double taxation are greater; the
corporation can be excluded from doing business where
partners may claim the right to engage in such business
as citize·ns; and the corporate powers are limited by the
charter, which can be changed only by consent of the state.
§ 16.

Corporations and joint stock companies. A joint

stock company is sometimes said to be a "partnership,
with many of the powers of a corporation.'' It is an
evolution of partnership law; some of the incidents of
partnership, such as non transferability of shares, or
authority of a partner to bind all the others, is excluded
by the contract or statute under which it is formed. While
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it can be formed, as between the members themselves or

the members and those who deal with it with full knowledge, merely by contract, such formation without express
authority does not exclude the partnership liability to
those who have no knowledge of the facts. All presumptions are in favor of the partnership liability, and it can
be excluded only by express statutory provision or actual
knowledge of the party. They are usually authorized by
statute, with transferable shares, and managed by a
board of di rectors.
The presumptions of corporation law are exactly the
reverse- there is no individual liability here un!ess expressly created by statute. For example: A, the owner
of a patent, executed an instrument of trust declaring
himself trustee for various persons to be known as the
McKay :Machine Association, which should exist for thirty
years, with 50,000 shares to be distributed among the
members in proportion to their interest, evidenced by
certificates transferable on the books of the trustee; such
transfer or the death of the owner was not to dissolve the
association; no member was to have any authority to
contract for the association, but all the business was to
be carried on by an executive committee, chosen by the
shareholders; profits were to be divided by this committee
from time to time, and paid to shareholders in proportion
to their interests. There was no statute expressly providing for the formation of such an association. A, as
trustee, was taxed upon all the tangible real and personal property of the association, and the state sought
to ·t ax the association on the aggregate value of the
vo1. vm-e
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shares, less the assessed value of the real and personal
property, as corporations were taxed upon their franchises. Held, it could not be so taxed, as it had no franchi8e, and was only a partnership formed under the
common law (31). So too, where a statute authorized the
formation of a "partnership association," with transferable shares, managed by a board of managers, with
power to take and hold property, sue and be sued in its
association name, and use a seal, and such an association
was formed in Pennsylvania and did business in Massachusetts it could not be sued in its association name in
Massachusetts, as a corporation could. It must be sued
as a partnership, in the names of its members (32 ).
§ 17.

Corporation and fraternity or stock exchange.
An unincorporated society resembles a partnership more
nearly than a corporation; it is not a legal entity, and
hence those who claim to be agents of such an institution
bind only themselves and those who aut!iorize them to
act. The members are not authorized to act for one another as in partnerships.
§ 18. Corporations and cost-book mining companies.
By custom of miners, there has grown up an unincorporated association that is quite like a joint stock company, in which the shares are transferable without affecting the continued existence of the association; only those
especially appointed have authority to bind others. Otherwise partnership rules apply.
§ 19. Syndica.tes. These are in fact temporary pa.rt~
(31)
(32)

Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mnss. 419.
Edwards v. Warren Llnoline, etc. Works, 168 Mass. 564.
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nerships organized for a particular transaction, such as
to purchase or subscribe for a large amount of stock in
a corporation to ha formed, so as to insure the completion of the proposed scheme. .As soon as the special
transaction is completed, the syndicate is terminated.
They are substantially partnerships (33).
§ 20.

Corporations and state institutions. There are
in many states, state universities, asylums, penitentiaries,
etc., managed by boards created by law, and appointed
by the governor or elected by electors. These are frequently called corporations of a public kind; while in other
states they are not so considered, although they have
some corporate powers. They are, in such states, called
state institutions, and are subject to modification at the
state's will without violation of the constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts ( 34).
SECTION

6.

TESTS OF CoBPORATE EXISTENCE.

§ 21.

Tests of corporate existence. Many times it is
difficult to tell whether a particular institution is a corporation or not. The following tests have been suggested:
(1) The merger of the individuals composing the corporate body int-0 one distinct artificial individual existenc.e. (2) The legislative intent-if this can be clearly
ascertained it will be contro11ing in the creating state but
not necessarily elsewhere. (3) The powers conferredas to have perpetual succession under a special name,
and in an artificial form; to take and grant property;
(33)
(84)

5 National Corp. Rep. 455; 8 Q. J. Econ. 98.
TboDlll8 v. Board ot Trustees, 198 U. S. 207.
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contract, sue, and be sued in this name; and to receive
other grants and privileges. (4) In foreign jurisdictions, the powers conferred, rather than the legislative
declaration will control. For example: The constitution
of state A provided that the assent of two-thirds of the
members of each branch of the legislature should be
requisite to every bill creating any body politic or corporate. A statute provided that any number of persons
may associate to establish a banking business, upon filing
a certificate giving name, place, amount of stock, number
of shares, names of shareholders, and duration of association. Such persons were authorized to do a banking
business, exercise such powers as were incidental thereto,
choose a president and other officers; president and
cashier were to sign contracts, notes, etc. Suits were to
be brought by or against the association in the name of
the president, but not to abate by his death; conveyances
were to be made to or by the president; shares were to be
personal property, transferable on the books of the association, the vendee acquiring all the rights and liabilities
of the vendor, and no shareholder was to be personally
liable for the debts of the association. The act did not
receive a two-thirds vote. A bank was organized, and P,
as president sued D to recover on demands due the bank.
vVhile it was held in the lower court that the powers conferred by the foregoing statute were sufficient to make
the banking institutions corporations, and hence invalid
under the constitution, this view was reversed in the
higher court, and these institutions were held not to be
corporations within the meaning of the constitutional
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provision, since there was not a complete merger of the
members into the artificial being, inasmuch as it could not
sue or be sued or bold lands in its association name ( 35 ).
Again the statute provided for taxing "all moneyed or
stock corporations" on their capital stock. The National
Express Company was organized as a joint stock company in 1853, under a law of 1849, and materially differed from a corporation; afterward by various enactments such powers were conferred upon such express
companies as to make them appear to be corporations,
yet in all these acts they were still designated joint stock
companies, instead of corporations. It was held that
the legislature did not intend to make them into corporations and so they could not be taxed as such. So too,
while an insurance company organized in England, as a
joint stock company, under a law expressly providing
that it was not a corporation, could be treated as a corporation in Massachusetts for purposes of taxation, or a
New York express company, organized as a joint stock
company under the laws above referred to, could be sued
in New Jersey as a corporation, yet such an association
would not be considered as a citizen of the state in which
it was organized, so as to give the Federal courts jurisdiction, because of diversity of citizenship, when it was
sued by a citizen of another state (36).
SECTION

7.

CLASSES OF CORPORATIONS.

§ 22.

Classes of corporations. The basis of classification may be: (1) As to number of members: Aggre(85)
(36)

Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 103.
Great Southern Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449.
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gate and sole. An aggregate corporation is one in which
there is capacity to have more than one member at a time.
In a sole corporation, there is capacity to have only one
member at a time. (2) As to purpose: They are ecclesiastical (or religious), and lay; wbicb latter are
eleemosynary and civil. An ecclesiastical corporation
was one composed of spiritual persons clothed with a
spiritual jurisdiction and subject to control by the church
authorities. They do not exist in this country, for the
state cannot confer ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as it bas
none. Religious corporations are, with us, corporations
of a civil kind, formed to manage the temporalities of a
church. All other than ecclesiastical were lay corporations, organized for various secular purposes ; they were
divided into eleemosynary, formed to distribute the alms
or bounty of their founder; and civil, which were for any
other lay purpose. (3) As to completeness of corporate
existence: Corporations are said to be pure and perfect,
those that have all the powers of self management incident to corporations at common law; and quasi or imperfect, having only part of the powers incident to corporations at common Jaw. A municipal corporation is an
illustration of the first, and a county or township, of the
latter. ( 4) As to their relation to the state: Corporations are (a) public, formed for a governmental purpos-e;
as a municipal corporation; (b) quasi-public, one that is
really a private corporation, but charged with the perf ormance of some specially public function, like a railroad company; ( c) private, those formed for the private
benefit of the members themselves, as a manufacturing
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company. ( 5) As to method of acquiring membership:
Corporations are non-stock, in which membership is acquired by election or complying with the corporate constitution or by-laws; and stock-corporations, wherein
~mbersbip is acquired by the complete ownership of
shares. ( 6) As to validity of corporate existence: Corporations are: (a) de jure, one whose right to exercise corporate powers is invulnerable, if assailed by the state in
quo warranto proceedings; (b) de facto, one whose e~
istence is ordinarily invulnerable against any one but the
state, in a direct quo warranto proceeding; ( c) by estoppel,
one which has no legal existence except as against someone who is estopped from raising the question.
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CHAPTER II.
OBEATION Ol' OOBPOBATIONS.

§ 23.

In general. A corporation is created through the
joint act of the state and individuals, usually designated
incorporators or promoters; these apply to the state for
the privilege of becoming incorporated themselves, or of
creating a corporation out of other individuals, or a group
or association of other individuals or corporations. After
permission is given, these promoters organize or provide
for the organization of the corporation; their functions
then cease ; the members or subscribers contribute the
capital, elect directors and officers, and take general control of corporate affairs; the directors and officers then
start and keep in ooeration the ordinary powers of the
corporation (1).
SECTION

§ 24.

1.

THE STATE'S FUNCTIONS.

State's power to create. The power to create a

corporation is an incident of sovereignty, and so does not
have to be conferred by constitutional provision (2). So,
too, the sovereign's consent is essential- no other power
can rightfully create a corporation. None but the sovereign can create, and none but the sovereign that creates
can take away the franchise to be a corporation.
(1)
(2)

1 Cook. Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.) , § 2.
McCulloch v. Maryland. 4 Wheat. 316.

CREATION

115

§ 25.

Evidences of the sovereign's consent. These are
mainly four: (1) By king's charter; (2) by common
law; (3) by prescription; and ( 4) by legislative act. Lord
Coke long ago said the essentials of incorporation are:
1 Persons to be incorporated. 2. A name by which
they are incorporated. 3. Of a certain place. 4. By
sufficient words, and although the words ''incorporate,''
''found,'' ''erect'' or ''create'' are generally used they
are not essential; any m:>rds indicating an intention to
create are sufficient.
§ 26.

By king's charter. In England, by the common
law, this was the usual way; the power still exists in the
king, and is sometimes exercised, particularly in creating
corporations for establishing colonies. In England the
power, however, is now usually exercised through acts
of Parliament to which the king's consent is essential.
The king, however, cannot create a corporation with
power of imprisonment, give it a monopoly, or jurisdiction contrary to the common law. Private business corporations are now organized under the general law called
the Companies' Act of 1862, and amendments since; public
service companies require a special act of Parliament,
and are incorporated only after investigation and report
upon their necessity. Several corporations stilJ exist in
this country under charters granted by the king before
the American Revolution.
§ 'rl.

·e reation by common law. The state and the nation, in their organized capacity, are corporations; so,
also, the king, the bishop, or parson (in the English
church), or executive officers generally, in their official
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capacity, are considered corporations sole. They are
not incorporated, in the ordinary sense, but the common
law holds these to be corporations, so far as is necessary
to enable their functions to be performed without break,
in case of death or removal; the office or state endures
though the officers die-or, as the c<>mmon law maxim
was, ''the king never dies." For example, a school superintendent's bo.nd made to the "governor of the state,"
can be enforced by any governor, when default occurs,
though not the governor when the bond was made, and
though there is no statute authorizing such a bond. It
is good at common law, and the "governor" is a corporation sole, so far as necessary to enforce it (3).
§ 28. Corporate existence by prescription. At common
law when a corporation could show that it had exercised
corporate powers for a long period of time, its right to
be a corporation could not be questioned by any one but
the state or king; the common law indulged the presumption that the proper charter had once been granted, but,
through lapse or accidents of time, had been lost; its right
to exist was then said to be by prescription. With us, in
the case of public corporations, the same presumptions
are made; though it has been said that they will not be
made in case of private corporations. There seems to be
no very good reason for such a statement, since, in the
absence of any ev.idence to the contrary, the presumption
of right doing ought to be indulged, and the statutes of
limitations relating to quo warranto, should be given
effect not only against the state, but its citizens as welL
(3)

Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 176.
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Creation by legislative act. In England, the king,

as supreme executive, was the bolder of all the franchises
of the commonwealth, and hence his consent was essential
to the creation of any corporation; with us the legislative
bodies are the <'ustodians of the state's franchises, and
hence no corporation can be created without legislative
consent. Such power inheres in our general legislative
bodies, and is exclusive and plenary as to time, place,
method, and purpose, unless limited by constitutions, or
by the nature of legislative power, or of a franchise. For
example, where a bank was created by the legislature
without express constitutional provision, it was held the
bank was validly created, since the state legislatures can
d~ all things not prohibited by their constitutions (4). So
too, Congress can create a corporation to carry out any
of the express powers conferred by the Constitution, for
such a power is incident to the legislative authority conferred upon Congress within its provinee (5).
§ 30.

Forms in which the legislative authority is exer-

cised. These are, when constitutions do not prevent: (1)
By special act; (2) by general act; (3) by implication;
(4) by consolidation. The last two are really only special
instances of one or other of the first two.
§ 31.

By special act. Until about 1840, this was the

usual method in the United States, and to a great extent
in England; the special act was usually enacted at the
suggestion or through the influence (good or bad) of
those who wished to become incorporated, and would
(4)
(ts)

Bell v. Bk. of Tenn., Peck (Tenn.) 269.
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. ts2tS.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

118

give such powers and qualities as the whim or caprice of
the promoters or the legislature dictated ; corporations
for like purposes had entirely unlike organizations and
powers; bribery and corruption were not infrequently
resorted to for the purpose of proeuring or perpetuating
charters; "the time of the legislature was unnecessarily
consumed; the integrity of the members of the legislature
was unduly exposed; or, through the ignorance or carelessness of the legislature, and the astuteness and diligence of designing and overreaching men, there were constantly coming to light clauses in these acts of the legis-lature, giving powers and granting privileges which were
unjust, inequitable, and which never would have been
done with the knowledge of the legislature.'' In this way
Aaron Burr secured a charter for a company t:o supply
the city of New York with water, with authority to use its
surplus capital ''in any way not inconsistent with the
laws and constitutions of the United States and New
York," under which the Manhattan Bank has been carrying on its banking business since 1799 (6).
§ 32. By general act. It is possible that this method
was in use at Rome; the first general law in use in England was in the time of Coke, allowing the erection of b.ospi tals; it was not extended to other corporations. After
the political views of the American and French revolutions, that all men were entitled to equal rights, became
the motive power of political life, clamor was made for
equal privileges in the formation of corporations; to meet
this doctrine and to prevent fraud and legislative jobbery
(6)

Century Magazine, May, 1899; Parton's Lite of Burr, 238.
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incident t-0 the grant of franchises by special act, general
laws were enacted for the creation of corporations, by
complying with easy and simple requirements. As early
as 1784, New York, foUowed by Pennsylvania in 1791,
made such a law as to churches; North Carolina in 1795
provided for canal companies in this way; Massachusetts
made general regulations for manufacturing corporations
in 1809; New York provided for the incorporation of such
corporations in 1811; and by 1840 nearly every state bad
such provision for one, or all, class or classes of corporations. But general acts were not sufficient to overcome
the difficulty, for the legislature could and often did create
corporations under special acts, though there was a general law under which similar corporations could be
formed. It was found necessary to limit the legislature
in some way. New York, in her constitution of 1821, provided that the "assent of two-thirds of the members
elected to each branch of the legislature shall be requisite
to every bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing
any body politic or corporate." In 1838, Florida, in her
constitution, for bade the creation of churches by special
act, and required the legislature to pass a general law
for their incorporation. In 1845, Louisiana did the same
as to all except municipal corporations. In 1846, New
York did likewise, and such provisions are now found
in most of the state constitutions.

By implication. Where rights and powers are
granted to an association of persons, and there is no mode
by w hicb such rights and powers can be enjoyed or exercised, without acting as a corporation, such an assooia§ 33.
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tion is, by implication, held to be a corporation to the extent necessary to make such rights and powers available.
For example, where the statute proYidcd that the board
of directors of a state university shall have the custody of
the property of the univP.rsity, and a11 lands shall be
taken, held, transferred, and managed by said board, and
it shall make by-laws, elect members of the faculty, and
fix their salaries, such a board is a corporation so far as is
necessary to enable it to hold lands and sue and be sued,
though the legislature had not declared it to be a corporation (7), yet not to such an extent as to prevent the legislature from modifying it, if it saw fit to do so.
§ 34. By consolidation. The legislature, by general
law (or special act, where constitutions do not forbid),
may provide for the formation of one corporation out of
two or more existing corporations. This is designated
consolidation, or amalgamation. This matter is further
considered below.
§ 35. Limits upon legislative authority. These are
such as arise: (1) From the nature of le~slative authority. Since legislatures with us are held to have delegated
authority only, it is usually said they cannot re-delegate
their discretionary powers to others, and hence cannot
delegate to any other body the general power to create
corporations; this limitation does not prevent the passing of a general law providing for the creation of corporations by complying with the terms indicated, and directing an executiYe officer to certify to the fact of compliance. A real exception, however, appears to exist, in
(7)

Dunn v. Unh"erslty or Oregon,

!)

Ore. 357.
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the power of Congress to delegate to the territorial legislatures power to create corporations. (2) From the nature of a franchise. By the common law an.individual
cannot have even a benefit thrnst upon him without his
consent, so the state cannot incorporate into a private
corporation any person who does not consent to be a member. It follows from this that there must be an acceptance of the act of incorporation by the persons to be incorporated before the act becomes operative. Perhaps
the rule is otherwise as to public corporations. (3) From
oonstitutionl:'.l provisions. These are found in the national or state constitutions, and are considered below.
Illustrations of the first two above are: Where the statute provides that, when the persons interested shall desire to form a corporation, they shall petition the court
in writing, setting forth the objects and privileges they
desire to exercise, with the name to be used, and the court
shall make an order to have the petition entered upon
t1ie record, and when this is done the petitioners shall be a
corporation with certain powers specified in the act, there
is no improper delegation of legislative power (8). Wbere
a majority of landowners petitioned to be incorporated
with power to lay out and improve a street, and levy the
cost upon the adjoining ]ands, it was held that a party
who had not consented to become a member could not be
made such, and have his land sold for refusing to pay his
assessment. The legislature has no ''power over a person to make him a member of a corporation, and subject
(8)

State v. Dawson, 16 Ind. 40.
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him to taxation, nolens vol ens, for the promotion of a
private enterprise" (9).
§ 36. Powers of Congress. The national Constitution
neither expressly authorizes nor forbids the formation of
corporations; but ever since Secretary Hamilton's report
upon the national bank, and the decision of McCulloch
v. Maryland (10), it is clear that Congress has the incidental power to create any corporation that it deems necessary or convenient in carrying out any of its great substantive powers; it can create a bank, railroad, bridge,
turnpike, telegraph, and such like corporations, to be
located and operated in any of the states either with or
without the state's consent, so far as necessary to provide for interstate commerce (11); it has also exercised
the power to create a corporation for building a canal
across the Isthmus of Panama; and n'Ow owns and operates a railroad across the Isthmus. Such corporations
are not entirely foreign in any state, may exercise the
power of emnnent domain within the state if so authorized
for a public purpose, are exempt from state taxation or
control if such would impair their efficiency as an instrument of the national government, and have the right to
sue and be sued in the Federal courts unless otherwise
provided. It is doubtful if the national government can
create a corporation to engage generally in manufacturing, mining, or agriculture, within the states, without
their consent (12). Within the territories, or in the Dis(9) Ellls v. Marshan, 2 Mass. 269.
(10) 4 Wbea t. 316.
(11) Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525.
(12) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 1904, p. 732 ff.; 3 Mich. L. R. 264 (Feb,.

1906).
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trict of Columbia, Congress bas unlimited power to create
corporations.
§ 37. National restrictions on state legislatures. There
are no express limitations, but there is the implied limitation that no state can create corporations for such purposes and confer upon them such powers as would prevent, the exercise of such exclusive or concurrent power
as Congress bas over the same subject. A·s where a state
incorporated a telegraph oompany with the exclusive
right to construct and operate its telegraph lines along a
railroad, which, by Federal legislation, was a post road,
along which any telegraph company organized under the
laws of any state, might, upon obtaining the consent of
the railroad company, construct and operate its lines; the
exclusive grant of the state must yield to the right of a
telegraph company complying with the Federal laws (13).
§ 38. Powers of territorial legislatures. The power to
create corporations inheres in such bodies, subject to control by Congress; Congress has provided that they can
be formed only under general laws, which are subject to
repeal or amendment by the territorial legislature or
Congress.
§ 39. State constitutional limitations. The most usual
constitutional limitation is that the legislature shall pass
"no special act creating corporations," or "conferring
corporate powers,'' but they ''shall providoe by general
law for the creation of corporations, and all such laws
shall be subject to amendment or repeal.'' By the weight
of authority, creating corporations, and conferring cor(lS)

Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel Co., 96 U.S. L
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porate powers, are equivalent, though some cases hold
that after the corporation is once created under general
law, other or special powers can be conferred upon it by
special act. Such provisions do not prevent the classification of corporations upon some reasonable basis, and the
enactment of provisions for the creation of these different classes with different powers and functions for each
class. A law which relates to a class of perso.ns or things
is general, while a law relating to particular persons or
things of a class is special. Other constitutional provisions sometimes require that no law shall embrace more
than one subject, and this shall be distinctly set for th in
the title; other.s require laws for the creation of corporations to receive a two-thirds or three-fourths vote of the
members of the legislature.
Where the legislature passed a general law for the incorporation of water works companies, and the next day
passed a special ac.t giving E and his associates, as soon
as they should incorporate under the general law, the right
to supply water to San Francisco, charge certain rates
therefor, and have certain rights and be subject to certain
burdens, different from those granted or imposed under
the general law, such second act violated the constitutional
provision that corporations should not be created by special act (13a). So, by special act, to authorize a particular
city to take in additional territory, "confers corporate
powers," contrary to the constitutional inhibit.ion. But
on the other han<l, a special act authorizing an existing
railroad company to purchase the railroad of another ex(13a)

San Francisco v. Spring Valley W.W. Co., 48 Cal 498.
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isting company, and, after doing so, to change its own
name, does not create a corporation contrary to a provision that corporations shall not be created by special
act (14).
SECTION

2.

THE PROMOTER'S FUNCTIONS.

§ 40.

Definition a.nd classes. A promoter is a person,
by whatever name, who sets the machinery in motion, procures the subseriptions, directs the end, looks after the organization, prepares the prospectus, and negotiates the
agreements, necessary in the formation and creation of
a corporation. For convenience we may call promoters
(1) statutory, which may be divided into (a) commissioners, under speeial acts, and (b) incorporators, under
general laws; or, (2) self-constituted.
§ 41. Commissioners. Under special acts it was usual
to designate a part or all of the applicants as commissioners to open books, receive subscriptions to stock, distribute the stock, call a meeting f<>r organization, and superintend such meeting; their fnnotions then ceased; such
functions were of a public, discretionary character; the
commissioners stood toward the corporation and subscribers as trustees. They, however, could subscribe
themselves, and exercise their discretion in making allotment of shares if there was an over-subscription ( 15 ).
§ 42. Incorporators. Under general laws, a certain
number of persons are required to sign and file articles
of incorporation; they are called incorporators or cor(14)
(15)

Wallace v. T,oomJs, 97 U. S. 146.
Walker v. Devereaux, 4 Paige Cb. (N. Y.) 229,
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porators, and are usually directed or permitted to call
for sub.scriptions to the stock, call an organization meeting of subscribers, act as inspectors of the first election,
certify who are elected, and appoint a time and place of
the first directors' meeting; their functions are about the
same as the commissioners under special acts; they may
or may not, as they choose (at least under some statutes),
subscribe for stock. Their functions cease as soon as the
organization is complete (16).
§ 43.

Self-constituted promoters. The law allows
others, besides commissioners or inc.orporators, to take
many of the steps preliminary to incorporation; anyone
who actively undertakes any necessary step is a promoter; he introduces the enterprise to desirable persons,
informs them of its nature, solicits their aid, indicates
possible profits and the capital needed, and discharges various other details. In recent years his functions have become important, especially in organizing one corporation
out of former existing corporations. The steps he usually
takes are: (1) Securing options on the stock or property
of the companies to be c.ombined; (2) financing the concern by securing the money necessary to complete the
transaction, and furnish \rorking capital; (3) organizing the new company. .A.s soon as options are obtained, a
proposition is made to some financial house to und'erwrite
the stock (i. e., agree to take it, if the public does not)
of the new corporation, to the extent sufficient to furnish
all the cash necessary for the lransact.ion, for a commission usually to be paid in stock of the new company. As
(16)

Nlckum v. Burkhardt, 30 Ore. 464.
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soon as such agreement is made, the promoter secures the
fewest possible persons necessary to incorporate with
the least possible amount of stock, but with authority to
increase the stock to the amount required. As soon as
this small amount of stock is subscribed, the corporation
is organized by the selection of the requisite officers; these
then increase the stock to the amount necessary, authorize the issue of all of it to the pr-omoter, who, in consideration therefor, agrees to have conveyances of all the property or stock of the corporations, upon which he holds options, made to the new corporation; by simultaneous
transactions, these conveyances, duly executed, are delivered to the corporation, the promoter delivers the stock
or cash to the old companies in payment, and delivers, to
the financial house, the stock which it was to receive as
commissions ; if any stock is left the promoter appropriates it as his fee for engineering the deal (17). The legal
relations of promoters to the oorporation, to shareholders, and among themselves, are discussed elsewhere.
SECTION

3.

THE

CORPORATE CHARTER.

General nature. The legal conception of a. corporation consists in the offer and acceptance of a charter
-a written or printed instrument-wherein are set forth
the terms and conditions upon which the state, by legislative act, will permit an individual or association of individuals to exercise tbe franchise or franchises granted
therein. It is both a contract-resulting from the offer
§ 44.

(17) St. Louis. F . Scott, etc. R. R. Co. v. Tiernan, 37 Kans. 606: Old
Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 316; Same v. Lewlsobn, 210
u. s. 206.
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and acceptance, and also a law enacted by the legislature,
conferring the powers indicated; it is a contract the obligation of which cannot be impaired by either party to it
without the consent of the other party (18); it is also a
law, such that every person is supposed to know Hs contents, under the maxim that'' ignorance of the law excuses
no one" (19). If general, the courts take judicial notice
of it; if special, it usually must be pleaded and proved.
In its first instance, however, the charter or articles of
association is a license of authority for the persons
named to convert themselves or other persons, or an association of others, into a corporation by organization, in
compliance with the conditions indicated. Although the
statute provides that, upon the filing of articles of incorporation, the subscribers thereto "shall thereafter be
deemed a body corporate,'' such does not in fact make a
corporation, and it is usually hBld that no company really
exists until the requisite stock has been subscribed, and
an organization is completed by naming the directors.
§ 45. Offer and acceptance. The offer may be made
either by the state to persons (as is the case in general
laws), or by persons to the state (as is usual in special
acts), and the acceptance be by the other party. Acceptance is essential, but need not be formal; it can be implied
from acts, such as organizing and acting under it; to be
valid, as against the state which makes the offer (unless
the law otherwise expressly provides), the acceptance
must be within the state making it, by all to whom the
(18) Trustees ot Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.
(19) Hoyt v. Thompson, 19 N. Y. a>7; Central Transportation Co. v.
Pullman Ol r Co., 139 U. S. 24.
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offer was made. Renewals, extensions, and amendments
must be accepted in the same way. For example, a special
act was passed in .T anuary, 1849, authorizing persons
named to form a railroad company; November 1, 1851, the
new constitution of the state provided that ''corporations
shall not be created by special act;" June 2, 1852, the
grantees met, accepted the special act, and organized.
Held, the acceptance was too late, and the corporation
was invalid (20). But when it appeared that the same
parties had applied for the charter, in the same words in
which the state passed the special act in January, 1849,
there was an offer to, and acceptance by, the state, and the
corporation was valid (21). \Vhere parties, authorized
by a law of Maine to form a corporation, met in New
Y-0rk, accepted the charter, and elected directors, who
authorized the president, chosen at the same time and
place, to execute a mortgage, suoh mortgage was void,
since the corporation had not boon lawfully formed. The
reason wus that natural persons in themselves have n<>
power to form a corporation; the charter or law alone
confers such a faculty; this law is inoperative outside of
the state enacting it; and the corporate faculty cannot,
therefore, accompany the natural persons outside of the
state, and be exercised there (22). This severely technical view is now modified by the rule that the corporation,
incorporators, and officers who participated in such acts
outside of the state are estopped to deny their validity.
(~)

(21)
(22)

State v. Dawson, 16 Ind 40.
State v. Dawson. 22 Ind. Z12.
Miller v. Ewer, 27 l\fe. 509.
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§ 46.

Wha.t makes up the charter. Under a charter
from the king, or by a special act of the legislature, the
instrument or act itself makes up the charter, and usually
sets forth in detail the name, powers, method of acquiring membership, management, etc. Under general laws
articles of incorporation or association are required to
be entered· into and filed with some public officer; the charter then consists of ( 1) the provisions of the general law,
and (2) the articles of incorporation, consistent with the
general law. Where the general corporation statute was
silent as to the power of a railroad corporation formed
under it to lease its road, a power to lease, placed in the
articles of incorporation, would not give such power, since
it w·as inconsistent with the general law, on the ground
that an enumeration of powers excludes those not
enumerated (23).
§ 47. Provisions of general law. These enumerate the
purpose or purposes for which corporations can be
formed; contain provisions or restrictions as to the number of incorporators, name, duration, amount of stock or
debt, location of offices, number and qualification of directors. and officers, liability of members, method of voting, notice of meetings, quorum, etc. Also they contain
certain provisions as to what the articles of incorporation shall contain, and how they shall be executed.
§ 48. Articles of incorporation. The general law
usually requires that those who wish to incorporate (not
less than a certain number of natural persons competent
to contract), shall enter into written articles of incorpora(28)

Oreeon R. R. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U.S. 1.
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tion, sign, and acknowledge the same (as they would a
deed), and file the same with some pttblic officer, who is to
record the same (if found to comply with the law), and
furnish a certified copy thereof under the seal of the state
to the applicants ; this copy so authenticated usually ia
made prima f acie evidence of the existence of the corporation. The general law usually requires these articles to set forth the name of the corporation, its purpose,
location, duration, amount of stock, number of shares,
officers, directors, and, in some cases, other matters. They
must conform to the general laws (inoonsistent provisions are surplusage and void), and usually cannot, even
though claimed, secure any powers except such as are expressly allowed by the general law; in New Jersey and
Delaware, however, any powers may be created by the
incorporators, if claimed in their articles of association.
and not expressly forbidden by the general law. Under
the first general incorporation law in England for the formation of hospitals, the oorporation was created by a
deed of settlement, setting forth the organization in the
· deed endowing the charity. This is not usual in this
country. Under the English Companies Acts, a memorandum of association, similar to our articles of incorporation, is to be entered into and filed with a registrar, who
issues a certificate stating the corporation has been
formed. In England, after the memorandum is executed,
the parties may adopt articles of association, which
correspond to the by-laws adopted by the members
after the articles of incorpo1:"ation are executed in the
United States.
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§ 49. Where to incorporate.

In the absence of express
statutory requirements, incorporators do not need to reside in the state in which they seek to be incorporated. So
also, under the rules of comity that obtain throughout
the United States, a corporation formed under the laws
of one state is permitted to do business in another state.
In some of the states the incorporation laws are much
more liberal than in others, and confer much more extensive powers. In fact, many states have so liberalized their
corporation laws as to be fairly open to the charge of
bidding for the fees arising from incorporation. Business men generally pref~r to incorporate where they can
secure the broadest powers, be hampered least, and be
required to give as little information to the public as
possible. It has therefore become customary to inquire
"where is the best place to incorporate for certain purposes T" The so-called liberal or desirable states, for one
reason or another, are genrally stated to be: Arizona,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New• York, Porto
Rico, South Dakota, and West Virginia.
The points to which attention and comparison are
usually directed are: Whether part or all of the incorporators or directors musit be residents of the incorporat..
ing state; whether there is a maximum or minimum limit
to the capital stock, and a limit to corporate indebtedness; what part of the stock is required to be subscribed,
or paid in, before doing business ; whether stock can be
paid for in property or services, and, if so, whether, in
the absence of actual fraud, the judgment of the directors
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as to the vame of the property taken in paymenJt of stock
is conclusive, or only prima facie sufficient, or whether
the matter is for the court or jury to determine; whether
the shares may be issued with preferences or not; whether
the shareholders' or directors' meetings must be held
within the incorporating state; whether the shareholders
are authorized to vote by proxy, or to cumulate their
votes; whether there is any statutory liability upon shareholders or directors for debts of the corporation, or for
failure to make certain reports; whether directors are
liable for paying dividends out of the capital, or whether
shareholders are liable for receiving iucb dividends, not
knowing they have been so paid out of capital; whether a
transfer of unpaid shares releases the transferror;
whether the records, minute-, account-, and stock-books
must be kept within the state, and be open to inspection
of shareholders or pnblic officers; whether annual reports
as to names of officers, directors, shareholders, and details as to paid up capital, debb, and operations are required; whether the corporate property, surpJus, and
franchise are subject to tax, and if so bow; whether shares
are taxed to the shareholders also, and whether they are
subject to an inheritance tax; what are the powers as to
consolidation, leasing and selling property, and holding
its own shares or shares in other corporations; can material amendments be made without unanimous consent;
can directors prefer themselves as creditors; are directors liable only for gross negligence, or must they exercise the reasonable care of competent business men in the
management and control of the corporate business; what
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are the organization and filing fees; are the provisions
of the law under which it is proposed to incorporate plain
and clear, and have the courts passed upon their meaning (24).
It will be readily seen that the foregoing questions and
others like them require the careful attention, comparison and advice of a competent attorney before any definite conclusion can be reached. Sometimes it is considered desirable to incorporate in a foreign rather than
the domestic state, or the reverse, so that suits may or
may not be brought or removed to the Federal courts.
SECTION

4.

THE AssocIATION AGREEMENT.

§ 50.

Its necessity and nature. Since a corporation
aggregate is composed of more than one person, the organization of which is not thrust upon any one, some association of a contractual character necessarily precedes,
accompanies, or results from, the formation of a corporation; it need not be, though it usually is, a formal or written transaction, and sometimes it is very complex and intricate. Its general nature, however, is an agreement by
each associate with bis fellows to organize for the purpose contemplated, and to contribute bis proportion of
the funds agreed, the consideration being the mutual
promises of the parties.
§ 51. Forms of association contracts. These are various, but may be classed as: (1) An exclusively statutory
contrac.t; or, (2) a common law agreement. These latter
(24) See Mechem. Modern Law ot Corporations, 2 Vols. 1008; Corporation Manual with Forms 1907-8; Frost, Incorporattoa (3d ed.) 1908;
Clepbane, Business Corporations.
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are: (a)° An agreement to subscribe for stock in the corporation to be formed; (b) an agreement subscribing for
s*ock in a corporation to be formed, or after it is formed;
( c) subscriptions to promoters, agents, or trustees; ( d)
underwriting contracts; ( e) application, allotment and
notice; (f) conditional subscriptions.
§ 52. Statutory contract. In some states where the
statutes provide that articles of incorporation shall be
filed, in which shall be stated the names of the incorporators, and the number of shares which each agrees to
take, all who wish to become members must subscribe for
the stock in the articles of incorporation, and no other
method of subscribing will be valid. This view, however, seems to be confined to a few cases in New York
and Missouri, under special statutes; the general rule in
other states is otherwise. For example, where the statute
provided that any number of persons not less than five
might incorporate by making and subscribing articles of
association, "by signing bis name and place of residence,
and the number of shares be agrees to take," and A, on
a preliminary subscription paper, "agreed to take the
number of shares written opposite our names' '-$5500but did not sign the articles of incorporation, and died
before the articles of incorporation were executed and
filed, such subscription could not be ·enforced against
the estate of A, the court saying" the statute neither contemplates nor alludes to any preliminary paper of subscription," and one can become a member in no other
mode than the one pointed out in the statute (25 ).
(25) Sedalia, W. & S. Ry.,.. Wilkerson, 83 Mo. 235. Compare:
Co. Ry. v. Crow, 119 S. W. 435 (Mo. App.).

Shel~
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§ 153. An agreement to subscribe for stock in a corpora-

tion to be formed in the future, contemplates a subscription upon the books of the company after they are properly opened; the person does not by such an agreement,
become a member, nor can the corporation enforce the
subscription. Where T signed a paper agreeing "to subscribe the sum set against our names, when the books
may be opened for subscription"-$3000-and T refused
to subscribe when the books were opened and he was
notified, T could not be held as a member and be lia bl9
for the whole amount of the stock, but only for such
damages as the corporation could sh.ow it had suffered
by T failing to subscribe as agreed (26). Some authors
claim there is no difference between an agreement to subscribe, and an agreement subscribing; i e., a present subscription, particularly when the corporation is not yet
formed (27). The courts, however, take a different
view (28).

54. Agreements subscribing for stock in a corporation
to be formed have occasioned much conflict as to their
legal effect, and at least four theories exist: (1) That
it is a mere offer, withdrawable at any time before tha
corporation is organized and accepts the offer; death or
insanity revokes it, and any one may withdraw upon giving notice to the person who took the subscription (29).
(2) That it is an offer, until acted upon in accordance
§

(20)
(27)
175.
(28)
(29)

Thrasher v. Pike Co. R. Co., 25 III. 393.
Prof. Colllns, Rules given in 1 Cook, Corporntlons (5th ed.),
Yonkers Gazette Co. v. Taylor, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 334.
Bryant's Pond Co. v. Felt, frl Me. 234.
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with the provisions, and then becomes a binding con-·
tract. (3) That it is a binding contract from the time
it is made (30). (4) That it is an offer to the proposed
corporation before its inoorporation and acceptance, but
a binding agreement between the subscribers from the
time it is made (31). The first view probably has the
weight of authority. If the subscription is made to the
stock of the corporation already formed, which accepts
the subscription, the contract is binding from the time of
acceptance. Illustrations of the foregoing views are as
follows: F signed for 20 shares on a paper reading ''we
hereby agree to pay for the number of shares set opposite
our names, etc." This was signed by several others, all
before the company was incorporated; and, before incorporation, F notified the person who had taken his subscription that he wished to withdraw, and asked that bis
name be taken off the list. Held, he could so withdraw
(note 29, above). So too, where H, along with others,
signed "we hereby subscribe for and agree to purchase
the shares set opposite our names,'' under seal, he could
withdraw before incorporation by notifying the person
who took his subscription. So, where a party signed a
sim·i lar paper, but not the articles of incorporation, and
waited until after incorporation to withdraw, it was too
late. On the other hand, where a party signed a preliminary paper of the same kind before incorporation,
and died before incorporation, his estate was held liable
on the subscription, on the theory that such an agreement
(30)
(81)

Tonica & Petersburg R R. v. l\lcNeely, 21 Ill. 71.
Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Davie, 40 Minn. 110.
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was valid between the various parties when made, and
was a continuing contract with them in their corporate
name as soon as formed (note 30, above). So also, where
D subscribed a preliminary paper, but with the•'oral agreement that the subscription should not be delivered until
other parties named had subscribed, but which was in
fact used to secure other subscriptions, he was liable, although the parties named never subscribed, and D did
not know the paper bad been so used, or delivered to and
acted upon by the corporation. Under these last two
theories withdrawal requires the unanimous consent of
the subscribers.
§ 55. Subscription to promoter or trustee. If made to
a statutory promote·r, as a commissioner or incorporator,
it is a binding contract from the time of making; if made
to a self-constituted trustee, who is to organize the corporation, deliver the subscription list to the corporation,
and deliver certificates of stock to the subscribers, it is a
binding contract between the promoter and subscribers,
in accordance with its terms, from the time it is made;
he M8 a right to enforce it, if he performs his part (3la);
and when it is delivered to the corporation and accepted
by it, the corporation can enforce it (32).
§ M. Underwriting. This is a form of subscription
entered int-0 before subscriptions are called for from
the public, whereby, for an agreed commission or protit,
the underwriters undertake to take all the shares, except
what the public subscribes for after the books are regu(31a) San Joaquin T..an<l Co. v. West, 94 Cal. 399.
(32 ) West v. C'rawtorcl, 80 Cal. 1!>.
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larly opened and subscriptions called for (33). If properly drawn it is an enforceable contract from the time
it is made.
§ 57. Application, allotment, and notice. Under the
English law an application for shares is made to the promoters, very similar to our subscriptions to stock in a
corporation to be formed; after the subscription books
are closed, the promoters make allotment among those
who have subscribed, either pro rata, or in such way as
the promoters deem for the best interests of the corporation. After allotment is made, the subscriber must be
notified of the number of shares alloted to him; the contract is not complete until then; before that time it is a
mere withdrawable offler.
§ 58. Conditio.nal subscriptions. Subscriptions may be
upon conditions: (1) Express or implied; (2) precedent or subsequent; (3) before or after incorporation;
(4) or the delivery of the subscription may be conditional
§ 59. Express and implied conditions. Express conditions may be found either in the subscription, or in the
statutes relating to subscription; the former may be of
infinite variety, if not inconsistent with the charter; the
most usual condition found in statutes is that payment
of a certain amount shall be made at the time the subscription is made; if such subscription is made before incorporation, two views are taken as to the necessity of
payment under such a statute-one that it is necessary,
and failure to pay makes the subscription void; the other
(supported by the weight of authority) is that such pro(33)

Electric Welding C.O. v. Prince, 193 Mass. 242.
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vision is meant for the benefit of the corporation only,
and it may waive it if it chooses. The principal implied
condition, attaching to subscription at common law, is
that no one can be called on to pay anything to the corporation for carrying on its busmess until the whole
amount of stock agreed upon is fully subscribed.
§ 60.

Conditional subscriptions prior to incorporation.
If these are necessary for purposes of organization, two
views are held: the New York view, that they are entirely
void, and cannot be counted; and the Pennsylvania view,
which holds the con<lition to be void, and the subscription
absolute, unconditional and valid, so it may be counted as
.one of the necessary subscriptions. If such conditional
subscriptions are not necessary for organization, in either
state they would probably be held valid according to their
terms.
§ 61.

Conditions precedent and subsequent. A subscription upon condition precedent is one which requires
the condition to be performed, unless waived, before the
subscriber can become a member; if made after incorporation two theories exist as to their legal effect: (1) That
they are mere withdrawab1e offers until the condition is
fully performed; (2) that they are binding contracts from
the time of making, to a wait the time of performance, and
the subscriber cannot withdraw unless the corporation
fails to perform. Subscriptions upon conditions subsequent are valid, and have the effect of making the subscriber a member from time of acceptance by the corporation; if the corporation fails to perform the condition, the
subscriber cannot withdraw, but has an action for dam-
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ages against the corporation for its failure. Courts construe conditional subscriptions to be conditions subsequent if possible (34).
§ 62. Conditional delivery of subscriptions. Subscriptions, absolute in form, may be delivered to someone to
be delivered to the corporation only upon the happening
of some event; if the delivery is made to some one unconnected with the corporation it does not become effective
until delivery to, and acceptance by, the corporation; if
delivered to an agent of the corporation, one line of authorities holds that the legal effect is the same as if delivered to an outside party, while another line bolds that
it becomes an absolute delivery to the ·corporation at once,
and the condition is waived.
§ 63. Fraud a.nd mistake. These vitiate the subscription the same as in other contracts, and make it voidable
at the option of the subscriber. He must, however, be
diligent in discovering the fraud or mistake and prompt
in repudiating the subscription after ascertaining the
fact. The English and some American cases bold that,
even if the subscriber has acted With due diligence, be
cannot repudiate the subscription after insolvency and
creditors' rights have intervened (34a); others hold he
can if be is not guilty of !aches (35 ).
§ 64. Parties that may subscribe. The general rule is
that subscribers must be persons capable of contracting, so far as an subscriptions necessary for organization
are concerned. An infant may subscribe, but if he does be
(34) Rnllroad Ol. v. ParkR, ~ Tenn. 5!i4.
(34a) Oakes v. Turquand. L. R. 4 App. Cas. 615, 2 H. L. 325.
(85) Hinkley v. Oil Co., 132 Ia. 396.
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may repudiate the subscription as in other contracts ; at
common law, the subscription of a married woman was
said to be void, but under statutes in most states her subscription is now valid; an alien friend or non-resident,
or person of any nationality or vocation may subscribe;
neither private nor public corporations can s ubscribe for
shareij unless specially authorized; in the absence of constitutional provisions forbidding, the state or nation, by
legislative permission, may subscribe for stock in pnblic
service corporations, but not private manufacturing companies. The statutes now often permit one corporation
to acquire by original subscription or purchase the shares
of other corporations.

5. ORGANIZATION.
§ 65. Schemes of organization. As before indicated,
under a king's charter, or a special act, or a deed of
settlement, the organization was distinctly set forth in the
instrument itself, and usua11y the persons who were to
act as the first officers were designated; methods of continuing the succession were also specifically provided
Under general incorporation laws, it is usual for the organization to be completed, before the articles of incorporation are filed, by electing the proper officers and
agents, and certificate of this fact is made when the
articles are filed with the public officer; in other cases
the incorporators call for subscriptions, and, after these
have been received, the incorporators can the subscribers
together and they elect officers, adopt by-laws, etc., and
start the machinery running. In other states more formal
proceedings are essential, such as having a hearing beSECTION
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fore a court or commission esitablished for the purpose,
with a finding of such court or commission entered upon
a public recor<l, and sometimes publications thereof made.
§ 66. Proof ~f organization. Usually un<lcr general
laws a certified copy of the articles of association, filed
with the secretary of state and duly certified by him under
the great seal of the state, is prima facie evidence of the
existence of the corporation; it is, however, usually not
conclusive, and the facts of organization may be inquired
into. Under special acts, the act itself, or an exemplified
copy thereof with evidence of user, was sufficient to establish corporate e~istence (36). General reputation has
been held to be sufficient.
§ 67. Commencement of corporate existence. As to the
exact time of corporate birth, there are divergent views,
based more or less upon the peculiar provisions of the
statutes. These are: (1) There is no corporate life
until organization is complete; (2) corporate life begins
as soon as the articles are filed with the proper officer,
without stock subscription or organization; (3) only a
qualified corporate existence begins when the articles are
filed, and the adult or perfect corporate capacity is not
acquired until the stock is provided as required; ( 4) corporate life begins as soon as the articles are filed, but,
until the stock is divided into shares, the incorporators
are tenants in common of the proposed capital; ( 5) under
special acts, the statute may make those named, ipso facto
and eo instanti, a corporation without further act on their
part. Thus, where the statute required the names of ~he
(36)

Mokelumne Hill, etc. Co. v. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 424.•

144

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

directors for the first year to be stated in the articles
of association, and provided that the "existence of the
corporation should date from the filing of the articles with
the secretary of state," and this was done, yet it was held
that it was not in existence before the stock was subscribed, and a full and complete organization perfected,
and those who incurred obligations in the name of the corporation were personally liable (37): On similar facts it
was ruled otherwise in South Dakota (38). In another
case on like facts it was held that those who participated
in incurring the obligation, or were careless in permitting
it to be incurred before organization was complete, were
personally liable, since a ''corporation'' without organization was like "the bull of a ship, without rudder or masts
or gearings" (39).
§ 68. Conditions of de jure existence. A substantial
(but not necessarily literal) compliance with all mandatory conditions of the general law is essential to de jure
existence, that is, such as will avail against the direct
assault of the state. The implied condition that there
must be good faith in s.eeking corporate powers is mandatory; mandatory express conditions are: (1) that there
shall be a certain number of incorporators; (2) written
articles of agreement; ( 3) giving the names and residences of subscribers to stock if that is required; (4) naming place of business; (5) stating definitely the purpose
or purposes; ( 6) subscribing articles of association; (7)
acknowledging them; (8) filing them as required by law;
(37)
(38)
(39)

Walton v. Ollver, 49 Kans. 107.
Singer Mrg. Co. v. Peck. 9 So. Dak. 28.
Wecbselberg v. Flour City Bank. 64 Fed 90.
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all these have been held to be matters of which the state
may complain if not substantially followed. Some conditions however are merely directory, as where the statute
provided that the first meeting of the incorporators should
be called by a majority of the persons named in the act
of incorporation, the meeting was called by only one of
the incorporators, and all were notified and attended the
meeting, the corporation was validly formed (40). So
some conditions are subsequent, as where the statute provided that before a corporation could commence bitsiness,
the president shall cause the articles of association to be
published, and a certificate thereof to be deposited with
the secretary of state, and a duplicate with the clerk of
the court, the making and depositing of the certificate
was not a condition precedent to corporate existence, but
a condition to the lawful carrying on of business after
incorporation ( 41).
§ 69.

Conditions of de facto existence. Something less
than a substantial compliance with all mandatory provisions will suffice for de facto existence, i. e., such as
is valid as against any one but the state. The following
are conditions of de facto existence: ( 1) A valid law
under which such a corporation could be formed; (2) a
bona :fide attempt to organize under the law; (3) an apparent compliance therewith ; and ( 4) corporate user.
When these things concur, by the weight of authority,
no one but the state can successfully question the corporate existence, and then only in a direct proceeding for
(40)
(41)

Newcomb v. Reed, 12 Allen (Mass.), 362.
Harrod v. Hamer, 32 WI& 162.
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that purpose. The matter however is very much involved,
and the courts do not seem to f ollow any settled doctrine.
Much of the confu:;ion arises from the great variety of
opinion that exists as to the necessity of pleading and
proving corporate existence, and the presumptions relating thereto. These are noted elsewhere.
§ 70.

Conditions of existence by estoppel. Estoppel is
founded in the obligation which every man is under to
speak and act according t.o the truth of the case; so,
wherever an act is done by a party which cannot be contravened or contradicted without fraud or misconduct on
his part, and such act has induced another to believe in
the existence of a fact ·or condition and thereby to change
his position, the party who did the act is not permitted to
show the contrary. It does not shut out the truth, but
rather lets in the whole truth. If persons, therefore, have
acted as if a corporation were in existence, in such a way
as to recognize it to be such, where it is equitable ( 42) to
hold them to such recognition and inequitable ( 43) not to
do so, they will be estopped to deny such corporate existence, even though it is really neither a de jure nor a
de facto corporation. This seems to be the rule by the
weight of authority, but there are many cases to the contrary; a different view is that there can be no estoppel
upon a matter of law, and hence if there is no law, or
an unconstitutional law, there can be no estoppel; still
another view is that there can be no estoppel unless there
is at least de facto existence; still another view is that
(42)
(43)

Doyle v. Mizner, etc., 42 Mich. 3.'l2.
Estey Manufacturing Co. v. Runnels, 55 Mich. 130.
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it is against public policy to allow persons to claim
corporate existence unless they have substantially complied with a valid law, hence there can be no recognition
of corporate existence arising merely by estoppel, even
against the pretended corporation itself ( 44).
§ 71.

Parties estopped. Where existence by estoppel
is recognized, the parties estopped to deny corporate existence are: (1) The pretended corporation itself; (2)
those who act as, or claim to be, members, either among
themselves, or in regard to their liability upon their
subscription, or statutory liability to corporate creditors
(45); (3) the promoters and officers of the apparent corporation; ( 4) persons who have dealt with the apparent
corporation in such a way as to recognize it to be such;
either when they seek to avoid their liability to it, or to
hold its members liable as partners ( 46); but dealers
with such pretended corporation, without knowledge that
it claims to be such, are not estopped to deny it is a corporation; ( 5) persons who have injured such corporations by their torts or crimes, w-hen called to account,
are also estopped.
Effect of failure _to comply with conditions. (1)
The state may complain for failure substantially to
comply with any mandatory conditions in quo \\arranto
proceedings and prevent further action as a corporation.
(2) If there is neither de jure nor de facto existence, a
§ 72.

(44)
( 45)

Boyce v. Trustees of M. E. Church. 46 Md. 359.
Canfield v. Gregory, G6 Conn. 9; McCarthy v. TAvascbe, 89 Ill

270.
(46) West Winsted Sav. Bk. v. Ford, 27 Conn. 282; Snider's Sons'
Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224.
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person not estopped for other reasons can question the
validity of the pretended corporate existence in any proceeding in which it is of any importance to him to have
it determined. (3) If there is de facto existence (except as against the state), the powers, rights, duties, and
liabilities of the corporation and its members are the
same as if de jure. ( 4) And where there is neither a
de jure nor a de facto corporation, as to a party otherwise estopped by his own acts, the corporation is to him
the same as it would be if it were de jure. (5) But to
one not so estopped, by one line of authority he may treat
the members (if it is for a business purpose) as if they
were partners ( 47 ), and by another bold them as members of an unincorporated association (48)-tbe liability
resting only upon those w:ho have participated in the acts,
or authorized them to be done, or ratified them.
( 47)
(48)

Martin v. Fewell, 79 Mo. 401.
Fay v. Noble, 7 Cnsb. (Mass.) 188.
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CHAPTER III.
THE BODY CORPORATE.
SECTION

1.

MEMBERS, INTEGRAL

p ARTS,

AND ORGANS OF

ACTION.

§ 73.

Necessity of members. In a corporation aggregate there must be members, otherwise it cannot exist.
If it is a non-stock company, the death of all the members terminates the existence; but, if it is a stock company, the representatives of deceased members who succeed to the shares become members, and consequently the
corporation is not dissolved A practice has lately grown
up whereby a corporation purchases and retires its own
shares of stock. When that is done, if all shares are so
retired, it would seem the corporation would be dissolved.
No case, however, bas yet been decided so holding. The
ownership of all the shares by one member does not dissolve the corporation (1), although it has been said that,
for some purposes, ·the corporate existence is suspended
until other persons become members by becoming owners
of some of the shares, but this is not according to generally received views.
§ 74.

Acquisition of membership. Membership in nonstock companies is obtained by complying with the con(1)

Louisvllle v. McAteer (Ky.), 81 S. W. 698.
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ditions set f or·t h in the constitution and by-laws. In stock
corporations, membership is acquired through ownership
of stock and this may be: (1) subscription to the stock
accepted by the corporation; or, (2) by a completed transfer of shares; or, (3) in some cases, by estoppel such as
acting or holding one's self out as a member without in
fact having subscribed. "\Ve have already considered acquisition of membership by subscription. Transfer of
shares is considered below. Where one held himself out
as a member of a corporation and allowed the pretended
corporation to incur obligations, the member was estopped
to allege the corporation was illegal because the law under
which it was formed was unconstitutional (2).
§ 75. Integral parts. Sometimes one corporation is
composed of two groups of individuals in such a way
that the continuance of both is essential to the continued
corporate existence; if, therefore, from any cause all of
one group should die, and there was no method of supplying their place, the corporation would necessarily be dissolved. It was once contended that directors were such an
integral part, but the cases have decided otherwise. It
is not usual now to find a corporation created with integral parts, although St. 1'iary's church in Philadelphia
is said to be so created.
§ 76. Organs of action. Since a corporation is an artificial entity, it can act only through representatives.
These are: (1) The majority of a quorum of corporate
members duly assembled in corporate meeting; (2) a
majority of directors duly assembled in directors ' meet(2)

McCarthy

¥.

Ln,·nscbe, 89 Ill. 270.
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ing; (3) officers of the corporation who are considered
parts of _the organization; ( 4) agents, who are not considered parts of the organization but who represent it
as any agent does bis principal; and (5) servants, who do
not represent it but simply work for it. For example,
where a minister, without a formal meeting of the church
trustees so directing, solicited subscriptions on Sunday
to complete the church, the names and amounts being
written down by a clerk as they were announced, a subscriber could withdraw at any time before the trustees
met and accepted the subscription list, or ratified the
act of the minister, since be was not duly authorized before tha.t time (3).
§ 77. Qualifications of agents and officers. Unless statute or charter prevents, a corporation may select any
persons it pleases to be its officers, agents, or servants.
It is usual either by statute, charter, or by-law provision,
to require directors to be shareholders and in some states
they are required to be citizens of the United States.
§ 78. Functions of shareholders and directors. Shareholders wield the extraordinary and unusual powers, such
as electing directors, accepting and rejecting amendments,
increasing and reducing the capital stock, making bylaws, admitting members, and in some circumstances removing officers or restraining ultra vires transactions;
disposing of all the corporate property; winding up the
corporate business or surrendering the corporate franchises, and dissolving the corporation (4). The directors
(3) Methodist Church v. Sherman, 3G Wis. 404.
(4) MetropoJltan Elevated Ry. Ot. v. Manhattan El. Ry. Co., 11 Daly
(N. Y.) 1173.
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control the ordinary business affairs, such as the policy
of management; the expediency of acting or contracting; and the selection of inferior officers, fixing their compensation, directing their actions, etc. Within this scope
of their authority, if they act in good faith, the stockholders cannot dictate to them nor control their acts in
any particular; the stockholders must wait until time for
a new election for selecting such directors as will conform to their wishes, unless the power of removal of
officers has been reserved to the shareholders by statute,
charter, or by-law provisions.

Functions of other officers. The president,
merely as president, presides over corporate meetings
and has no greater power in managing the corporate business than any other shareholder; but, by statute, or
charter, or by-law, or by a course of action acquiesced in
by all, he is usually given the power to represent the corporation in most of its ordinary business transactions.
He usually executes conveyances, and signs contracts and
certificates of stock. The vice-president performs the
function of the president, when he is unable to perform
his duties. The secretary keeps the minutes, records of
corporate meetings, and has no other duties unless specifically conferred upon him. · He is usually made the custodian of the 'corporate seal, and is required to attest
it and affi..~ it to all documents executed by the corporation. He frequently is allowed to issue shares, and is
often made the transfer agent of the corporation. The
treasurer is custodian of the corporate funds, and bas
power to endorse checks for collection by the corporation.
§ 79.
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He is sometimes said to have implied authority to draw
checks or bills of exchange, or sign promissory notes for
money borrowed by the corporation, but it is doubtful if
he can do this without special authority. The corporation can select such other officers and agents and confer
such authority upon them, within the corporate powers,
as may be necessary or convenient, subject to the general
rule that directors should not delegate to others their
discretionary powers and duties ( 5), although some cases
hold that this may be done under a general authority "to
appoint such subordinate officers and agents as the corporation may require" (6).
SECTION

2.

INTERN AL RELATIONS.

Contracts contained in the charter: Da.rtmouth
College case. In 1769 the king of England incorporated
twelve persons by the name of Trustees of Dartmouth
College, and granted to them and their successors the
usual corporate powers, and also authority to fill up any
vacancies which might occur in their own body. In 1816,
the legislature of New Hampshire attempted to amend the
charter by increasing the number of trustees to 21 - the
nine additional members to be appointed by the governor
- and also by putting over the trustees a board of overseers, with power to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees. The corporation refused to
accept the amendment, and brought suit for the conversion of its corporate seal and records by those who
took possession under the amendment to the charter; the
§ 80.

(5)
(6)

First National Bank v. Commercial Assn., 185 N. Y. 575.
Sheridan Light Co. v. Chatham Bank, 127 N. Y. 517• .
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supreme court of New Hampshire sustained the legislation, but the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the
United States, where it was held, reversing the New
Hampshire decision, that the charter constituted a contract originally between the king and the corporation,
and, after the American Revolution, between New Hampshire and the corporation; and that contract was one the
obligation of which could not be impaired by the state of
New Hampshire without violating the provision of the
national Constitution: "No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of con tracts" (7).
§ 81. Same: Variety of charter contracts. From this
case, has grown up a great body of corporation law. Resulting from this decision it has been held that in the
formation of a corporation there are: (1) A contract
between the state and the corporation; (2) a contract between the state and corporate creditors ; (3) a contract
between stockholders and corporate creditors, in the case
of a special statutory liability; ( 4) a contract between
the state and the corporators or member3; (5) a contract between the corporation and the members, or among
the members themselves, as to the amount to be contributed, or that subscriptions are made in good faith.
All these contracts, whether express or implied, are protected by the constitutional provision. For example, where
the statute under which the corporation was formed provided that stockholders should be individually liable for
corporate debts to double the face value of the shares,
this liability could not he taken away, so as to divest a
(7)

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wbeat.

~18.
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prior creditor of the right to resort to this fund for payment in case the corporation could not pay-there is an
implied contract between the st.ate and the existing corporate creditors which cannot be annulled by the state
alone (8). So, too, on the other hand, when a person has
become a shareholder in a corporation in which there is
no individual statutory liability of the shareholders to
the creditors, the state cannot, unless the right to amend
is reserved, impose such a liablity on the existing shareholders without their consent (9).
§ 82.

Same: Effects of the doctrine. The Dartmouth

College decision bas been severely criticised from time to
time by writers and judges, but, while reasonably definite
limits to it have been worked out by later decisions," the
original doctrines of the case have become so imbedded
in the jurisprudence of the United States as to make
them to all intents and purposes a pa.rt of the Consti tution itself," and have given "solidity and inviolability
to the literary, charitable, religious, and commercial institutions of our country." ·Although for a time, "it was
under the protection of this decision that the most enQrmous and threatening powers in our country have been
created," yet, for the most part, under the reservation
in state constitutions of the power to r epeal or amend
corporate charters without let or hindrance, most of the
danger threatened bas been obviated or averted.
Under this decision all vested property rights acquired
by executed contract, as well as all such rights as are
(8)
(9)

Hawthorne v. Cater, 2 Wall. 10.
Ireland v. Turnpike Co., 19 Ob. S. 369.

Vol VIII
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necessary to the fuH and complete enjoyment of the
original grant, or of property legally acquired subsequent to the grant, are protected. So too, any valuable
privilege, such as an exemption from taxation, or an exclusive right to supply water or gas, or to occupy streets
for railway purposes, or that the bills or notes of the
grantee shall be received for taxes, given by the corporate charter, and which conduced to the original acceptance of it, is protected by the constitutional provision.
On the other hand, since grants by the state are strictly
construed against the grantee, an exclusive grant is never
presumed, a tax exemption dooo not extend to property
not used or not necessary, police regulations necessary for
the prE!servation of the public safety, health, and morals
are not forbidden, laws authorizing municipal subscriptions, not yet actually made, may be repealed, unnecessary and unexecuted contingent privileges, such as an
unexecuted right to consolidate in the future, and subsequent grants not supported by a good consideration, may
be revoked without violating this constitutional provision (10). For a full discussion of the doctrine of the
Dartmouth College case, see Constitutional Law, §§ 230,
236-42, in Volume XII of this work.
SECTION

3.

CORPORATE FUNDS.

§ 83.

In general. By incorporation for business purposes there is a dedication of certain funds by the implied and express command of the state and the corporators to the attainment of certain purposes in a certain
(10)

Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U. S. 646.
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way. Because the state believes the purposes desirable,
.it authorizes the peculiar method; because the corporators
deem the method necessary or desirable and the purpose
profitable, they contribute the funds; the peculiar method
is by the state authorizing a changing body of persons,
through a specified form of organization and under a
designated name, to act and be considered as one person,
in whom are vested the funds, and upon whom is placed
the duty of applying them to the purposes named. These
funds are designated capital or capital stock.
§ 84. Capital and ca.pita.I stock. There is much confusion in the use of these terms. The best usage, however, is to say the capital of a corporation is the whole
amount of its property of whatever kind, and to say that
capital stock is the amount which it bas obtained or is
authorized to obtain by way of subscription (11). The
latter is the sum fixed by the corporate charter as the
amount paid in or to be paid in by the subscribers for
the prosecution of the business and for the benefit of the
corporate creditors.
§ 85. Purpose of capital stock. Corporations acting
through their proper officers, within the scope of corporate powers, fix no liability on their officers or on anyone else than the corporation itself. Hence the purpose
and policy of requiring a capital stock as security and indemnity for persons who become its creditors; the lawmaking power confers upon the members a privilege-a
franchise-a right to make contracts in its artificial name
without fastening a liability on any natural person; and it
(11)

People v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. 433.
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exacts from them, as a condition on which it grants this
franchise, that they place a capital stock in safe pledge
for the security of their creditors. This is a permanent
investment, with no power in a shareholder to withdraw
it until the corporation is wound up and all its debts paid,
and with no power in the managing board to permit it to
be withdrawn at the expense of creditors. It is looked
upon as a trust fund for the benefit of the corporation
and its members, and the protection of corporate creditors. The capital stock ''is the aggregate amount of
the funds of the corporators, which are combined together under a charter for the attainment of some common object of public convenience or private utility. This
amount is usually fixed in the act of incorporation. It
is thus limited in reference to the convenience of the intended corporators, and for the information and security
of the public at large. To the corporators, it prescribes
the amount and subdivisions of their respective contributions to the common fund; the voice which each shall
have in its control and management; and the apportionment of the profits of the enterprise. To the community
it announces the extent of the means contributed and
•
forming the basis of the dealings of the corporate body,
and enables every man to judge of its ability to meet its
engagements and perform what it undertakes. The
capital stock is like that of a co-partnership or joint stock
company, t11e amount which the partners or associates
put in as their stake in the concern. To this they add,
upon the credit of the company, from the means and resources of others to such extent as their own prudence

THE BODY CORPORATE

159

or the confidence of such other persons will permit.

Such
additions create a debt; they do not form capital, and,
if successful in their career, the surplus over and above
their capital and debts becomes profit, and is either divided among the partners and associates. or used still
further to extend their operations" (12).
§ 86.

Capital stock, franchise, surplus, and shares of

stock. These are different things. The capital is the
money or property, or both, of the corporation; the shareholders' shares are representative of the capital, the surplus, the dividend earning power, the franchises, and the
good will. The capital stock of the company is owned
and held by the company in its corporate character; the
share capital stock of the shareholders, they own and
hold in different proportions as individuals ; the one belongs to the corporation, the other to the corporators.
The franchise of the company, which may be deemed its
business opportunity and capacity, is the property of the
corporation, but constitutes no part or element of its capital stock, while the same franchise does enter into and
form part, and a very essential part, of the shareholders'
capital stock. While the nominal or par value of the
capital stock and of the share stock are the same, the
actual value is often widely different. The capital stock
and surplus differ also. The capital stock of the company
may be wholly in cash or in property, or both, which may
be counted and valued. The company may have, in addition, a surplus, consisting of some accumulated and re(12) Sanford, V. C., In Barry v. Merchants' Exchange, 1 Sand. Ch.
(N. Y.) 280.
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served fund, or undivided profits, or both, but that surplus is no part of the company's capital stock, and therefore, is not itself capital stock. Neither the capital nor
capital stock can be divided and distributed, but the surplus may be, yet that surplus does enter into and form
part of the share stock, for that represents and absorbs
into its own value surplus as well as capital, and franchise in addition. So it may be said that the property of
a corporation consists of three things, which are its
capital stock, its surplus, its franchise; but these three
things, distinct in the ownership of the company, are
united in the ownership of the shareholders. The share
stock covers, embraces, represents, all three of these in
their totality, for it is a business photograph of all the
corporate possessions and possibilities (13). Hence,
where the statute requires the "capital stock and the surplus'' of a corporation to be taxed, the value of such
cannot be determined by taking the aggregate market
value of the outstanding shares, for such would include
the value of the franchise and good will also. There is
however much confusion in the taxing laws in the use of
the terms "capital," "capital stock," and "property,"
and the cases cannot be reconciled.
§ 87.

Kinds of shares of stock Shares are of various
kinds, such as common, preferred, guaranteed, interestbearing, treasury, deferred, founder's shares, watered,
fictitious, or spurious.
Common shares entitle their owners to an equal pro(18) Largely quoted trom Judge Finch in People v. Coleman, 126
N. Y. 483.
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portional participation in the management and profits,
during corporate life, and in the net assets in case of dissolution. Preferred shares entitle their owners to some
preference in the distribution of profits or of assets over
the owners of the common stock. They may be either
cumulative or non-cumulative as to profits, up to a certain
fixed amount; if cumulative, a deficiency in paying the
dividend for one year must be made up out of the profits
of succeeding years. In the absence of express provision
making preferred stock cumulative there is a tendency to
hold it, nevertheless, to be so, but this is not so strong
as to make it entirely certain it will be so held, where
it is not really so ·expressed. Preferred shareholders
usually have a right to participate in the management,
and are subject to liabilities, as other shareholders. "Six
per cent cumulative preferred," means that the owner
of such shares will receive six per cent on the face value
of bis shares before the common shareholders receive
anything. In case in any one year there is enough profit
to pay only three per cent on the preferred shares, then,
in the subsequent years w.hen there are sufficient profits,
the preferred shareholder will be entitled not only to the
six per cent for those years, but also to all arrears in the
payment of the dividends of previous years, before the
common shareholders are paid dividends (14). After
the preferred shareholders have been paid in full, if
there is then a surplus, this may be divided among the
common shareholders even though they will thereby re(1.4 ) Roberts v. Roberts, etc. Co., 184 N. Y.
M. S. Ry., 91 N. Y. 488.

2~;

.Jermain v. L. S. 4;
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ceive much more than the six per cent paid to preferred
shareholders-unless the preferred shares are made participating in the profits, after the common shares receive
a dividend equal to the preference dividend. Preferred
dividends are not debts, like interest, and to be paid at all
events, but are to be paid only out of profits (15 ), when
they have been duly declared as dividends by the proper
authorities ( 16). Neither is a preferred shareholder
a creditor of the company, even though his shares so
state, so as to give him claim prior to that of unsecured
creditors (17), unless the statute so authorizes (18).
Guaranteed shares in the United States now mean substantially the same as cumulative preferred shares. Interest-bearing shares are such as bear int~rest upon all
sums paid in, until the corporation is completed and
profits are earned out of which to pay dividends. Such
payment out of capital instead of profits, however, is held
to be illegal as against creditors who might be injured
thereby.
§ 88. Same (continued).
Treasury stock is often
stated to be that part of the authorized stock left in the
possession of the corporation to be issued in the future
by the corporation or upon further subscription. The
term, however, is more properly used to designate stock
that has once been issued, but surrendered or forfeited
to the corporation, and afterward re-issued or sold by
it. It cannot be voted nor does it draw dividends while
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 81 Mich. 76.
N. Y,. et<!. Ry. Co. v. Nlckals, 119 U. S. 296.
Hamlin v. Trust Co,. 78 Fed. 664.
Heller v. Natl Bk., 89 Md 602.
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held by the corporation. In recent years, a practice has
grown up, particularly in speculative ventures such as
involve mining and patent properties, for the owner of
the mine or patent to organize a corporation with a certain authorized amount of capital stock, in exchange for
all of which the mining property or the patent right is
to be conveyed to or aceepted by the corporation, in full
payment for the whole of the stock, the directors usually
passing a resolution that in their judgment the value of
the property to the corporation is equal to the value of the
stock. The person to whom the stock is so issued then
generally is to, and does, donate to the corporation a certain part of the stock received by him as treasury stock
fully paid, to enable the corporation to sell it at the best
price that can be obtained for it, in order to get the money
-"working capital"-actually necessary to start and
carry on operations. The buyer of such shares takes a!
a purchaser, and not as an original subscrib er, and, in
the absence of fraud, is not liable to pay any more than
the purchase price, even though this is much less than
the face value. Such a procedure has been held valid,
if there is no fraudulent purpose or over-valuation of the
property, and creditors are not thereby injured (19).
Deferred stock draws no dividend until some one class of
shares receive their ~ividends. They are practicaJly common shares. Debenture-stock is not stock at all in our
American sense, but rather a bond, the holder of which
is a creditor and entitled to interest, and it is issued in
(19) Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Drexel, 90 N. Y. 87; Iron Co. v.
Ha,.a. 185 Pa. Sl 489.
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such a way that any fraction of it may be transferred.
Founder's shares entitle the holder to all the profits, after
certain fixed maximum dividends are paid to the other
shareholders. Watered stock is that which upon its face
purports to have been paid for at its full value, but which
in fact has been issued without the corporation having
the right to demand the full face value thereof. Fictitious
shares are substantially the same as watered shares.
Spurious stock is that issued in excess of the amount
authorized. It is void, and the holder does not become
a member of the corporation.
Right to create capital stock. The power to
create, increase, or decrease, capital stock is a franchise
which can be exercised only under the authority of a
legislative grant (20). At the time a corporation is organized, however, it may provide for both common and
preferred stock, and call for subscriptions for either;
if the corporation is first created, and the stock subscribed upon the understanding that only common stock
shall be issued, by the weight of authority the corporation cannot (except by unanimous consent of shareholders) create shares that shall have a preference over
the common shares (21). By express legislative authority, however, it has been held that the majority of
members, contrary to the wishes of the minority, may
issue preferred shares; it is said to be analogous to borrowing money and the majority certainly have the right
to do that, if done in good faith.
§ 89.

(20)
'21)

Cook v. Marshall, 191 Pa. St 315.
Campbell v. Zylonlte Co., 121 N. Y. 4M.
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§ 90. Nature of shares of stock. A share of stock is an

intangible property right to participate in the profits of
the corporation, and, in the event of dissolution, to participate in the division of assets after debts are paid.
Such shares are personal property, goods, wares, or merchandise within the seventeenth section of the statute of
frauds, and choses in action. They are not negotiable
instruments, and at common law could not be taken by
attachment, or on execution, or in replevin, because of
their incorporeal nature. By statutes in most of the
states provision is made for attaching shares of stock or
taking them upon execution, by notifying the company
not to transfer them otherwise than as directed by the
court. They are usually considered as being located at
the domicile of their owner, though the state may give
them a situs at the domicile of the corporation (22). They
are evidenced by a certificate which usually says: "This
is to certify that A. B. is the owner of Ten Shares of the
Capital Stock of X Company of the par value of $100
each, fully paid up and transferable only upon the books
of the corporation upon surrender of this certificate duly
endorsed.'' This is usually signed by the president, and
countersigned by the secretary under the seal of the corporation. Upon the back is usually a form of assignment
which will read: "For value received, I hereby assign
and transfer all my right, title, and interest to the shares
in X Company, evidenced by this certificate, to Y, and I
do hereby irrevocably appoint Z to be my agent, or attorney in fact, for me, and in my name, to have the trans(22)

Plimpton v. BJ&elow, 93 N. Y. 592.
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fer of the same made upon the books of the c-0rporation."
This will be signed by A. B. and delivered to Y. It is
not necessary to fill in the name of the purchaser, nor the
name of the attorney, to make the transfer. These may
be left blank and then, after delivery of the certificate
to Y, the purchaser, he may, by mere delivery of the certificate, sell it to some one else, and this party to another,
and so on; the last purchaser may fill in his own name
and the name of any proper person to have the transfer
made on the books of the company, who can then take
the certificate to the corporation, surrender it, have the
transfer made to the purchaser upon the books, and receive a new certificate in the name of such purchaser.
4. CORPORATE NAME.
§ 91. Necessity of a name. It was said long ago that
names of corporations are given of necessity, for the corporate name is a s a baptismal name, and the very being
of their constitution, "and though it is the will of the
king that erects them, yet the name is the knot of their
combination, without which they could not perform their
corporate acts." Such is the rule yet.
§ 92. Acquisition of a name. A name is usually given
in the charter or articles of association, and the law now
generally requires it to be so given; and sometimes specific
and definite provisions exist which must be carefully followed; but in the absence of specific provisions, it is not
perhaps indispensable that it should be so given; it may
be derived from usage. The corporation perhaps cannot select a name already in use by another corporation
organized in the same state.
SECTION
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§ 93.

Rights in the corporate name. If lawfully acquired, the right to a corporate name.is a franchise (23),
and the corporation which bas acquired a name bas the
same right to use it as it would a trade mark, and may
enjoin its subsequent appropriation and use by another
corporation, association, or person, if it would be damaged
thereby (24). It has been held, however, that a foreign
corporation cannot prevent the use of a corporate name
afterwards selected by a domestic corporation; and no
exclusive right can be acquired in geographical names.
The secretary of state or the proper registering officer has
discretionary power to refuse to register a company that
chooses a name that too closely resembles one already in
use.
§ 94. Effect of misnomer. In the case of contracts this
has no effect, if the identity of the corporation can be
established. In process against the corporation by the
wrong name, a suit is not validly begun, but it may be
corrected by amendment; if the corporation issue process
for itself in a wrong name, it is ground for plea in abatement; slight variations, not misleading as to the identity
of a corporation, are not usually material.
§ 95. Change of name. The corporate name can be
changed only by consent of the state and of the shareholders; such change, if legal, does not affect the rights,
duties, or liabilities of the corporation (25). It has been
held, however, if the change is illegal, members consent(2~)

Boston TI11!,her Rhoe ('o. , •. Roi:.lon Rubber C'o., 140 l\lnss. 436.
(24) Armington v. Pnlmer. 21 Il. I. 100.
(25) Cinctnnntl Cooperage Co. v. Bate, 96 Ky. 350. Compare:
Netf v. Covington. etc. Co., 108 Ky. 457.
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ing thereto are liable as partners afterwards. Statutes
usually provide a simple method for changing a corporate
name.
SECTION

5.

CoRPORATE LIFE.

§ 96.

Mode of existence. Perpetual succession. In the
absence of any provision to the contrary the duration of
a corporation is perpetual. It is however usual, by constitutional or statutory provisions, to fix a limit to the
corporate life. Some statutes require a limit to be fixed
in the articles of association. Within the time fixed however the corporation is said to have perpetual succession,
by which is meant the power to provide other members in
the place of those who drop out. In the case of non-stock
corporations, this is usually done by the election of other
members; in stock corporations, the successor in the
ownership of stock becomes a member. For example, the
general corporation law provided that "every corporation shall have succession for the period limited in its
charter, and, when no period is limited, for twenty years."
Afterwards a special act was passed incorporating a gas
company with "perpetual succession," with the exclusive
right to manufacture gas for thirty years. At the end
of twenty years the state brought quo warranto to prevent the corporation from continuing to act as such.
Held, corporate life bad expired, and that "perpetual
succession" meant continuous succession for the twenty
years fixed by the general law, and not everlasting existence, or existence for thirty years (26).
(26)

State v. Payne, 129 Mo. 468.
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Mode of action. Shareholders' meeting. So far
as the members control corporate action, they must do so
in a duly called corporate meeting. This meeting must
be called by the proper officers; in the absence of other
provisions, the directors have this authority; it is usual
to put such authority in the hands of the president or
secretary. Regular meetings of shareholders are also
usually provided for in the by-laws, the time and place
being designated there. Wbere no corporate meeting was
held, and the secretary called on a majority of the shareholders individually, and they separately authorized a
mortgage of the corporate property to be given, which
was executed by the president and two stockholders at
the request of the mortgagor, to whom it was delivered
to secure a $3000 note given by the corporation for the
loan of that sum of money, it was held that such mortgage
was not valid (27).
§ 98. Notice of shareholders' meeting. At common
law, notice of corporate meetings, definite as to day, hour,
and place was necessary to be given personally to each
shareholder in order to make the meeting valid, as against
a shareholder who had no notice, was not present, and
complained promptly; and, in the absence of charter, bylaws, or statutory provisions, this is still the rule; the
matter, however, is usually regulated by the charter or
by-laws; these frequently allow notice to be given by publication, or through the mail. If the meeting is a special
one, or the business to be done extraordinary or unusual,
the notice must state what the business to be done is,
(27)

Duke v. Markham, 105 N. C. 131.
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but one who is present and participates in the business,
without objecting, is estopped to deny the validity of the
meeting. No further notice is necessary of an adjourned
meeting, or the business to be done thereat, than the record
of the resolution adjourning the meeting, if the time and
place are fixed by the resolution; otherwise notice should
be given. Since regulations concerning meetings are for
the benefit of shareholders, they may waive informalities
by attendance and participation, or acquiescence in the
results.
§ 99.

Quorum. At common law if all of an indefinite

number of stockholders are duly notified to meet, those
who assemble constitute a quorwn; but charter, by-law,
or statutory provisions now usually require a majority
of the shares outstanding to constitute a quorum. It has
been held that members may vote by proxy, and in such
a case it seems that one member, holding the proxy of
enough shareholders to make a majority of the shares,
may by himself hold a corporate meeting and elect the
officers, providing this meeting was duly called. This is
frequently done by corporations organized in New Jersey
and in other states with liberal corporation laws. And
where there is no provision as to what oon.stitutes a
quorum, one member, with the proxies of a few others
(not however, with his own stock, constituting a majority
of shares), can bo.Jd a lawful meeting at the time and
place fixed in the by-laws of the corporation, without
notifying any other shareholders, although the corp-Oration bas been defunct for seventeen years; and the directors so elected at such meeting are validly elected, since
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due notice is given in the by-laws, and since, at common
law, those who attend, one or many, if all are duly notified,
constitute a quorum ( 28).
§ 100. Place of meeting. In order to make a valid meeting, against shareholders who do not attend, the meeting
must be held within the state creating the corporation (29); but those who attend the meeting held out of
the state (30) will be estopped from denying the validity
of the action taken. A corporation formed by the consolidation of two corporations, created in different states,
may hold a shareholders' meeting in either state (31).
So, too, the rule that corporate meetings should be held
in the creating state does not apply to non-stock, beneficial organizations. Statutes frequently provide that
shareholders' meetings may be held out of the state, if
the articles of incorporation so provide.
§ 10L Directors' meeting. The directors must also
act in a duly called meeting. They have no authority to
bind the corporation by their individual acts done outside
the corporate meeting (32). The rules as to the notice of
meetings are the same as ·in the case of shareholders.
There are cases, however, holding with much reason that
a person dealing with a corporation, having no notice
to the contrary, has a right to presume that the rules and
regulations have been followed by those acting for the
company, and, if not, the company is bound anyhow (33).
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)

(32)
(33)
Vol

Morrill v. Little Falls Mtg. Co., 53 Minn. 871.
Miller v. Ewer, 27 Me. 509.
Missouri Lead, etc. Co. v. Reinhardt. 114 Mo. 218.
Graham v. Boston, etc. Co.. 118 U . S. 16L
Bank or L. R. v. McCarthy, 55 Ark. 473.
Loulsvllle, etc. Ry. v. Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, rs73.
vm-11
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In the absence of a provision to the contrary, the quorum
of the directors' meeting is a majority of all the directors.
They vote as individuals and not according to shares,
and cannot vote by proxy. Being agents of the corporation, there is no necessity to meet within the state, as
in the case of shareholders. Exercising delegated power
themselves, it is usual to say that they cannot, without
special authority, delegate their discretionary duties to
an executive committee. There are many cases, however,
and perhaps the weight of authority, to the contrary (34).
§ 102. Records of meetings.

Corporate meetings, both
of shareholders and directors, being de1iberative assemblies, should be conducted according to parliamentary
usages. It is not necessary to the vaJidity of corporate
actions that records be kept, yet, if they are kept, they
are the best evidence of the action taken, and other evidence is not admissible until it is shown that the records
cannot be obtained. When no records were kept, or they
have been lost or destroyed, oral evidence is admissible
to prove corporate actions, and the ordinary presumptions made in other cases apply here.
§ 103. Execution of contracts.

The contracts of a
corporation should be made in the corporate name. Conveyanc.es of land should be to the corporation in its corporate .name; so, too, the conveyance by the corporation
should purport to be granted and executed by the corporation in its corporate name. So, also, notes by the corporation should be signed by the corporate name, and
(34) Sheridan, etc. Co. v. Bank, 127 N. Y. 517; Cnloo, etc. Ry. Co.
v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 564.
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notes payable to the corporation should be made to it
in .its corporate name. Yet courts often hold contracts
and conveyances, not executed in conformity to the foregoing rules, to be the contracts and conveyances of the
corporation, when it is entirely clear they were meant to
be such (35). Where a deed read "I, Thomas H. Benton,
President of the Sulphur Springs Land Company, do
hereby convey, etc." and it was signed by Benton in the
same WB;Y, it was held that this did not pass the title of
the land company to the grantee (36). It should have
read ''The Sulphur Springs Land Company hereby conveys, etc.'' and should have been signed ''The Sulphur
Springs Land Co. by Thomas H. Benton, President.''
The American Bar Association has recommended a form
for corporation acknowledgments that is sufficient in
most states. The use of the corporate seal is discussed
below.
SECTION

6.

CoRPORATE DEATH.

DissoLUTION OP

CORPORATIONS.

§ 104. Methods of dissolution.

A corporation may be
dissolved: (1) By expiration of the time mentioned in
the charter. (2) By the happening of a condition or
contingency prescribed by the charter to have that effect.
(3) By death of all the members in the case of non-stock
corp<;>rations; but in the case of a stock corporation the
shares of the deceased members are distributed as personal property, and consequently the successor in ownership becomes a member, and the corporate life is not
(35)
(36)

Rawlings v. Gas Light Co., 105 Tenn. 268.
Zoller v. Ide, 1 Neb. 439.
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affected. ( 4) By the loss of an integral part (in case of
corporations consisting of integral parts), without the
power to replace such integral part. ( 5) By a surrender
of the f rancbise, accepted by the state. It is both said
and denied that acceptance by the state is essential to the
dissolution; this is usually now provided for by a general
law prescribing a method whereby this may be done.
Mere non-user or insolvency of the corporation does not
alone amount to a dissolution (37). ( 6) By repeal of
the corporate charter by the legislature, when the state
bas reserved such power. (7) By forfeiture of the corporate franchise, by a proceeding in the courts for that
purpose, because of non-user or misuser of the franchise
granted.
§ 105. One man companies. In the case of stock corporations, there is usually nothing to prevent one member
from acquiring all the shares of stock. By the weight of
authority, if the corporation was validly created, the fact
that one person acquires all the stock in good faith bas
no legal effeot upon the continued corporate existence;
acting in the corporate name and through the corporate
officers, the action taken is corporate action (38). And,
on the other hand, the individual acts of the sole owner
do not bind the corporation; though the individual owner
mig.h t himself be estopped to deny that such action was
in effect corporate action. In ~1aryland and Kentucky,
it has been held that the ownership of stock by one person
virtually suspends corporate existence during such sole
(87)
(88)
681.

Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 456.
Durlacher v. Frazer, 8 Wyo. 58; Chase v. Tel. Co., 121 Mlcb.
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ownership. And in equity, or in cases of fraud, or evasion
of corporate duties, the acts of all the shareholders or a
single shareholder owning all the stock, may be treated
as the acts of the corporation if necessary to work out
justice (39). As, for instance, where a sole shareholder
in a corporation without creditors set fire to the corporate
property, there could be no recovery upon the insurance
policy (40).
E1fect of dissolution ( 41). ( 1) The corporate
franchises can no longer be exercised. (2) Involuntary
dissolution at common law extinguished executory contracts, and no damages could be recovered for non-perf ormance. In equity and by statute, in most states, the
obligation of such contracts survives, and may be enforced
against the corporate assets, and it is said that voluntary
dissolution does not extinguish such contracts. (3) At
common law, debts due to or from the corporation were
extinguished; but now such claims are preserved in equity
and generally by statute. ( 4) Personal property at
common law, upon dissolution, vested in the crown or
state; but now it is preserved as an asset for the payment
of creditors, or, after payment of creditors, for distribution among the shareholders (42). (5) Real property,
at common law, reverted to the grantor; but now a corporation whose duration is limited may take or grant
an estate in fee; and, upon dissolution, all real property
§ 106.

(39)
(40)
(41)
(1899], 1
(42)

Bundy v. Ophir Iron Co., 38 Ob. St. 000.
Melly v. Insurance Co., 148 Fed. 683.
State Bank v. State, 1 Blacld. (Ind. ) 267; In re HJgglnaon
Q. B. 325.
Bacon v. Robert.son, 18 Bow. 480.
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then belonging to the corporation becomes assets for the
payment of debts and distribution among shareholders,
there being no reversion either to the gran tor or to the
state in the case of private business corporations (43).
In eleemosynary and non-business corporations the common law doctrines of the escheating of personal property
to the state and reversion of real property to the
grantor are applied ( 44), though this has recently been
denied (45). (6) Actions by a corporation at common
law abate upon its dissolution, but statutes usuaJJy now
prevent such a result by allowing the representative of
the defunct corporation to continue the suit in its place.
At common law no valid judgment could be rendered
against a dissolved corporation, and attachment and garnishment proceedings were terminated by a dissolution.
Statutes now usually provide that dissolution shall not
abate pending suits, nor prevent the bringing of suits
within a certain time against the defunct corporation ( 46).
Upon dissolution, either by voluntary surrender of the
charter, by repeal, or by forfeiture, statutes usually provide either that the corporation itself shall continue to
exist for a certain time, in order to wind up its affairs.
or a receiver shall be appointed for such purpose.
In the case of public service corporations which are dissolved, or to be dissolved, a receiver is appointed to take
charge of the property and continue its operations for the
(43)
(44)
136

u. s.
(45)
(46)

Wilson v. Leary, 120 N. C. 90.
Titcomb v. Mut. Ins. Co., 79 Me. 311:) : Mormon Church v. U.S.,
1.
Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412.
Shayne v. Post Pub. Co., 168 N. Y. 70.
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benefit of the public, until a re-organization can be made
by forming a new company to take over the property discharged of its debts. Usually the property is sold, under·
foreclosure of some mortgage lien, to a committee who
purchases for the benefit of the lienholders, who have
agreed upon some plan of organizing a new company to
carry on the business, the stock and bonds of which will
be issued to the former creditors and shareholders, in
proportions agreed upon in the re-organization plan.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

178

CHAPTER IV.
CORPORATE POWERS AND LIABILITIES.
SECTION

1.

POWERS IN GENERAL.

§ 107.

Theories of corporate capacity. There are two
of these: (1) Special capacities; (2) general capacity.
The doctrine of special capacities is that corporations
have such powers, and only such, as are expressly grantoo
or necessarily implied from those granted ; all others are
excluded. The doctrine of general capacity is that a corporation once duly created has all the powers and capacities of a natural person, so far as they can be exercised by an artificial person. While the rule of special
capacities is almost universally adhered to in this country,
there is a tendency in the decisions of the state courts,
where no public interest or policy is specially involved
and creditors' rights are not affected, practically to allow
a general capacity to do everything in every way that
an individual could do within the field covered by a business in which the corporation was organized to engage (1). Where the corporate charter authorized the
company "to make contracts and engagements with other
corporations or with individuals for the transporting or
conveying of f reigbt and passengers,'' the company
(1)

Remick v. Hardware Co., 73 Neb. 800.
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leased its railroad and rolling stock to another company
for twenty years at a fixed rental per year, with a power
in the lessor to terminate the lease at any time, the damage
done thereby to the lessee to be assessed by arbitrators.
The lessor terminated the lease. The damages were
assessed for the loss of the unexpired term at $150,000,
which the lessor refused to pay. Held, the lessor was not
liable, as, under the doctrine of special capacities, the
company had only such powers as were expressly conferred, and the charter provision above given only referred to traffic contracts for the through transportation
of freight and passengers (2). On the other hand, where
a corporation was organized ''to make, sell, or lend on
hire railway carriages and rolling stock, and carry on the
business of mechanical engineers and general contractors,'' under the doctrine of general capacity it could acquire, build, and operate a railroad, since such authority
was not forbidden (3). This doctrine, however, is not
now followed in England in parliamentary corporations (4).
SECTION 2. CLASSES OF CORPORATE POWERS.

§ 108.

Corporate powers are of three classes: (1) In-

cidental; (2) express; (3) implied. The incidental powers
are such as are annexed tacitly, without any express
words, to any corporation duly created. They include:
(a) The power to have perpetual succession for the
period designated in the charter or statute; (b) to have a
(2)
(3)
(4)

Thomas v. Ry. Co., 101 U. S. 71.
Riche v. Ashbury Ry. Co., J,. R. 9 Ex. 224.
Same case, reversed in the House ot Lords, L. R. 7 H. L. 653.
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corporate name and to contract, grant, receive, sue, and
be sued therein; (c) to purchase and hold the personal
and real property necessary to carry on the business for
which it was formed; (d) to have and use a corporate
seal; (e) to make by-laws; (f) to remove members and
officers under some circumstances.
Express powers are such as are specifically enumerated
in the charter or general law: and constitutionally granted
therein, together with such as are lawfully inserted in
the articles of incorporation. But powers not authorized
by the general law cannot be acquired by placing them in
the articles of incorporation.
Implied powers are such as are reasonably necessary or
proper for the execution of the powers expressly granted,
and oot expressly or impliedly excluded. In this connection, necessary does not mean indispensable but does include that which is convenient and usual in carrying out
the express powers. But where a corporation was formed
''to manufacture cars, and to purchase, acquire, and hold
such real property as may be deemed necessary for the
successful prosecution of its business," such corporation
had no authority to build a town for its employes,. put
up 2200 houses for them, construct streets, sewage, sewage
farms, gas and water works, erect school houses, churches,
hotels, theaters, market-houses, concert and dancing halls,
and provide for carrying them on, establish and operate
groceries, dry goods and other stores for furnishing their
employes with supplies, at a place about 18 miles from
Chicago, where land was much cheaper than in Chicago,
and where it was desirable to locate their extensive shops,
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and where, at the time, there were no dwellings, stores,
schools, and places of amusement and subsistence sufficient for the needs and convenience of the large number of
employes needed to carry on the business. On the other
hand it had implied power to acquire 55 acres of vacant
land upon which to dump cinders, and 25 more acres upon
which to store cars, also to build larger boilers than were
then needed in order to meet future needs, and in the
meantime to furnish power to adjoining plants, and under the power to "sell supplies" on its palace cars, it
might sell beer, wine, and whiskey, as beverages, but could
not bold shares in a steel company, all the product of
which was used by the car company in the construction
of its cars (5).
§ 109. Rules for construing corpora.t.e charters. The
legislative intention is to be ascertained, if possible, and
given full effect; the language is to be construed neither
strictly nor liberally, but according to its fair import;
words are to be given their ordinary meaning, unless custom or usage has given them a different one; the whole
law or charter is to be considered; but the enumeration
of certain powers, by implication excludes all other unnecessary powers. When the question is one between the
state and the corporation, or when the public interest is
involved, a strict construction against the corporation
and in favor of the state will be applied, and then, if the
charter is silent about a power, it does not exist; if the
language is susceptible of two meanings, that construction is to be adopted which works least harm to the state.
(5)

People v. Pullman Car Co., 175 Ill 125.
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The rules of construction of the charters of corporations
formed under general laws are the same as those formed
under special laws (6), although some courts make an effort to apply a different rule to articles of incorporation
under general laws, on the ground that they are private
contracts similar to partnership association articles (7).
SECTION

3.

PARTICULAR POWERS.

Power to contract. In general, in order to determine the validity of a corporate contract, three questions must be answered: ( 1) Did the corporation have
power to make iU (2) Was it made by an authorized
agentT (3) Was it made in the proper formT
The first is a question of the subject matter; the second, one of the agent's authority; and the third, one of
form. The first is considered immediately following; the
second belongs in the province of the law of Agency (see
Volume I), the general rules of which apply to corporations as principals, as well as to individuals, or, so far as
they are peculiar to corporations, are considered herein
under the beadings of corporate modes of action, directors, officers, etc. The third is further considered herein
under the subject of the corporate seal.
§ 111. Power to contract debts and borrow money. A
corporation may contract debts to any extent for its corporate purposes that its credit will allow, unless statutes
forbid (8). Statutes frequently fix the limit as to the
§ 110.

(G) Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1; Dempster, etc.
Co. v. Downs, 126 Iowa, 80.
(7) Na ti. Bk. v. Inc. Co., 41 Ob. St L
(8) Bnrry '" Merchants' Ex., 1 Sandt. (N. Y.) 280.
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amount that may be borrowed, and in such case one who
has knowingly loaned money to the corporation, in excess
of the limit, cannot recover the excess as against other
creditors, unless the money was used in discharging existing valid debts. But one who, in good faith, loans
money after the corporation has already borrowed up to
the limit can recover, if he had no knowledge of the fact.
It has been held that a corporation cannot borrow money
for the purpose of purchasing its own shares, nor for the
purpose of purchasing property not needed. Thus a savings company cannot borrow money to make an investment
before it has received any deposits to be inves.ted (9). So,
too, where a national bank purchases not only the draft
with the bill of lading attached, but also the goods represented by the bill, such agreement cannot be enforced
against the bank (10).
§ 112.

Power to issue negotiable instruments. Whenever it is a necessary or convenient method of conducting
their proper business, corporations, through agents having the express or implied authority so to bind the corporation, have the power to issue any form of negotiable
instruments; but they have no power unless expressly authorized to deal in notes or bonds. A stricter rule is applied in England than in the United States. If a corporation has power to issue a promissory note for any purpose, a bona fide holder for ~alue, having no knowledge of
want of authority of the agent or of other irregularity or
that it was issued for an ultra vires purpose, will be pro'.

(9) Fra.n klln Co. v. Lewiston, etc. Co., 68 Me. 43.
(10) Leonhard & Co. v. Small, 117 Tenn. 153.
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tected (11). Where a corporation was formed for encouraging athletic exercises with power to ''purchase and
erect suitable buildings for its accommodation,'' it bad
authority to borrow money to be used in building a clubhouse (12).
§ 113. Power to issue accommodation paper. There is
no implied power to issue or indorse negotiable instruments for the mere accommodation of an outside party;
but, if it is done by a corporation having authority to issue promissory notes, a bona fide purchaser, without
knowledge of the fact, will be protected. Thus, where a
manufacturing company, having authority to purchase
property on credit and give its promissory note therefor,
gave its note for the accommodation of X, without receiving any consideration therefor, and the plaintiff acquired
it in due course of business before maturity, and paid full
value for it, without knowledge that the corporation bad
received no consideration, be rould enforce payment
against the corporation (13).
§ 114. Power to be surety or guarantor. There is no
such implied power. This, and the rule relating to accommodation notes, are based upon the view that neither
the officers nor the majority of the shareholders have any
right to give away the corporate property to the injury of
other shareholders without their consent; nor can the officers or all the shareholders give away the corporate
property without making provision for the payment of
creditors. But since, where the reason ceases the rule
(11)
(12)
(13)

Monument Natl. Bk. v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57.
Bradbury v. Canoe Club, 153 Mass. 77.
Monument Natl. Bk. v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 6t.
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ceases also, and persons can give away their property if
they choose, it has been held that if all the shareho~ders
agree, and no bona fide creditor's rights are affected, the
guaranty will be binding (14). There are also well-defined
exceptions to the general rule; e. g., a corporation rightly
holding the securities of another person or corporation
has a right to dispose of them and guarantee their payment in the ordinary course of business; so also a railway
company may guarantee the payment of the bonds and interest of the company whose road it is authorized to lease.
§ 115. Power to form partnerships. The general rule
is that a corporation has no such power, unless expressly
authorized; the reason being that it would necessarily
give to some one outside the corporation, i. e., the other
partner, a power of management over the corporation,
which would be inconsistent with its duty to the state.
Of course, the corporation may be expressly authorized
to enter into a partnership, and in California it has been
held that if the management was left entirely to the
corporation it might be a partner. Where a manufacturing corporation entered into a partnership with three
other similar corporations for manufacturing cotton-seed
oil, and turned its plant over to .the partnership for the
purpose, it can repudiate the agreement, and upon failure, after demand, to allow the plaintiff' to enter into possession of its own property, an action for unlawful de·
tainer may be maintained to recover possession (15).
§ 116. Trusts and trade combinations. Etymologically
the word trust comes from the same as tryst, troth and
(14)
(1~)

Murphy v. Land Co., 97 Fed. 723.
Mallory v. Hanaur OD Works, 86 Teno.

~
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true. In law a trust exists whenever the legal title to
property is vested in one person, called the trustee, to be
held or dealt with by him, for the benefit of another, called
the beneficiary. The name of the industrial institutions
now designated trusts is derived from the trust of equity.
Its present use originated in 1882, when the Standard Oil
Trust was formed by the shareholders in several different companies transferring their shares to trustees in
trust to accomplish certain business ends, converting the
trust of equity into a peculiar form of business association. Since then its meaning has even become much
broader, and ''embraces every act, agreement, or combination of persons or capital believed to be done, made, or
formed with the intent, effect, power or tendency to monopolize business, restrain or interfere with competitive
trade, or to fix, influence, or increase the price of commodities.'' These things are not new, either in the law or
.
.
1n economics.
Forms assumed: A rough classification, based upon
the tie that binds them together, gives the following
forms: 1. Friendly agreements. 2. Pools. 3. Stockcontrolling schemes. 4. Corporations.
§ 117.

Power of corporations to form trusts. In con-

sidering this subject, two principles should be kept constantly in mind-one, based upon the nature of a corporation, is, that the grant of corporate power is a franchise
granted by the state for a definite purpose, to be exercised
in a way prescribed, and subject to forfeiture by the state
if it is not carried out in accordance with the grant; the
second is based upon public policy, viz., that combination
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agreements of individuals, partnerships, or corporations,
with the purpose and effect (with certain exceptions) of
restraining trade, destroying competition, and resulting
in monopoly, are unenforcible, and under some circumstances WTongful-tortious or crimiaal.
§ 118.

Same: Corporation must not violate its fran-

chise. The first principle, that a corporation must not abdicate its purpose or prescribed method of management,
is well expressed in Whittenton Mills v. Upton (16), by
Thomas, J., where the question involved was whether a
corporation could be a member of a partnership. He
said: ''No member of the corporation, as such, can bind
the society. In a partnership each member binds the society as a principal. If, then, this corporation may enter
into partnership with an individual, there would be two
principals, the legal person and the natural person, each
having, within the scope of the society's business, full
authority to manage its concerns, including even the disposition of its property. . • . The partner may manage and conduct the businesg of the corporation, and bind
it by his acts. In doing so he does not act as an officer or
agent of the corporation by authority received from it,
but as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and
each capable of binding the society by the act of its individual will." This agreement was held void. Such agreements, if valid, would have the effect, as Judge FinC'h
says, in People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. (17), to
permit a corporation "to receive its powers and priv(16)
(17)

10 Gray (Hass.) 582.
121 N. Y. 582.
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ileges merely to put them in pawn; and to give away to an
irresponsible board (or person) its entire independence
and self-control.''
The above were cases of purely private business corporations, not those owing any special duty to the public.
The rule applies, of course, with more reason and more
strictness to quasi-pttblic corporations, or those owing
particular duties to the public. As stated by Justice
:Miller in Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co. (18), "Where a
corporation, like a railroad company, bas granted to it by
charter a franchise intended, in large measure to be exercised for the public good, the due performance of those
functions being the consideration of the public grant, any
contract which disables the corporation from performing
those functions, which undertakes, without the consent of
the state, to transfer to others the rights and powers conferred by the charter, and to relieve the grantees of the
burden which it imposes, is a violation of the contract
with the state, and is void as against public policy.''
From these principles, therefore, it follows that all contracts of a corporation, either private or quasi-public, to
enter into combinations, whether of partnership, pool, restraint of trade, trust, lease, consolidation, sale or otherwise, the necessary effect of which is to destroy its autonomy in the performance of its duty to the state, are,
or ought to be, held to be void and unenforcible, and this
so, regardless of any other quality of the contract. And
it is generally held so, although there are some holdings
(18)

101

u. s. 71.
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to the contrary, in the case of leases and sales by purely
private corporations.
"\Vhile a contract by a corporation violating this principle alone is not criminal or wrongful, it is ultra vi res in the
true sense, and the state undoubtedly has a technical right
to complain. The state, however, does not, and will not,
complain of snch a transaction unless the contract made,
or things done under it, injuriously affect or threaten
public interests; then the state may interfere by quo warranto to prevent or enjoin its consummation, either by
ousting the corporation of the power usurped or annulling
the charter.
§ 119.

Same: Contracts in restraint of trade are void
The second principle-that contracts in restraint of trade
(with certain exceptions) are void and un~nforcible-has
alone, no peculiar application to corporations, but applies
to individuals and partnerships also; this principle together with the first one above, gives the state a po~r
over corporations in regard to such contracts that it does
not have over individuals, viz., that the state can actively
and of its own accord take the life of the offending corporation for engaging in such a contract, though no punishment, aside from refusing to enforce the contract,
could be meted out to an offending individual or partnership.
What contracts restraining trade are void, is a difficult
matter, in the present state of the Jaw, to determine.
Judge Taft, in the Addyston Pipe case, divides contracts
in restraint of trade and competition into three classes:
(a) Those in which the restraining contract is wholly
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incidental and ancillary to another main or principal contract that is lawful; (b) those in which the restraining
contract is the main or principal contract, to which others
are only incidental, ancillary, or preliminary to this purpose; (c) those in which the restraining contract is the
only contract made.
As to class (a) it was formerly held, perhaps, that all
restraints upon trade were invalid. As Judge Taft says:
''The objections to such restraints were mainly two. One
was that by such contracts a man disabled himself from
earning a livelihood with the risk of becoming a public
charge, and deprived the community of the benefit of his
labor. The other was that such restraints tended to give
to the covenantee, the beneficiary of such restraints, a
monopoly of the trade, from which be had thus excluded
one competitor, and by the same means might exclude others. . . . After a time it became apparent to the
people and the courts that it was in the interest of trade
that certain covenants in restraint of trade should be enforced.''
And for various reasons" covenants in partial restraint
of trade are generally upheld as valid when they are
agreements (1) by the seller of property or business not
to compete with the buyer in such a way as to derogate
from the value of property or business sold; (2) by a retiring partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a partner pending the partnership not to do anything to interfere, by competition or otherwise, with the business of
the firm; ( 4) by the buyer of property not to use the same
in comi>etition with .the business retained by the seller;
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and (5) by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete
with his master or employer after the expiration of his
time of service. Before such agreements are upheld, however, the court must find that the restraints attempted
thereby are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment by the
buyer of the property, good-will or interest in the pa~
nership bought; or to the legitimate ends of the existing
partnership; or to the prevention of possible injury to the
business of the seller from use by the buyer of the thing
sold; or to protection from the danger of loss to the employer's business caused by the unjust use on the part of
the employe of the confidential know ledge acquired in
such business. • • • This very statement of the rule
implies that the contract must be one in which there is a
main purpose, to which the covenant in restraint of trade
is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted only to protect one of the parties from the injury which, in the execution of the contract or enjoyment of its fruits, be may
suffer from the unrestrained competition of the other.
The main purpose of the contract suggests the measure
of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform
standard by which the validity of such restraints maY. be
judicially determined" (19).
What, however, is reasonable or unreasonable depends upon the circumstances of each case, and different
courts take different views of similar circumstances, but
total restraints in both space and time are generally held
void; yet with improved machinery and communication,
(19)

United Statee v. Addyston Pfpe Co., S:S Fed. 271.
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what are now reasonable for protection would formerly
have been held to be unreasonable.
Under class (b) when the main contract is to restrain
trade, and this does it so unreasonably as to affect public
interests, such main and ancillary contracts are not enforcible. Under class (c) there being no lawful purpose
to forward, no rule to measure the necessity of restriction, but a purpose to avoid competition which the law
favors, such contracts should be held void. Perhaps there
should be added to the a hove classes another that we may
call class (d)-pub1ic service companies or occupationsin which any restraints that prevent them from the performance of their whole duty to the public are held to be
invalid. Whether contracts in undue restraint of trade
are anything more than unenforcible, that is, illegal as being tortious or wrongfu~ so as to be the basis of a suit for
damages, <>r a criminal prosecution, in the absence of any
statute regulating the matter, is in controve·r sy; but the
weight of authority certainly is that if there is no fraud,
coercion, intimidation, or something of the kind practised
upon some one, there is no civil or criminal liability.
§ 120.

Anti-trust acts. Most of the states have enacted
anti trust acts, making a civil and criminal liability for
creating or attempting to create a monopoly. Some of
these, especially the late Michigan, Missouri and Texas
acts, are peculiarly stringent.
The United States act of 1890 (26 Stat. 209)' created
seven different crimes relating to interstate, foreign, or
territorial trade or commerce, punishable by a penalty
not exceeding $5,000, or one year's imprisonment, or both,
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by providing that every person (including corporations
or associations) who shall make (1) a contract in restraint
of such-trade, or (2) engage in a combination in form of
a trust or otherwise, or (3) engage in a conspiracy, in restraint of such trade, or ( 4) monopolize, or ( 5) attempt
to monopolize, or (6) combine, or (7) conspire, to monopolize such trade, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable as stated; and an injured party may recover damages, and the combination can be enjoined at the suit of
United States attorneys.
This applies not to the making or manufacture of goods
but allows an injunction against a combination of railway
employes to obstruct railroad commerce. It also prevents
the formation of pools and traffic combinations among
railroads, the direct tendency of which is to limit competition, whether reasonable or unreasonable; also such combinations as directly affect the sale of products that are ~
cross state lines. While the states have generally enacted
these very stringent anti-trust acts, some of the states
have with a very strange inconsistency, expressly authorized one corporation to acquire, own and vote shares in
other corporrutions, whether competing or otherwise, and
have thereby practically nullified all the supposed benefits of the anti-trust legislation, and legalized in a permanent form exact.ly what the anti-trust acts were designed
to make criminal.

Unincorporated trnsts. With the foregoing
principles in mind, it may be helpful to describe some of
the forms assumed (as above specified) more particularly. The unincorporated forms are the first three§ 121
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friendly agreements, pools, and certain stock-controlling
schemes.

friendly
agreements are numerous, and sometimes the most efficient. The tie that binds, however, is only the personal
honor and business interest of the members. This form
has been very effective in the Meat Packers' Association,
a mutual understanding among some six or eight large
corporations, based upon the personal honor of the members, whereby (as alleged) the price of cattle and meat
in all the important markets has been controlled for a
number of years. It is stated on the authority of one of
their number that there is a working agreement to the
effect ''that they will not, to their own loss and the destruction of their goodwill, send more beef to a market
than it reasonably requires. • • • Further than that
there is no bond between any two houses as to output. It
is not an illegal bond, nor is it intended to effect a restriction of trade to the detriment of the people; it is for natural and necessary self-protection. For instance, one of
the packing-houses calls us up by telephone and asks,
'Are you sending any extra cars anywhere today T' We
reply, let us say, 'Yes; we are sending six to New York,
because we learn from the reports of our agents that the
market there requires such a shipment.' The packer who
called us up does not ship what extra beef he may have to
New York, but to some other market. • • • Another
day ~ call him up and ask him a similar question, and
similarly abide by his answer, should it be like ours. The
answer is not begotten of speculation as to the amount of
§ 122. Sa.me: Friendly agreements. The first,
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beef the market will take; it is based upon fact. We could
not afford to send six cars of beef to New York or anywhere else upon the chance of disposing of them. A side
of beef is marketable too short a time for that." The supreme court, however, held that this friendly agreement
violated the Federal anti-trust act (20).
Same: Pools. The second, or pools, are agreements between several to divide competitive business or
products, either upon basis of work to be done, or earnings from the same, in proportions agreed upon. In all
other respects each party retains full control of his property. The method of enforcement is usually by a deposit
of money to be forfeited in case the agreement is violated.
Pools were, perhaps, invented by the railroads, and between 1858 and 1887 a large part of the competitive railroad business of the country was made more or less noncompetitive by these institutions. In regard to such pools
between connecting lines of railroad, where a division ot
earnings is made for through traffic, if the rates estabJished are not unreasonable, such transactions are valid·;
if between competing lines and for the purpose of preventing competition they are, at common law, prima f acie
invalid; however in England and in New Hampshire they
have been held valid if the rates agreed upon were not
unreasonable. The Interstate Commerce law made them
illegal in 1887, and they were formally abandoned, but
superseded by various rate-fixing associations. By 1897
the country was practically parceled out into the Joint
§ 123.

(20)

Swift v. United Statee, 196 U. S. 37t>.
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Traffic Association east of the Mississippi, and north of
the Ohio and Potomac; the Trans-Missouri Freight Association operating from the Missouri to the Pacific. In
the south there were three separate associations which
acted in harmony. In 1897-8, the Trans-Missouri and tbe
Joint Traffic Associations were held illegal by the Supreme Court of the United States, as violating the antitrust law of 1890. The railroads shortly after drew
closer together than ever under some of the forms named
below.

.!. good illustration of the pool is the Addyston Pipe
case, in which there was an association of six iron pipe
manufacturing companies. A representative board was
created" to whom all inquiries for pipe shall be referred,
and said board shall fix the price at which said pipe shall
be sold, and bids taken from the respective shops for the
privilege of handling the order, and the party securing
the same shall have the protection of all the other shops."
When a letting was to occur, all were notified by the board
as to what material was called for; it then fixed the price,
say at $24 per ton for a ~,800 ton job at St. Louis; bids
~re asked for by this board from the six companies; the
one which offered the highest bonus, $6.50 per ton, for the
privilege, was awarded the contract. When the public
letting at St. Louis occurred this company bid $24 per
ton, and since the law required three bidders, two of the
other companies bid slightly more than $24. The bonull
was divided among the oompanies in proportion to the
capacities of the various mills composing the association.
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This pool was held to violate the national anti-trust act
of 1890 (21).
§ 124. Same: Stock-controlling schemes. The third
form is the stock-controlling form, or the original trust
form. This was exclusively used to effect a combination
among corporations. It was accomplished by the shareholders of the several corporations to be combined delivering their shares of stock, in trust, to certain persons
as trustees, with power to vote the same; in return, the
trustees issued trust certificates to the former shareholders. The trust certificate holders had the power to elect
the trustees; and the trustees had the power, by holding
the stock of the various companies, to elect the directors
of each company, and could, in this way, place the management of all the companies in the hands of the same
persons. The earnings from all the companies were put
together, and from this sum dividends were declared to
the trust ce,.tificate holders; the former shareholders in
the constituent companies thereby participated in the
profits and losses of the combination, regardless of the
financial condition of the company in which they had held
stock. The Sugar Refineries Co. is a good illustration. It
was organized in 1887, composed of twenty refineries,
created "to promote economy, reduce cost so as to keep
price as ]ow as is consistent with reasonable profit, to furnish protection against unlawful combinations of labor,
to prevent lowering of standard of refined sugar.'' The
properties combined were capitalized at $6,690,000, but
the trust capital was fixed at $50,000,000. It was declared
(21)

Addyston Pipe & St~l Co. v. U.S., 17(S u. S. 271.
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illegal in 1890 by the New York courts, because it was a
monopoly, and a partnership between corporations (22).
It immediately incorporated in New Jersey as the American Sugar Refining Go. and now comes under the next
form.
§ 125.

Incorporated trusts: Property owning class.
The fourth is the corporate form wherein a corporation
becomes the apparent owner, or is organized for the purpose of apparently purchasing and owning, or holding,
part or all of the stock or property of the corporations to ·
be combined. These take two general forms: 1. Property
absorption. 2. Stock absorption. In the first, the old
companies usually go out of existence, leaving one collossal corporation as the owner of the property. In the
second, the old companies remain.
Of the property owning class, a good illustration is the
Glucose Sugar Refining Company (23). This company
was organized in New Jersey in 1897, to purchase the
property of all kinds, of all the glucose factories within
the "corn belt," comprised in an ellipse 950 miles long,
and 700 miles wide, of which Peoria, Ill., was the geographical center. Cash or stock was to be issued in payment for the various properties. Each company knew
what the purpose was. Options were given to a Chicago
bank for a certain period, agreeing to convey all the property to the bank or its transferee, upon request, at a certain date. The American Glucose Co., of New Jersey,
with its plant at Peoria, Ill., had given such an option, in..
(22)

(23)

People v. N. R. Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582.
Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. ML
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eluding a promise on its part and those of its officers, not
to buy, sell or manufacture glucose or its products, for a
certain period, within 1,000 miles of Chicago; other companies did substantialiy the same; these transactions were
conducted with secrecy, and were completed, when a dissenting Illinois shareholder in the American Glucose Co.
complained; the conveyance was set aside, and the carrying out of the plan enjoined. Under somewhat similar
circumstances in the Sugar trust case (24), and the Trenton Potteries case (25), the transaction was held not to
be unlawful in the manner in which the questions were
raised.

Same: Stock absorption class (community of
interest). The stock absorption plans are mainly two,
according as their ostensible purpose is (1) managing, or
(2) holding. The first of these subdivide into " commuflity of interest" plans; "bond-stock" exchange methods,
or " stock-stock" exchange methods. Of these, the "community of interest" plan is very flexible, and does not
yet seem to have a well defined meaning. The general
idea is that where there are two or more competing corporations, each, or the shareholders of each, acquire by
interchange a considerable part of the shares of the
others, so that there is a kind of" tenancy in common" of
the whole of the competing properties. The legality of
such plans bas not yet been tbe subject of litigation on
the ground that they, in effect, form unlawful combinations.
§ 126.

(2f)

(25)

U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 1.U6 U. S., 1.
Trenton Potteries Co. v. Ollpbant, 58 N. J. Eq.. 007.
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§ 127.

Same: Stock absorption class (bond-stock ex-

change). The bond-stock plan is a very simple device
for placing the management of one or more companies
under the control of another. A Company, having power
to issue bonds, offers to B Company to issue its bonds for
the shares of B Company; the offer and terms of exchange are made known to the shareholders of B Company, and, if a majority accept, the shares are transferred
to A Company, and its bo~ds issued to such shareholders;
the bonds are usually secured by a deposit by A Company of the same shares with a trustee, as collateral se.
curity for the payment of the interest on the bonds; A
Company, however, retains the right to vote the shares,
until default is made in paying interest. Its legality, as
a plan of combination, has not yet been tested, but the Supreme Court of the United St.ates has said "it is not
within the general powers of a corporation to purchase
the stock of corporations for the purpose of controlling
their management, unless permission be given them to do
so,, (26).
§ 128.

Sa.me: Stock absorption class (stock-stock ex-

change). The stock-stock plan is substantially the same
as the bond-stock plan, except the stock of A Company is
exchanged for the stock of B Company. The most conspicuous example of this method is the United States Steel
Corporation, formed February 23, 1901, in New Jersey,
with an authorized capital stock of $1,100,000,000, and
bonds to the amount of $304,000,000 or $1,404,000,000. Its
business powers, by its charter, included manufacturing,
(26)

De I~a Vergne Ret'rtg. Co. v. German Ins. Co., 17fS U.S., 40.
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mining, trading, building, transporting, and obtaining and
using patents ; its trust powers, authorized it to acquire
in any way any or all of the stocks, bonds and securities,
or property, of companies or persons engaged in an.y or
all of the foregoing lines of business, and bold for investment, or use, sell, or exercise, "all the rights, powers, and
privileges of ownership, and to exercise all voting power
thereon," and to issue its own stock or obligations, and
make any contracts in order to do any of these things. It
was a combination of ten of the largest concerns engaged
in the iron and steel industry at the time; each of these
ten was itself a large aggregation, mostly by stock ownership, of many others ranging in number from six to thirty,
several of which were made up of three or four or more
sub-companies. The stock and bonds of the ten constituent companies at the time of formation amounted to
$911,700,000, for which there were issued altogether $1,167,000,000. The stockholders that formerly composed
the ten or more corporations have now been consolidated
into shareholders of the United Stat~s Steel Corporation,
and are no longer shareholders of the constituent companies; practically the sole stockholder of each of the constituent companies is the United States Swel Corporation; as such, it elects the board of directors of each corporation, and can, if it chooses, give exactly the same
board to all the companies; upon the other hand, the
shareholders of the United States Steel Corporation elect
its directors-who, if they wish, may elect themselves directors of each of the constituent companies. The result
is the same as if the former companies, or all their share-
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holders, had entered into a permanent agreement to combine their competing properties by electing the same persons directors over all the companies, with power to control the management and policy of each according to the
terms of the agreement. The business result is precisely
the same as that of the original trust form. Its legality
has not been attacked in the courts.
§ 129. Same: Stock absorption class (holding company). The holding corporation is, or may be, created
in exactly the same way as the stock-stock plan just described. The purpose is alleged to be different, to be investment, rather than management. Its most conspicuous illustration is the Northern Securities Company,
formed (as stated) to invest in, and hold as an investment,
Great Northern and Northern Pacific railway shares.
These railroads are competing lines for something like
1,000 miles, and the laws of the northwestern states forbade the consolidation of parallel and competing lines.
The Northern Securities Company was organized in New
Jersey in 1900 with $400,000,000 capital stock. It immediately issued enough of its stock at par to acquire, in exchange, more than 90 per cent of Great Northern shares
at $180; likewise it issued enough of its stock at par to acquire in exchange a like per cent of Northern Pacific at
$115 per share-the Union Pacific getting $80,000,000 in
Northern Securities stock, and over $9,000,0GO cash, for
its $78,000,000 holdings of Northern Pacific; the total
issue of new stock was about $122,000,000 more than the
par value of the oombined capital stock of the two companies. The existence of the Securities company was to
be perpetual
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In deciding that the holding of this stock by this company violated the anti-trust act of 1890 the Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Harlan said (27): "The government does not contend that Congress may control the
mere acquisition or the mere ownership of stock in a state
corporation, engaged in interstate commerce. Nor does
it contend that Congress can control the organization of
state corporations, authorized by their charters to engage in interstate and international commerce. But it
does contend that Congress may protect the freedom of
interstate commerce by any means that are appropriate,
and not prohibited by the Constitution. It does contend
that no state corporation can stand in the way of the enforcement of the national will legally expressed.'' Also,
"although the anti-trust act bas no reference to the mere
manufacture or production of articles or commodities
within the limits of the several states, it does embrace
and declare illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever nature, and whoever may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily
operates in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states or with foreign nations ; that combinations,
even among private manufacturers or dealers, whereby
interstate or international commerce is restrained, are
embraced by the act; . . . that the constitutional
guaranty of liberty of contract does not prevent Congress
from prescribing the rule of free competition for those
engaged in interstate and international commerce." The
foregofog was said in reference to section 1, of the act,
(27) Northern Securltles Co. v. United States, 193
vo1. vm-u .

u. S. 197.
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which forbids "every contraot, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations."
§ 130. Sa.me: Same (continued). The second section
reads, "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons to monopolize" such trade or commerce shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction ''shall
be fined $5,000, or imprisoned one year or both." In regard to this, it seems pertinent to inquire whether, if the
wealth of one person was sufficient, and he had the inclination to acquire most of the stock of the competing railroads of the west, in order to prevent competition among
them, and attempted to do so-would this act.ion violate
section 2 T This does not yet seem to be answered by the
courts. In Illinois, where corporations may be formed
for any lawful p-urpose, it was held that corporations for
purposes of this kind, which resulted in a monopoly of the
whiskey business of the country and of the gas business
of Chicago, were illegal and void, and could be dissolved
by the state, although apparently there was perfect compliance with the provisions of the law (28). New Jersey
on the other hand, holds t.hat courts have no authority to
declare such a corporation illegal, so long as the state legislature has not expressly made them illegal (29). The
Whiskey trust has passed through all possible forms
from a pool in 1882, to an ordinary trust in 1887 ; a corporation trust under Illinois law in 1890, held illegal by
(28)

Distilling Co. v. People, 156 Ill. 448; People v. Gas Trust, 130

m 268.
(29)

Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 50'7.
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the supreme court of Illinois in 1894; a New Jersey managing corporation in 1899, formed of four others, after the
Illinois decision; and now finally, as formed in 1902, it is a
New Jersey Distilleries Securities Corporation, controlling (or trying to) all the rest.
§ 131. Power to consolidate.

Consolidation is a merger, union, or amalgamation, by which the stock of two
or more corporations is made one, their property and
franchises combined into one, their names merged, and
their powers combined, so that practically one new corporation results. Consent of the state and consent of
the shareholders are essential to any consolidation. By
the weight of authority, under a reserved power to alter
or amend the charter, the majority of members may consent to a consolidation against the wishes of the minority;
if the state bas not reserved the power to amend, unanimous consent of members is essential. By consolidation
the old companies are usually dissolved, their property
becomes that of the new company, but their liabilities continue against the old companies, although they are usually
enforcible against the new company; lands vest by virtue
of the consolidation in the new company without further
conveyance; and generally contract rights of the old companies pass to the new, and it must perform the contract
duties of the old; the new company is liable for the debts
of the old companies to the extent of the property received, and, if expressly assumed, to their full extent (30);
they are also usually held liable for the torts of the old
(30) Compton v. Ry. Co., 45 Ob. St m2, 167 U. S. 1. Compare:
Wabash, St. L etc. Ry. Co. v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587.
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companies. The foregoing matters are however, usua1ly
regulated, either in the agreement of consolidation, or
by the provisions of the statute authorizing them. In interstate consolidatio.ns, the new company exists in each
state with the powers, rights, and franchises that the constituent company in that state bad, but not those that belong to the companies created in another state. Thus two
companies were incorporated, one in Illinois and one in
Missouri, to build a bridge across the Mississippi river
at the same place ; afterward they were consolidated, by
authority of the laws of each state, with a capital stock
equal to the sum of the stocks of the separate companies.
Held, Illinois could tax the new company on all its capital
stock, since it was a separate company in Illinois (31).
§ 132.

Power to acquire and hold real property. At

common law it bas been said a corporation had this power
to an unlimited extent. But in this country it is generally
held that corporations have the right to purchase and bold
only such as is necessary or convenient to carry out their
legitimate purposes. If a conveyance of real estate to the
corporation is executed, none but the state can afterwards complain; and it can only in a quo warranto proceeding to forfeit the corporate charter, unless some
statute authorizes the conveyance to be set aside or the
land to be eschea ted to the state ( 32). If the conveyance
is not completed, an interested party may object in any
suit by the corporation to perfect its title; and a court of
equity will not decree a specific performance of a contract
(31)
(32)

Quincy Ry. Bridge C.O. v. Adams C.O., 88 Ill. 615.
Com. v. N. Y. etc. Ry. Co., 132 Pa. SL 59L
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to convey land which a corporation has no authority to
hold. A corporation may take any estate in land except
an estate in joint tenancy, or such as dower, curtesy, or
tenancy in tail. A grant of a freehold, without wordi of
inheritance or succession, will pass a fee to a corporation
aggregate, even if the corporate life is limited, but, in the
case of a corpora ti on sole~ the word ''successors'' should
be used to carry a fee. Thus, where land was granted to a
railroad company, and its successors, the company took a
f ee, though the corporate life was limited to fifty years,
and where it granted the land to another party before the
coroprate life expired, the grantee took a fee (33); so also
upon the expiration of the corporate life, under the modern rule, the land would become a part of the assets of the
corporation, and continue an estate in fee.
§ 133. Power to take by devise. Corporations were
expressly excepted in the English statute of wills of 1543,
and consequently lands could not be devised to them. This
was however a limitation on the power to devise to a
corporation, rather than on the power of a corporation to
take and hold land, and was placed in the statute of wills
as an exception, in order to prevent the repeal of existing
statutes of mortmain forbidding corporations from taking and holding land, unless they had a license from the
king permitting them to do so. In this country (with the
partial exception of Pennsylvania), ~ortmain statutes
designed to preserve feudal incidents to lords upon the
death of their vassals are not in force. In the absence of
a special statute to the contrary, corporations are capable
(88)

Nicoll v. Ry. Co., 12N. Y. 121.
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of taking a devise of land for any purpose necessary in
carrying on their business (34). In some of the states
there is a limit placed upon the amount which may be devised to them; in New York a devise in excess of this limit
is void as to the excess, and the next of kin or residuary
legatee or heirs may claim such excess (35); the general
weight of authority, however, holds that only the state can
complain, as in other cases (36). A distinction is to be
drawn between limitations in a corporate charter and in
statutes of wills; the former follows the corporation wherever it may be, at home or abroad, whereas the statute of
wills operates only in the state enacting it. Thus, where
the New York statute of wills forbids the devise of land
t-0 a corporation, a New York corporation may take land
in Connecticut, under a will made in New York by a resident of New York, the Connecticut law of wills having
no limitations in it, and the right to devise land depending on the law of the state where the land lies.
§ 134.

Power to acquire personal property. The
general rule is that such personal property, but such only,
both as to kind and amount, as is reasonably necessary
for the corporate purposes, may be lawfully acquired; but
there is no limit as to the amount of personal property
that may be acquired through the profits of carrying on
the corporate business. For example where a packet company was organized with power to own and control vessels for transporting freight and passengers on the Mis(84)

For the history of these matters, see McCartee v. Orphan As7·

Jum, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 437.
(35)
(86)

In reMcGraws' E11tate, 111 N. Y. 66.
Farrington v. Putnam, 90 Me. 405.
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sissippi river, and to own warehouses necessary for storing and forwarding property, and to do any and all business incidental to transportation of persons and property,
it had no authority to purchase 4,000 bushels of wheat to
be transported, and could not maintain an action against
the party for failing to deliver the wheat as agreed, although payment of $1,000 had been made thereon; the
$1,000 paid could be recovered in an action for money
had and received (36a).
§ 135. Power t.o acquire its own shares. In the United
States, perhaps the weight of authority allows a corporation to purchase its own shares, so long as the security
of creditors is not impaired thereby. There is no doubt
that it may do so in order to prevent loss to the company.
In England and in many of the states, however, the rule is
otherwise. And in those states which allow corporations
to purchase their own shares, it is said they ought not to be
allowed to speculate in them: and such transaction must
be not only in entire good faith, but the exchange must be
of equal value, free from fraud, actual or constructive,
made when the corporation is not insolvent, nor in the
process of dissolution, and be neither injurious to creditors, nor to the advantage of a few favored stockholders
and to the injury of the others (37). The purchase of its
own shares is not a reduction of tl1e capital, if the purcha8e is made from profits; and the shares, even if purchased from capital, may be sold again to replace the
amount paid. While the corporation owns its own shares,
they are dormant and not to be voted by it.
(36n)

(37)

Northwestern Packet Co. v. Shaw, 87 WI& 65lS.
~e Mt. Co. (Ky.), 32 S. W. 267.

Prince v.
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§ 138.

Power to acquire stock in other corporations.

The general rule in the United States is that one business corporation has no general or implied authority to
acquire or hold stock in another such corporation, organized either for a similar or different purpose, as an investment, for speculation, or for the purpose of controlling or managing such corporation (38). There are
some cases to the contrary, as is the English doctrine.
When it is necessary to prevent loss or to secure the payment of a debt, such stock may be taken. It is held a parent company may secure the stock of a branch company,
and it is usual to say that authority to consolidate implies
a power to purchase the stock of a company with which
the consolidation might be made. Several states have by
statute authorized corporations to acquire, own, hold,
and vote shares in other corporations, and it is sometimes
said that charitable, educational, insurance, and savings
bank companies have an implied power to invest their
funds in the stocks and bonds of other corporations.
Where one company holds stock in another, without authority, it may collect dividends, but cannot vote, and a national bank is not liable for any statutory liability on such
stock.
§ 137. Power to alienate property. Corporations are
held to have the power to alienate their property in the
ordinary course of business to any extent, if creditors, or
dissenting shareholders, or the public, are not injuriously
affected; if the corporation is a failing one the majority
of members may dispose of all its property for the pur(88)

People v. Gas Trust, 130 DL 268.
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pose of closing out its business and paying creditors,
against the consent of the minority; but not otherwise.
Such property as is charged with a public trust, or which
is essential to the performance of the duties the corporation owes to the public, cannot be sold so as to prevent
the performance of such duties. The corporate franchise
cannot be disposed of without special authority, and, when
that is given, the theory is that a sale of it is in effect a
surrender to the state and a regranting of it by the state
to the purchaser, who takes it subject to the provisions
of the law as they exist at the time of the purchase (39).
The power to sell includes the power to mortgage.
§ 138. Power to act in & persona.I relation. A corporation may take property that it has authority to own, in
trust, and administer the trust according to its terms. In
some states it is held that a corporation may be an executor, administrator, or guardian, and they are frequently authorized to be such by statute. They may also
be an agent or attorney in fact.
§ 139. Right to sue. At common law a corporation bas
the right to sue anywhere that it can find the defendant
and serve him with process. States may exclude foreign
corporations from suing in the state courts, except as to
interstate or foreign commerce, but no state can exclude
a foreign corporation from suing in the Federal courts;
Federal corporations also have the right to sue in the
Federal courts.
§ 140. Suits a.ga.inst corporations. For purposes of
suit in the United States courts, either by or against the
(89)

State v. Sherman, 22 0. St. 411.
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corporation of another state, it is conclusively presumed
to be a citizen of the state ( 40 ), and an inhabitant of the
district, in which it is incorporated ( 41). Alien corporations, such as are formed under foreign governments, may
J>e sued in the United States courts in the district where
they may be found doing business. Corporations of other
states may be sued in the state courts of any state where
they may be found doing business, if proper service of
process can be made upon them; and it has been held that
a corporation is doing business in a state when a traveling
salesman is within the state taking orders for goods, and
service of process may be made upon him in suits arising
out of the business done with him. It is usual to say that
the corporation must be engaged in business in the state,
and that the agent must stand in some representative
character to the company in order to make the service
of process valid, and a personal judgment against it eff ective ( 42). Service upon an officer temporarily within
the state is not generally sufficient.

141. Pleading. The courts are in conflict as to the·
necessity of alleging corporate existence; one line of authorities holds that the plaintiff corporation must always
allege itself to be such; another line holds exactly the contrary. One line of authorities holds that, in a suit against
a corporation, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant
is a corporation; and others hold just the reverse. So,
too, one line of authorities holds that pleading the general
§

(40)
(41)
( 42)

St. Louis, etc. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545.
Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444.
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350.
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issue or a general denial raises the question of oorporate
existence; others hold the reverse.
§ 142. Right to have and use a seal. At common law
it was said a corporation could contract only under its
corporate seal ( 43) ; the rule is now otherwise, and the
corporation is not generally required to contract under its
corporate seal in any other case than an individual would
be required to do so ( 44) ; signing is now generally of
more importance than sealing, although at common law
sealing without signing was sufficient. Any device adopted
by the corporation as a seal will be sufficient; if the seal
alone is present it must be proved to be a corporate seal;
if a oontract is shown to have been executed by the proper
officer with authority, any seal will be presumed to be the
corporate seal. The presence of the corporate seal is
generally held to be prima f acie evidence of the agent's
authority and the regularity of the corporation's actions,
but this is also denied; it is said to be evidence of a valid
and sufficient consideration, but it does not exclude inquiry
into those matters. If present upon a negotiable instrument it does not make it non-negotiable (45).
§ 143. Power to make by-laws. A by-law is a regulation made in regard to the relation of shareholders and
officers to the corporation, or prescribing the functions of
officers, times and places of meeting, etc. (46). The power
to make them is incidental to corporate existence, and re·
sides in the shareholders, unless otherwise provided.
(48) Horne v. Ivy, 1 Mod. 18.
(44) Muscatine Water Co. v. Lumber Co.. 85 Ia. 112.
(45) Chase Natl. Bk. v. Faurot, 141 N. Y. 532.
(46) State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L 435.
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This authority may be conferred upon directors. In the
absence of special statutory authority, there is no power
to provide by by-laws for forfeiture of shares for nonpayment, or to prevent the transfer of shares, or to create
a lien upon shares that will be effective against transferees without notice, or for the expulsion of members of
a corporation having a capital stock.
By-laws must be reasonable, conform to the charter,
to statutes, and to the common law; must operate uniformly, and not be in restraint of trade. They cannot
modify v~ted rights, change terms as to dividends, increase or decrease liability of shareholders, or enlarge
corporate powers. Members and officers, but not outside
parties, are presumed to have notice of their provisions.
For example, where a by-Jaw provided that "the members pledge themselves in their individual as well as collective capacity to be responsible for all moneys loaned"
to the corporation, and plaintiff loaned money to the corporation, but had no knowledge of such a by-law until
after the loan was made, he could not hold shareholders
individually liable ( 47).
SECTION

§ 144.

4.

DocTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES AcTS.

Meaning of term. Ultra vires literally means

"beyond the powers;" in its application to corporation
law it means beyond the authority of the corporationthe corporation may have the power but not the rightful
authority to do the act; and, since there is no authority
to do the act, there is no authority to ratify it, even if all
the shareholders should consent. There are various
( 47)

Fllnt v. Pierce, 99 Maas. 68.

POWERS AND LIABILITIES

215

theories as to the effect of an ultra vires act; some
authorities say such acts are void, either because of a
legal incapacity to do the act ( 48), or because it is against
public policy ( 49). Others say they are enforceable whenever it would work injustice not to enforce them ( 50).
The reasons for the first theory are: (1) The interest
of the public that corporations shall not transcend the
powers granted; (2) the interest of the shareholders that
the capital shall not be subjected to risks of enterprises
not contemplated by the charter; and, (3) the obligation
of everyone contracting with the corporation to take
notice of the legal limits of its powers. The reason for
the second theory is that no one should be allowed to retain the benefits of the exercise of a power claimed, without fully discharging the obligation arising thereon. The
doctrine is now confined almost exclusively to contracts,
and is not applied in the law of torts.
§ 145.

As to executed contracts. Ultra vires contracts,
wholly executed by both parties, will not be disturbed on
complaint of either; the court will generally leave the
parties as it finds them; yet not always so, for, under
some circumstances, it may help one party to secure payment or possession of property parted with under an ultra·
vires agreement. Thus, where a person granted land by
a deed delivered to a corporation having no authority
to take the land, but which did, nevertheless, and paid
in full for it, the grantor could not repudiate bis deed
(48)
(49)
(00)

Centrnl Trnns. Co. v. Palace Car Co., 100 U. S. 24.
Selden, J., In Bissell v. Ry. Co., 22 N. Y. 259.
Comstock, J., In the same case.
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and recover the land (51). So where a corporation, without authority to acquire or deal in lands, deeded land
to the defendant, who paid one-third of the purchase price
and refused to pay the balance, the court enforced full
payment (52); so, where a corporation without authority
to form a partnership, did so, and placed its real property in the partnership, the corporation could withdraw
and, after demand and refusal to deliver, could bring
suit for unlawful detention of its property (53); but a
court of equity will not annul an executed ultra vires
lease upon application of the lessor ( 54 ).
§ 146.

Executory contracts. Ultra vires contra.cts
wholly executory, that is, not performed by either party,
may be repudiated by either party to the contract; in
fact it is usually said to be the duty of either party to
withdraw from them, and, when he does, no action for
damages will lie and a court will not decree specific performance. Thus where .J agreed with a corporation
(which had no authority to subscribe for bonds of another company) tD buy and sell such bonds on the joint
account of himself and the corporation, and he did so, the
corporation could not recover from J half the profits made
by the purchase and sale (55). On the other hand, where
a party, together with a corporation having no such authority, became surety for a third party, the first party
could not recover from the corporation one-half of the
(!'>l)
(52)
(53)
(M)

(55)

Long v. Georgia Ry. Co., 91 Ala. 519.
Fayette Land Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 93 Va. 274.
Mallory v. Hanaur 011 Works, 86 Tenn. 598.
St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Terre Haute & I. Co., 145 U. S. 898.
Nassau Bk. v. Jones, 95 N. Y. 115.
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whole sum necessary to discharge the surety obligation,
though it was fully paid by him (56).
§ 147. Partially executed contracts. There are two
general views as to the legal effect of such a contract; the
rule in England, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, and in several of the states, is that such a contract
is absolutely void as a contract, and no action in any form
can be maintained upon it (57). However, if the person
who has performed his part has parted with anything of
value, that may be recovered from the other party in any
form of action proper for such purpose. The other view,
held by a number of the state courts, is that the person
who has not yet performed his part, but who accepts or
retains any of the benefits received from the other party,
is thereby estopped from denying the validity of the contract, and consequently it is enforceable according to its
terms by the other party (58). Thus, where a corporation loans money without authority, taking a note therefor, it cannot maintain an action on the note by one view,
and can by the other. So, too, where an insurance company, having authority only to insure against accidents
in travelling, insured the plaintiff against accidents caused
otherwise, although he had paid his premium and received bis policy, he could not recover under his policy,
by one view (59); although by the other. and more equitable, but less logical view, where a party was insured
against destruction of his crops by hail, by a company
(f>6)

(57)
(58)
(59)

Lucas v. White Line, etc. Co., 70 Ia. ML
Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S. 24.
Bath Gas L. Co. v. Clafry, 151 N. Y. 24.
Mlller v. Ins. Co., 92 Tenn. 167.
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authorized only to insure against destruction by fire or
lightning, he can recover on the policy (60).
§ 148. Who may complain of ultra vires contracts?

(1) The state may if the public interest is injuriously
affected; (2) the parties may, except as limited in the preceding subsections; ( 3) shareholders may enjoin the completion of an executory ultra vires contract, and, in some
cases, if they act promptly, may have an executed ultra
vires contract set aside (61); ( 4) creditors cannot usually
complain, but, where the ultra vires contract would, if
performed, make the corporation insolvent, it has been
held that the creditor can enjoin the performance or ha\e
it set aside ( 62). This matter is further considered below.
Outside parties, although they may be in some way affected by the ultra vires contract, cannot enjoin it.s performance.

5. LIABILITY FOR ToRTS AND CRmES.
§ 149. Torts. Corporations are liable for the torts of
its officers, agents, and servants, substantially as the
master is liable for the torts of his servant while engaged
in the master's business; and, in this connection, the managers of the corporation are practically the corporation,
the whole of the corporate duties being vested in them.
Corporations have been held liable for damages from
assault and battery, false imprisonment, libel, malicious
prosecution (63), fraud and deceit, conspiracy, trespass,
SECTION

(00)
(61)
(G2)
164.
(G3)

Denver F. Ins. Co. v • .McClelland, 9 Colo. 11.
Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Aln. li7.
Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583; Cole v. Iron Co., 133 N. Y.
Goodspeed v. Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530.
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nuisance, negligence, etc. It has been said they are not
liable for slander, because slander cannot be committed
by an agent, but this does not seem right, and recent cases
repudiate this view (64). By the weight of authority, a
corporation is liable for torts arising in a business that
is ultra vires (65). They are liable for exemplary
damages, as masters are for torts of their servants. In
general, see Agency, in Volume I of this work.
An exception is made in the case of charitable corporations, such as hospitals, etc., that receive no compensation for their services; the funds of such institutions are
not taken to pay damages for torts committed by their
agents, such agents alone being held; some recent cases,
however, take a different view.
§ 150. Crimes. Corporations are held liable for crimes
arising out of non-feasance or misfeasance, and also for
criminal libel. There seems to be no good reason why
they might not be held criminally liable for many other
offenses, even for felonies of the higher grade, except that
the criminal laws are strictly construed, and do not
usually provide penalties that could be applied to them.
There is a tenden.cy to hold them liable for such crimes
as may be punished by fines (66).
Corporations are liable for contempt of court as individuals are, and may be punished therefor by fines imposed upon them (67).
(64)
(65)
(66)
(67)

Sugar Mtg. Co. v. Taylor, 130 Ala. 574.
Nims v. Boys' School, 160 Mass. 177.
People v. Rochester Ry., etc. Co.. 195 N. Y. 100.
Telegraph Newspaper O>. v. Comm., 172 Mass. 294.
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CHAPTER V.
TBB CORPORATION AND THE STATE.
§ 151.

General methods of control. (1) By the courts:
The state, by permitting actions at law and suits in equity,
exercises general control over corporations as over other
persons. But the state also exercises, by visitation
through the courts or commissions, special control over
corporations under certain circumstances. (2) By legislative bodies: Certain powers, such as the general regulation of all persons, whether natural or artificial, within
the state, inhere in Congress and the state legislatures;
other special legislative powers are frequently reserved
to the state, when the corporation is created. The legislative power of the state is limited by constitutional pro-visions.
§ 152. Limitations of Federal Constitution upon legis.
lative control. (1) Upon Congress: ·No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation; direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states aceording to population; bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws shall not be passed;
taxes or duties shall not be laid upon articles exported
(1) State v. Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, 47 Wis. 670: People
v. Dasbaway Assn., 84 CaL 114.
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from any state; preferences shall not be given to the ports
of one state over those of another, and vessels shall not
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. Most
of the foregoing provisions protect corporations practically the same as individuals. (2) Upon state legislatures: They shall not pass bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts;
lay imposts or duties on imports or exports, or any duty
of tonnage; nor abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within the jurisdiction of the
state the equal protection of the laws; provisions similar
to the last three are usually found in state constitutions
also. They operate to protect corporations, very largely
as individuals are protected, except corporations of one
state are not entitled to the privileges and immunities of
the citizens of the several states.
SECTION 1. THE STATE AND !TS OwN CoRPORATIONB.
§ 153. Control by the courts. There are five special
methods available to the courts, usually authorized by
statute, but existing at common law. These are: (1):
Quo warranto, or an information in the nature of quo
warranto, as it is now called. 2. Scire facias. 3. Mandamus. 4. Injunction. 5. Indictment. While it is
usual for the attorney-general to start these proceedings
(except injunction), the court itself, in order to protect
the public interest in a proper case has authority to direct
some one to bring them (2); and, by statute in many
(2)

State v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 170.
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states, the proceedings may be on the relation of any
individual
The writ of quo warranto is issued to bring a corporation before the court to show "by what authority" it
claims or exercises corporate franchises, and is applicable
to cases where there never has been a right, as well as
where there has been a cause of forfeiture, by neglect or
abuse; the same end is now accomplished in a similar way
by an information in the nature of quo warranto; the judgment is an ouster and seizure of the franchises. Scire
facias is used generally where there is a legal corporation which has abused its authority, and it is called upon
to "make known" why it has done so; the judgment is the
same as in quo warranto. Mandamus is a writ issued to
compel the performance of a definite corporate duty fixed
by statute, charter provision, or by the common law. Injunction is a writ issued by a court of equity to prevent
the doing of some threatened act. An indictment is a
criminal proceeding to punish a corporation for creating
a public nuisance, or other misdemeanor.
§ 154.

Causes of forfeiture. Any abuse, misuse, ornonuse, of corporate franchises to the injury of the public is
cause of forfeiture by the state in quo warranto or scire
facias; such as engaging in unlawful combinations; in
illegal insurance, or banking; for fraudulent organizations; wilful or negligent non-user, etc. Also for usurpation of any public franchise; or imperfect or insufficient
organization, or exercising corporate powers after expiration of charter; also for illegal intrusion into a corporate
office.

RELATIONS TO STATE
§ 155.

Statutes of limitation and waiver. There is an
English rule that after six years have elapsed, subsequent
to the cause of forfeiture, the courts will not entertain
a quo warranto, upon the relation of a private individual;
but no such rule applies to the state or the king-statutes
of limitation do not run against the state, unless the state
is expressly named. Many of the states have, however,
provided that the states shall not bring quo warranto proceedings after a certain time, varying from 8 to 21 years.
The legislative body may, after a cause of forfeiture has
occurred, waive the ·state's right to complain, and the
failure of the attorney-general to act has a similar, but
not the same, effect; a waiver by the legislature pardons
the offense, and the state cannot afterwards forfeit the
charter for that offense; but the failure of the attorneygeneral dQes not pardon the offense-merely postpones
action.
§ 156.

:Mandamus. This is a prerogative writ to compel the performance of a duty. Whenever a specific and
determined legal duty is imposed upon a private corporation, expressly or impliedly, by statute, charter, or common law, and there is no other adequate remedy for its
enforcement, mandamus will lie in a suit in behalf of the
state to enforce the public duty, or, in case of a private
right, on behalf of the person to whom the duty is due;
but not to enforce a mere optional corporate privilege, or
to control discretion. It has been used to reinstate a
member, compel the callings of meetings, or the inspec-tion
of books, or a transfer of shares; or to compel public service companies, as water, gas, telegraph, railroad, etc.,
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to perform their duties to the public, or to individuals.
For example, where a railroad company, with the power
of eminent domain, has constructed and operated its road,
it will be compelled by mandamus to accept and transport freight, notwithstanding there is a strike of em- .
ployees for higher wages, there being no violent interference by the employees (3). So, where a street railway
company refused to transfer a passenger from one part
of the road to another, without the payment of an extra
fare, where the terms of the grant required such transfer,
the passenger could compel the company by mandamus to
tran sfer him ( 4 ). But where a corporation had merely
the privilege and not the duty of placing its car tracks
in certain streets, it would not be compelled to place or
keep them there (5).
§ 157. Control by courts of equity. These courts have
no general jurisdiction to dissolve corporations, though
it has been held that where dissolution was necessary to
prevent the continuance of a fraud, in a suit of which the
court has jurisdiction because of the fraud, it could go to
the extent of decreeing dissolution; such power, under
similar circumstances, is frequently conferred on such
courts by statute. Neither do courts of equity usually
have power to enjoin ultra vires corporate acts, without
other grounds of jurisdiction. An injunction may be
granted upon the application of the state, whenever a corporation is abusing the power given it for a public purpose, or acting adversely to the public, or creating a
(3)
(4)
(6)

People v. N. Y. Central Ry. Cio., 28 Hun (N. Y.) 543.
Richmond Ry. Co. v. Brown, 97 Va. 25.
San Antonio St. Ry. Co. v. State, 90 Tex. 620.

RELATIONS TO STATE

225

nuisance, or threatening to do these; or to prevent a dissipation of the funds of a public charitable trust, when
the beneficiaries are so numerous and indefinite that the
trust can be preserved only through the public authority.
A shareholder may enjoin the acceptance of fundamental
changes, the diversion of the funds, or the completion of
executory ultra vires contracts. Where one member of a
1!orporation obtains control of it, and fraudulently appropriates all its income by an excessive salary paid to himself as president, and by excessive rent paid to himself for
property leased to the corporation, a court of equity may
decree dissolution to prevent the continuance of the
fraud (6). So, too, the state may have an injunction to
prevent the giving of a prize fight exhibition by an incorporated athletic club (7). But the state cannot, by an
injunction in a court of equity, prevent an ice company
from manufacturing linseed oil. The remedy is quo warranto in a court of law (8).
§ 158. Indictment. This has been sufficiently considered above ( § 150), in discussing corporate li~bility

for crimes. At common law corporations were subject
to indictment for public nuisance, and are now generally
for such, and for violation of anti-trust, safety appliance,
and pure-food laws, giving rebates, and matters of a
similar kind.
Control by private visitor. In the case of charitable corporations, the person who endowed the charity
§ 159.

(6)
(7)
(8)

Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 118.
Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 143 Ind 98.
Atty.-Oen. v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239.
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had, at common law, the right to appoint a visitor to see
if the funds were applied according to the terms of the
gift; if he did not appoint any, the right to do this re.
suited to himself and his heirs; but, since we have
abolished the English primogeniture rules of descent, and
all of a man's children become his heirs, such method of
visitation is impracticable, though, if not waived, the
legal right yet remains. Statutes, however, usually provide other methods, and such visitorial rights, unless
otherwise provided, are presumed to be vested in the corporate trustees (10).
§ 160. Control by public visitor. In most of the states
there are railroad, insurance, and other commissioners,
whose duty it is to inquire into and report upon the condition of various kinds of corporations; these are provided for the protection of the public, and have been held
to be valid methods of the state in supervising such corporations as are likely to become injurious if not looked
after in some such way (11).
§ 161. Control by the legislature. This is either: (1)
Ordinary, or (2) extraordinary. In the exercise of the
ordinary legislative powers corporations are subject to
the power of eminent domain, the police power, and the
taxing power. In the exercise of extraordinary powers,
under some circumstances, corporate charters may be (a)
repealed, or (b) amended.
§ 162. Power of eminent domain. Corporations, like
natural persons, are subject to the power of the state to
(10)

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 4 Wheat. CS18.

(11)

Weld v. Gae Co., 197 MaBB. 556.
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take any of their property or their franchises for public
purposes upon making due compensation. The general
rule, however, is that property already devoted to a public use cannot be taken for another public use without
express authority; and it is sometimes said that the new
use must be different from the old use-that is, one railroad company could not be authorized to take the whole
line of another railroad company to be operated in the
same way; horse street-railways however have been taken
by eleotric companies, and toll-roads have been taken by
the state and turned into free roads. And so, where a
bridge company was incorporated with the exclusive right
to build a toll bridge over a river and take the tolls for
its use, such bridge and the right to take tolls may be
taken under the power of eminent domain, and upon payment therefor may be converted into a free bridge (12).
§ 163. Police power. Corporations are subject to the
police power of the state, the same as individuals; although they may be chartered for the express purpose of
carrying on a lottery or manufacturing liquor, subsequent
legislation may forbid such acts, without impairing the
contract, for the reason that no one can obtain a vested
right in any business that is dangerous to the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety. The state
cannot surrender or barter away its control over these
subjects. Under this power, also, the rates to be charged
by a public service company (within the limit that forbids depriving them of their property without due process
of law) may be fixed or regulated; so reports from in(12)

West River Bridge Co. v. DU:, 6 How. WT.
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surance, trust, building and loan, bank, and other like companies, may be required for the protection of the public.
The general limits to this power are that, in case of lawful businesses, property cannot be confiscated by the stnte,
vested right.a divested, nor the performance of national
functions interfered with, by the state legislature. For
example, where a lottery company paid five thousand
dollars to the state, and agreed to pay one thousand dollars as an annual tax for the privilege of carrying on a
lottery, for twenty-five years, the state could revoke this
privilege at any time, without specifically reserving the
right to do so, and without repayment to the corporation
of any money received (13). Or, a state can pass a law
repealing an existing license law, and forbid the further
manufacture of liquors and sale of liquors made prior to
the prohibitory Jaw, without "depriving any one of his
propel'ty without due process of law" (14).
§ 164.

Taxation. The state's power to tax corpora-

tions is the same as in the case of individuals. The corporate elements of taxation are (15): (1) the primary
franchise; (2) the secondary franchises; (3) the property, real or persona~ tangible or intangible; ( 4) the
capital stock authorized, subscribed, or paid in; (5) earnings, gross or net, or profits; (6) the shares of stock owned
by shareholders. It is possible that all of these might
be taxed at one time without being illegal, though it would
be what is in some sense double, or treble, or quadruple
(13)
(14)
(15)

Stone v. Mfssfsslppl, 101 U. S. 814.
Mugler v. KaDSas, 123 U. S. 623.
Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679.
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taxation. The matter is statutory, and there is but little
uniformity in the statutes or the decisions of the various
3tates upon the subject of corporate taxation.

It is not usual to separate the primary franchise-the right to be a corporation and exercis~ corporate powers-from the secondary
franchises, such as the right to occupy the streets by a
street railway, for the purpose of taxation. Some courts
seem to think that, since the state charges a very small
fee or none at all for incorporation, the primary franchise has no value (16) ; the proper view, however, seems
to be that its value is whatever it adds to the convenience,
efficacy, and safety of conducting the business by the corporate form of organization over other forms; in other
words, what would those who have it give for it rather
than do without it (17). Its value is diffu!ult to estimate,
and many rules for ascertaining its value have been suggested. Without attempting to separate the primary and
secondary franchises, these two methods of valuation have
been approved: ( 1) Find the market value of all the
shares and bonds of the corporation; from this subtract
the assessed value of all the real and personal property,
and the balance will be the value of the franchise. (2)
Ascertain the total net earnings (usua1ly the average for
a pe·riod of years); capitalize these at the average rate of
interest upon short loans; from the total amount so found,
subtract the assessed value of the real and personal property, and the balance represents the value of the fran§ 165. Taxation of franchises.

(16) Detroit Citizens Ry. v. C.Ommon Council, 12!S Mich. 678.
(l'l) Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal 276.
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chise; both of these in fact are based upon the earning
capacity of the capital of the corporation, and is the business man's estimate of its value ( 18).
The situs of the secondary franchise, such as operating
a street railroad, for purposes of taxation, is where the
line is operated; the same is true as to a railroad corporation. The situs of the primary franchise is usually
considered as being at the principal office of the corpora·
ti on; it undoubtedly can be, however, considered as having a situs wherever the corporation does business, in proportion to the business done; and it is usually so considered when business is done in two or more states.
Taxation of property. The corporate property
of whatever kind is subject to taxation, the same as that
of individuals. There is a tendency now to consider the
property as a unit devoted to a special purpose, and to
have all of it assessed by one state board instead of by
local assessors. After it is assessed by the state board,
the apportionment may be, and frequently is, made among
the various local subdivisions of the state, in proportion
to the business done in these districts, or mileage therein,
in the case of railroad or telegraph companies, etc. In
administering taxing laws it is not usual to consider that
the term ''property, real and personal,'' includes '' franchises'' unless expressly so provided, yet the legislature
may so direct, and provide a method of valuation (19).
And where the statute required all property to be taxed
at its true value in money, and directed the assessors, in
§ 166.

(18)
(19)

Spring Valley W. W. v. Scbottler, 62 Cal. 69.
People v. State Board, 174 N. Y. 417.
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determining the value of express, telegraph, and tele.
phone companies, ''to be guided by the value of said property as determined by the value of their entire capital
stock," such proportion of the total value of the capital
stock of an express company could be considered as located in Ohio, as the value of the tangible property in
Ohio bore to the total value of all the tangible property
of the company, wherever located (20). Patents and
copyrights are not the subjects of state taxation, but good
will may be taxed where the corporation does business.
Patented articles and copyrighted books, etc., are taxable
as property. The states cannot tax the franchises of a
national corporation without the consent of Congress, nor
can they tax any national government agency.
§ 167.

Taxation of gross or net earnings. These may
be the basis of taxation by the state in the case of corporations not engaged in inters·t ate commerce, or upon such
earnings as are not derived from such commerce. But the
states cannot directly tax corporations upon the monthly
or yearly earnings derived from such commerce, though
of course they can tax them upon any money or property
found actually in their possession on the assessment day,
from whatever source derived; this is a tax on property
and not earnings. It has been held also that corporations
may be taxed upon their capital stock, and the tax rate
may be graded according to the gross or net earnings,
or dividends, whether they are partly derived from inters·t ate commerce or not; this is on the theory that the
(20)

Adams Ex. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, 100 U. S. 185.
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tax is on the property and not on the earnings for any
period (21).
§ 168. Taxation of shares. These are taxable, although
the property or capital stock is taxed, and whether this
is at its actual or at its face value. In several states
this is held not to be double taxation (22), though others
bold otherwise. The situs of shares for the purposes of
taxation is usually the domicile of the owner, but the state
may make their situs to be that of the domicile of the corporation, and tax them there, even though their owner
lives in another state and is taxed there on the same
shares (23). It bas been held that alien owners may be
taxed higher than resident owners, but this is not the case
if the owner is a citizen of the United States residing in
another state.
§ 169. National taxation of state corporations. The
national government bas the same power to tax state corporations and their property, as it bas individuals and
their property. The Federal taxing power can be used
for the purpose of regulation as well as raising revenue (24).
§ 170. Repeal and forfeiture. These have already been
mentioned under dissolution. If there is no power reserved to the state legislature, it cannot repeal any corporate charter, although Parliament and possibly Congress may do so; if the power to repeal is reserved without qualification, it may be exercised at any time, with or
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)

Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217.
Thrall v. Guiney, 141 Mich. 392.
Tappnn v. Merchant's Bank, 19 Wall. 490.
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 633.
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without giving any reason for so doing. Vested property
rights are not destroyed however by such repeal (25);
if the power to repeal is reserved upon the happening of
some condition, some cases hold that there must be a
judicial determination that the condition has happened,
before the legislature can act; other cases hold that the
matter is wholly within the power of the legislature to
determine. The courts are not altogether in accord as to
the effect of the repeal of general corporation lawswhether they affect the existence of corporations formed
under them or not. If the power to repeal is reserved,
the effect of such repeal seems to be merely a question
of legislative intent, with the presumption that existing
corporations are not affected, unless clearly so intended.
No reserve power is necessary for forfeiting corporate
franchises for abuse or non-use; this power is implied
from the nature of a franchise, and can be enforced only
in the courts after a proper judicial determination of the
facts. A court of law alone has the power to dissolve for
breach of duty, and generally only on the complaint of
the state by the attorney-general.
§ 171. Amendment. Since a charter is a contract, the
general rule here is that it can be amended only by consent of both parties, that is, the state and the corporation; and further, since there is also contained in the
charter a contract between the corporation and each member, the corporation cannot accept an amendment unless
each member consents; and this is the rule in this country
concerning material amendments, when the state has not
(25)

People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. L
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reserved the power to amend. Under the transcendent
power of Parliament, however, a material amendment
could be imposed upon the corporation without its consent or that of its members-or they could be required t-0
stop business. Perhaps Congress bas a like arbitrary
power as to corporations created by it. Under a reserved
power to amend, the states have much the same power as
Parliament-that is an amendment, even though material, may be tendered, and, if not accepted, the state may
take away the corporate life (26). But in this connection
it has been held that what the state offers must be an
amendment, not something wholly new and different, such
as requiring a banking company to build a railroad.
Two views are taken, al so, as to the power of the majority to accept an amendment, if the power to amend is
reserved to the state when the corporation is formed. One
line of cases holds that the majority have the power to
accept what are generally considered material amendments, against the dissent of the minority; other cases
hold that unanimous consent is necessary. The difference
here is more as to what constitutes a material amendment,
than as to the rules relating to its acceptance. One case
holds that extending a railroad from 60 to 90 miles is immaterial, and a majority may accept such an amendment (27) ; while another holds that extending a 5 mile
railroad to 12 miles is material and requires unanimous
consent (28).
(26)
(27)
(28)

Yeaton v. Bank, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 593.
Buffalo, etc. R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336.
?Albrlskle v. Hackensack Ry. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178.
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2. THE

§ 172. In

STATE AND NATIONAL CORPORATIONS.

general. National corporations are not for-

eign corporations in any state, unless they are created to
operate in one of the territories or in the District of
Columbia; in which case their status is substantially the
same as if created by the legislature of one of the states,
Congress merely acting as the local legislature in these
cases. But corporations created by the national government to perform its national functions, to operate in any
state, are not foreign corporations in any state. By the
national banking act, a national bank located in any particular state is for most purposes treated as a citizen or
inhabitant of that state; it, however, cannot be taxed in
such states, or the exercise of its p owers be restricted by
the state where located, in any other way than as is expressly authorized by the national laws. For example,
where the statutes of Pennsylvania provided that no
foreign corporations should have an office in that state,
without obtaining a license from the state, for which an
annual charge was made, it was held that a railroad company chartered by Congress to build a road from Texas
to California, and having an office in Philadelphia, was
not a foreign corporation in that state, and subject to the
license law thereof relating to foreign corporations (29).

3. THE STATE AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
§ 173. Right of & foreign corporation. Strictly speaking the states of the Union are foreign to each other in
most matters relating to corporation laws; the ownerSECTION

(29)

Comm. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 98 Pa. St 90.
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ship of property, so long as it is legal in any state, by a
corporation organized in another state, is protected as the
property of an individual is, and, so long as its acts within
the state are legal, it is protected by the national constitutional provisions. Its rights, however, to do business
(except interstate commerce) in another state than the
one creating it, is based upon mere comity and cannot
be claimed as a legal right; it bas the power to do business anywhere (if not limited by its charter), but its right
to do business, in any other state than the one creating
it, depends upon the consent of the state where it seeks to
do business. Thus, where a Georgia bank had a general
power to purchase bills of exchange, a purchase made by
it in Alabama, without objection on the part of that state,
is a valid exercise of corporate powers (30). So, an
Indiana corporation, which through an agent in Louisiana
sells meats in that state, can be charged an annual license
tax upon the business done locally by the agent in the
state (31), though the license tax is higher than the license
tax charged to domestic corporations engaged in the same
business. But where the goods are shipped by a foreign
corporation, in distinct packages, to one in another state
who took orders for them, and who examines them, and,
if found all right, delivers them, collects the price, and
remits to the corporation, such transactions are interstate
commerce, and cannot be prevented or taxed by the
states (32 ).
(30)
(31)
(32)

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet 519.
State v. Packing 0>., 110 IA 180.
Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 501.
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§ 174. Right to engage in commerce. While the general

rule, as stated above, prevents a foreign corporation from
entering, and establishing a place of business, and exercising its corporate franchise there, without the consent
of the state, any corporation, just as a natural person,
under the national Constitution, has the right to engage
in interstate or foreign commerce-and this cannot be excluded or controlled by any state. Thus, where an Ohio
manufacturing company, through its agents, made a contract in Colorado to make in Ohio and deliver in Colorado,
an engine, the corporation could sue in Colorado for the
price, though it had not complied with the statutes of
Corolado in regard to doing business in that state as a
foreign corporation ( 33). The questions, what is interstate commerce, when it begins and ends, and what incidents of it may be regulated by the state, are fully discussed in Constitutional Law, Chapter XIV, in Volume
XII of this work.
§ 175. Right of state to exclude. Within the limits
above given, any state has a legal right to exclude or discriminate against any corporation organized in another
state (that is not an agent of the national government),
for any reason or without any reason. And, after it has
once granted a license to do business in the state, this
license can be revoked at any time, though a valuable consideration was paid for it, without violating the national
constitutional provisions; but, if the grant indicates a
"contract right to do business in the state, during the corporate lifetime without being subject to any greater lia(83)

Cooper l\ffg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 1'1:1.
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bilities than then were or might be imposed upon domestic
corporations,'' the state cannot change the terms without
consent of the foreign corporation, nor exclude it for not
consenting (34). As an illustration of the general rule,
it was held that where foreign insurance companies had
been licensed to do business in the state, and had done so
f or many years, paying the license tax regularly, a new
license tax could be imposed upon such corporations from
other states of 2112 7o, and on those from other countries
of 31/2 7o , upon premiums paid in the state, although
domestic corporations were required to pay only one per
cent (35).
§ 176.

Methods of exclusion or restriction. The statutes usually provide: (1) That, before doing business
in a state, a foreign corporation sha1l appoint some one
within the state, upon whom service of summons in suits
against the corpo-ration shall be made; (2) that, when the
corporations of state A are excluded by state B then
state A will exclude the corporations of state B-these
are called retaliatory laws; (3) that suits against such
foreign corporations shall not be removed by it to the
Federal courts. While a provision of this latter kind
cannot prevent the removal of a suit to the Federal courts,
the state may afterward exclude the foreign corporation, that so offends, from doing business in the state (36).
Certain penalties are usually provided for violating
these provisions. The state can collect the penalty or
(34)
(35)
(38)

American S. & R. Co. v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 103.
Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 91 Fed. 711.
Doyle v. Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535.
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oust the corporation for non-compliance. Much controversy has arisen as to the validity of contracts made with
a corporation that has failed to comply (37) ; the weight
of authority probably is that if a penalty is imposed,
either on the offending corporation or its agent, that is
the exclusive remedy, the validity of the contract is not
affected, and it may be enforced; this is particularly true
when the complaining party, who seeks performance of
the contract, is the person contracting with the corporation, since such a provision is specially designed for his
protection; and, if the corporation is complainant, many
of the cases hold it can enforce a contract made by it before it complied with the law, but others hold otherwise.
Another view is that, if there is no penalty and the corporation bas not complied, the contract is void and unenforceable by either party to it. This does not seem
reasonable, so far as complaint is made by one contracting with the corporation, since the law is designed for his
protection instead of his injury. The courts also are
not in accord upon what is "doing business," in violation
of these statutes; one line of cases holds a single act of
the kind the corporation was formed to do, if done without
eompliance with such statutes, violates them; while others
hold there must be several acts, amounting to "carrying
on'' business.
§ 177.

Visitorial power over foreign corporations. In

general, a state has no visitorial power over the internal
concerns of a foreign corporation doing business within
its territory, except so far as it has compelled it to be(37)

Toledo Tie Co. v. Thomas, 33 W. Va 566.
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come a domestic corporation, as a condition of doing business within the state. It may, of course, oust it from the
state, but cannot dissolve it; it may appoint a receiver for
such corporations as are doing business within the state
and have property there; but, if it has no place of business within the state or no officers or no property there,
it cannot do so. What are "visitorial powers" and what
are ''internal concerns'' are not very definitely settled:
but to compel an assessment upon the stock; or ''to entertain an action to dissolve a corporation; to determine the
validity of its organization; to determine which of two
rival organizations is the legal one, or who of rival
claimants are its legal officers; to restrain it from declar.
ing a dividend, or to compel it to declare one; to restrain
it from issuing bonds or from making an additional issue
of stock-would clearly all be the exercise of visitorial
powers over the corporation, or an interference with the
management of its internal affairs" (38); yet, to compel
the issue of a new certificate of stock to replace a lost
one, or to direct the corporation to allow a member to inspect the corporate books already in the state, are not
such as are beyond the power of the state to enforce
SECTION

4.

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE
CORPORATIONS.

§ 178.

Ta.xing power.

Under the taxing power of the
United States government, it has been held that state
banks with power to issue bills and notes can be taxed
by the national government so heavily as to make it im·
(38)

Guilford v. W. U. Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332.
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possible for them to do a profitable business of this kind,
and this is true even if the national government did this
for the express purpose of protecting the national bank
issues and destroying the state bank issues (39). This
power bas been suggested to be such that state corporations which engage in interstate commerce can be taxed
so heavily by the national government upon such busines~
that they cannot profitably do such business, and, in that
way, the national government can control, by naming
conditions or requiring a license, the recent corporate
trusts. No case bas yet been decided, but the legislation
of Congress just enacted as a part of the tariff programme, providing a tax upon corporate net earnings,
may be the first step in that direction. In the case of the
bank it was allowed to reorganize as a national bank and
thereby come directly under the national control (40). It
seems that this method might be used to compel corporations engaged in interstate commerce to incorporate as
national corporations, if a Federal law were enacted for
that purpose. Much of the vexatious variety of state
legislation, now casting a great burden of expense upon
such corporations in order to comply with it, might be
avoided and uniformity obtained thereby.
179. Adopting state regulations.
Undoubtedly,
though Congress bas exclusive regulation of interstate
commerce, it may adopt regulations made by the states
that have the effect to exclude corporations or others from
carrying on business that they otherwise would have the
§

(39)
{40)

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.
Casey v. Galll, 94 U. S. 673.
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right to do, against the state's consent, as interstate commerce. In this way the national law make3 it illegal to
sell interstate liquor in any state that has a prohibitory
liquor law. contrary to that law.
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CHAPTER VI.
SPECIAL RELATIONS.

1. THE CORPORATION AND ITs PaoMOTEBS.
§ 180. Duties of promoters. The promoters owe to the
corporation the general duty to take no advantage of it;
if they, while engaged in promoting the company, buy
property for the corporation, they must let the corporation have it at the price paid by them for it; this is because they are in a relation of trust toward the unborn
corporation, when they are acting for it (1). If they
own property, and purchase it from themselves for the
corporation, while engaged in promoting the corporation,
they must not pay more than the property is worth. If
they own or acquire property for themselves, while not
acting for the corporation, they have the perfect right
to sell it to the corporation at any price they can obtain,
provided they do not themselves, or by their dummies,
represent the corporation in making the purchase. These
last two statements, however, are probably subject to the
qualification that, if the promoters are themselves the
only parties interested in the corporation at the time and
no public subscription for shares is to be called for, or,
if all the shareholders know all the facts and ratify the
acts or do not object, a large amount of stock may be
SECTION

(1)

Chandler v. Bacon, 30 Fed. 538. See 54 Am. L.

Reg.~.

128.
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issued for property of little value, and purchasers of
shares from original shareholders, who took their shares
with full knowledge of the facts, cannot complain. Only
creditors, without knowledge, can complain that the stock
is unpaid, when the corporate funds are insufficient to pay
their claims. There are however some conflicting views
upon these matters.
§ 181. Same: Illustration. T and A on January 20
signed articles of incorporation of a railroad company;
on February 17 bought 40 miles of a graded railroad bed,
with right of way, for $15,000; on February 20 filed the
articles of association, at which time corporate life began,
the company to have $3,600,000 capital stock; immediately
thereafter organized by electing themselves and two
others, to whom they had sold an interest in the roadbed,
directors and officers of the company; in May offered to
sell the roadbed to the company for the $3,600,000 capital
stock and $200,000 in money; in November this offer was
accepted by the directors and the stock ordered transferred to the owners of the roadbed·; this was then done; a
little later at a meeting of the stockholders, who so received
their stock, all being present, a resolution was unanimously passed approving and ratifying the foregoing
transactions. In a suit by the company, after these parties had sold their stock to others, to have these transactions set aside, and the stock and money, above the
$15,000 paid by the parties for the roadbed, returned to
the company, it was held there was no liability (2).
(2) 8t. Louis, etc. Co. v. Tiernan, 37 Knn. GOO. Compare Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 315, and Old Dominion Copper
Co. ''· Lewlsoho, 210 u. S. 206.
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Liabilities to corpora.tion or its shareholders.
For all profits made by them in promoting the company,
or while acting for it, promoters are liable to the corporation or its shareholders, when the public are to be called
on generally for subscription to shares and full information is not given to the subscribers, or they are misled into
believing no profits are made or to be made. Thus, where
K obtained an option from V to purchase a tract of land
for $31,000, and then associated P with him for the purpose of organizing a corporation for the purchase of the
same land for $55,000, and prepared a subscription paper
so worded as not to disclose the true ownership of the
land, but to induce the signers to believe it belonged to
V, and to bind them to join in forming a corporation to
purchase such land for $55,000; and, in order to induce the
signers to believe that Kand P purposed to become stockholders on the same basis as the others who joined in the
apparently mutual enterprise, each signed for $10,000 ot
stock, and the corporation was formed, K and P elected
directors and managing officers, and the sale was completed, ostensibly by V, for $55,000, but really for $31,000,
K and P dividing the difference- the other subscribers
· may in equity have the contract rescinded and recover
their money, or may charge K and P as trustees for the
profits and have an accounting, or may sue them at law
for damages for fraud (3). On the other band, where the
promoter similarly acquired an option on property for
$6,000 and organized a corporation to purchase it, but,
in his subscription paper, described the land proposed to
§ 182.

(3)

Hebgeu v. Koefll.er, 97 Wis. 313.
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be purchased and stated "I hold the option and agree to
sell all my rights therein to said company for $8,500 when
it is organized," neither the company nor any subscriber
could complain that the promoter made a profit of $2,500,
since he did not pretend to be selling the property of another party, and going in with the subscribers on a pretended equality to purchase it at a price not known to
them but known to him to be false ( 4).
§ 183. Liability to party dealt with. Promoters are
personally liable to one dealing with them, even though
their dealing is in the name of the corporation, for the
reason that there is in fact no principal in existence that
they can represent (5). This liability perhaps can be
excluded by drawing the contract in a way that makes the
corporation alone liable, if any one.
§ 184. Liability among themselves. As between themselves, so far as they act in forwarding the scheme of incorporation in accordance with their agreement, they are
substantially partners fort he particular purpose, and one
is bound by the acts of the others in carrying out the
scheme in the way contemplated. But, as to the other
matters, only those who authorize, consent, or ratify the
acts of the others become liable therefor (6).
§ 185. Liability of corporation for acts of promoters.

Inasmuch as the corporation does not come into existence,
until after the promoters' acts bring it into existence, it
(4) Richardson v. Graham, 45 W. Va. 134.
(5) Weatherford, etc. Co. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 850; HJnkle7 v. Oil
Co., 132 Ia. 396.
(6) Plrtsch v. Mllbrath, 123 Wis. 647; Roberts, etc. Co. v. SchlJck.
62 Minn. 332.
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cannc t be a party to a contract made for it by its promoter, and so is not liable thereon, unless it expressly or
impliedly adopts the acts or contract after it has come
into perfect existence (7). The adoption of a promoter's
contract by the corporation is really making a new contract, which dates from the time of adoption and must be
entered into with all the formalities then required to bind
the corporation (8); and this is not properly termed a
ratification, for that implies the existence of a principal at
the time the agent makes the contract. See Agency, § 22,
in Volume I of this work.
SECTION

2.

THE CORPORATION AND

§ 186.

ITS

0FFICEBS.

Genera.I relation. There are three theories as to
this relation: (1) That the officers, including directors,
are merely agents of the corporation or the shareholders;
this is not quite correct, for the directors have the power
to act in good faith in a way that does not coincide with
the shareholder's view. (2) That they are trustees; this
view is not entirely correct, for there is no separation of
the titles to the corporate property into legal and equitable, and a vesting of the legal title in the trustees and
of the equitable title in the corporation, as there would
be in the case of a true trust. (3) That they are mandataries; this is not altogether correct, for there is no
vesting of the legal possession of the corporate property
in them as a special property, as there is in the case of
bailees. The truth is the relation of directors and officers
(7)
(8)

See note 5, above.
McArthur v. Times Co., 48 Minn. 319.
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is sui generis, involving relations analogous to all of the
above, but not exactly the same as either.
These theories may be illustrated thus: A shareholder
brought an action on the case for damages against the
director of a bank for loaning money without security.
Held, such suit could not be maintained-the corporation
must sue, for the director was its agent (9). A receiver
of a corporation brought a bill in equity against a director
for misappropriating the corporate funds to his own use;
held, in Illinois, that the director was the trustee of an
express trust, and could not successfully plead the statute
of limitations for that reason (10). On the same facts,
Tennessee holds the directors are only implied trustees,
and statutes of limitations run in their favor (11).
General rule as to duties. They owe the corporation the duty to exercise diligence and care and a
reasonable business judgment and prudence in managing
the corporate affairs, and, for failure in this direction,
they may be held in an action for damages by the corporation (12); some cases say they are liable only for
gross neglig;ence in managing the corporate affairs, or
selecting unfit servants, or failure to use ordinary care to
supervise their acts afterward (13); they have no right
to any profits made by them while working for the corporation; all such belong to it and may be recovered by it.
§ 188. Right to remove corporate officers. There is no
§ 187.

(9) Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456.
(10) Ellls v. Ward, 137 III. 509.
(11) Wallace v. Snv. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630.
(12) North Rud. Bldg., etc. Assn. v. Childs, 82 Wis. 460.
(13) Swentzell v. Penn. Bank, 147 Pa. St. 140.
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well-defined power to remove elected officers-as directors, president, etc.-wbo are elected for terms fixed in
the charter, general law, or by-law, before the term bas
expired (14); this may be provided for by by-law provision allowing it; a court could, upon proper showing,
remove such officer if he were violating bis trust, in a way
similar to the removal of other trustees. Agents, though
hired for a definite time, may be removed, subject to liability for damages if removed without cause before their
time of service has expired; if not hired for a definite
time, they can be removed at any time by the corporation
without making itself liable for damages.
§ 189. Rights of officers to manage the corporate business. So long as corporate officers act in good faith, with
due care, and keep within the corporate powers and
those conferred upon them, they cannot be prevented from
managing the business according to their best judgment,
and neither shareholders nor the courts can interfere ( 15).
§ 190. Right of officers to deal with the corporation.
The general rule here is that the officer cannot rightfully
represent both himself and the corporation in making a
contract with it; any such contract is voidable by the corporation or its members, even though in fact it was fair
and reasonable, by one line of cases (16); but by another
and perhaps the better view, if the contract is made in
good faith and free from fraud, it is not so voidable (17).
If the corporation, however, is represented by other
(14)
(15)
(16)

(17)

In the Matter of Election of Directors, '33 N. J. L. 168.
Blood v. La Serena. 113 Olli!. 221.
Mull80n v. Ry. Co., 103 N. Y. 58.
Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587.
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officers that have power to act for it in the transaction,
there is nothing forbidding an officer from dealing with.
it, and such contract is valid. The same rule applies to
corporations having common directors or officers (18)
dealing with each other through such officers; if they are
represented by non-common officers who could bind it by
their action, the contract is valid ; otherwise voidable.
§ 191. Right to salary. The general officers of corporations, including directors, are supposed to serve in
their capacities as such without compensation, and hence,
after they have so acted, they cannot, without consent of
shareholders, be voted salaries as back pay (19), for such
a thing would be giving away the corporate funds. For
any extraordinary service not included in the ·o rdinary
functions of the office, there is an implied promise to pay,
and in such case the directors have the right to fix the
amount. The shareholders usually reserve the right to
themselves to fix the sala1ies of the general officers, and
leave to the directors the right to fix other salaries. There
is an implied promise to pay any officer or any person,
who devotes his whole time to the service of the compan~
in ways other than merely performing the duties of his
office.
§ 192. Right of ofticers to resign. A corporate officer
may resign at any time, even though the statute provides
they shall continue in office until their successors are appointed, and this may be done without giving notice to
the public or to those dealing with the corporation (20).
(18)
(19)
(20)

Aldlne, etc. Co. v. Pbllllps, 129 Mich. 240.
National Loan, etc. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 Fed. 33G.
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132.
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No acceptance of the resignation is necessary to make it
effectual But the resignation of officers for the purpose
of preventing the bringing of any suit, or the service of
process, or of enabling a receiver to be appointed, is
ineffective. Salary and liability cease with the resignation (21).
§ 193. Right of officers to deal with shareholders.
There is some conflict upon this matter. It is usual to
say that directors and officers do not stand in any relation of trust and confidence toward individual sbare·bolders, and consequently can deal with them as if they
were strangers, and are not obliged to give them any information unless called for, that may affect the value of
the shares, even though they seek to buy shares from such
shareholders (22); but there are some recent cases to the
contrary, including a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, reversing a decision of the supreme court
of the Philippine Islands (23). It was held here that the
managing director of a church-landowning corporation,
having shares, and whose lands were about to be purchased by the government at a price that would greatly
enhance the vaJue of the shares, was under a duty to inform a shareholder from whom be sought to purchase
shares, of the facts known to him concerning the probable
sale of land to the government.
§ 194. Right to contribution. Where directors wrongfully pay dividends out of capital to shareholders who
know the facts, and such directors are held liable to
(21)
(22)
(23)

7.eltner v. Brewing Co., 174 N. Y. 247.
Denderlck v. Wilson, 8 Baxter (Teno.) 108.
Stroll!-! v. Replde, 213 U. S. 419.
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creditors for the amount so paid, they can recover the
amount from the shareholders who knowingly received
it; but, if the shareholders did not know the facts, they
would not be compelled to refund (24). And where directors jointly wrongfnlly waste the corporate funds, one
who has been compelled to make good the loss cannot enforce contributions from the others (24), the ordinary rule
relating to joint wrong-doers applying.
Liability of officers. The liability of officers to
the corporation is considered above, and to the shareholders and creditors hereafter. To third parties, or to
those who deal with the corporation, the corporate officers
are liable for their own wrongful acts, and cannot shield
themselves behind the liability of the corporation as their
principal. Thus, where an officer, without authority to
issue a note for the company, falsely claimed he had such
authority, he is liable to an innocent holder of the note;
but, if he had authority to issue notes for a proper purpose and abuses that authority, he is liable not to the innocent holder but to the company, which is liable to the
holder (25 ). So, too, where the manager of a lumber
company put a known inexperienced workman to work
with a defective machine known to be dangerous, whereby
the workman was hurt, the act of the manager was not
mere non-feasance, but a misfeasance for which he is
liable (26). So, also, a manager who keeps giant powder
§ 195.

(24)
(26)
(26)

Moxham v. Grant, 69 J,. J. (Q. B.) 07.
Dexter Sav. Bk. v. Friend, 90 Fed. 703.
Greenberg v. Lumber Co., 90 Wis. 225.
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in a dangerous quantity and place, for a corporation, is
liable for the damage due to explosion (27).
SECTION

3. THE

CoRPOBATION AND ~TS SHAREHOLDERS.

§ 196. In general.

The corporation has a right not to
have its existence denied by its shareholders-they are
estopped; it has a right to issue preferred stock under
some circumstances; to regulate transfers; to carrj on
the enterprise as the majority of the directors shall direct;
to accept amendments, under some circumstances by a
majority vote, and, if in failing circumstances, to dissolve
itself. These matters have been considered.
§ 197.

Right of corporation to·collect subscriptions. In

all the states except those of New England, every subscription to stock that does not so state otherwise is considered as including an implied promise to pay for the
shares when the corporation needs the money (28); it is
not usually a debt due immediately upon the subscription
(though some statutes make part of it such), but on1y an
agreement to pay when demanded by the proper corporate
authorities.
§ 198. Calls. Before any particular amount is due
upon any subscription a caU is to be made by the directors; this at common law was simply passing a resolution
saying that a certain per cent of the amount subscribed
should be due and payable at a certain time (29). Every
shareholder was supposed to take notice of such resolu(27) Cameron v. Kenyon Connell Co., 2'2 Mont. 812.
(28) Gettysburg Natl. Bk. v. Brown, 95 Md. 36'7; Hughes v. Mtg.
Co., 34 Md. 816.
(29) Budd v. Multonomab Co., 15 Ore. 413.
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tion, and was in default if he did not comply with it; it is
usual now to require notice of some sort to be given of the
fact of making the call, and also of the time and place it
shall be payable. It becomes a debt due the corporation
as soon as due, and may be sued for by the corporation;
to be valid, calls must operate equally and be uniform on
all. There is no right, unless expressly conferred, to call
for any more than the face value of the amount subscribed, or the amount agreed to be paid in the subscription contract (30). Calls should be made by directors
legally elected (31).
§ 199. Evidence of membership. The cases are not
agreed as to this; one line of authorities holds that the
corporate records, such as the stock and transfer books,
are prima facie evidence as to who is a member, even
against one who does not claim membership (32); the
better view is otherwise (33). Such records would properly be evidence of membership against the corporation,
and, with some propriety, might be considered such in
favor of corporate creditors. Such records are not, however, conclusive. A certificate of shares is not necessary
to constitute one a shareholder.
§ 200. Right to vote. At common law every member
had a right to one vote on every proposition, and no more.
Voting was not according to shares owned; now, by custom, by-law, and statute or charter, the rule is almost
universally the other way, and a shareholder has one
(SO)
(31)
(32)
(83)

Enterprise Ditch Co. v. Moffitt, 58 Neb. 642.
Moses v. Tompkins, 84 Ala. 613.
Glenn v. Orr, 96 N. C. 413.
Carey v. Wllllams, 79 Fed. 906.
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vote for each share owned (34). Preferred stock may
be issued without the right to vote, though the statute
says each share shall be entitled to one vote (35 ). The
holder of the legal title has the right to vote; executors
and administrators vote the stock belonging to the estate
before distribution; the corporation cannot vote its own
shares held by itself; a shareholder can vote as he sees
his personal interest, even though such is in conflict with
the corporate interest; but, if he owns a majority of the
stock, he must not commit a fraud, or deprive the minority
shareholders of their legal rights in the corporate busi·
ness and profits.
§ 201.

Proxy. At common law the member, unless the
charter expressly authorized, had no right to vote by
proxy, but must vote in person (35); now, statutes universally allow voting by proxy, which is simply the appointing by the shareholder of some one to be his proxy or
attorney in fact to attend a certain meeting and vote all
the shares that his principal owns, upon all questions
lawfully coming before that meeting, as fully as the owner
could if he were present. No special form is essential,
unless by-Jaws, charter, or statutes expressly so require.
§ 202. Irrevocable proxy.

There have been some attempts to make proxies irrevocable-but they cannot be
so made, even for a consideration; they are considered
such a separation of the interest in the stock and in its
control as are contrary to public policy; hence, anyone
(34)
(35)

Comm. v. Detwiler, 131 Pa. St 614.
State v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561.

256

PRIVATE CORPORATIO NS

that has given an irrevocable proxy can cancel it at any
time (36).
§ 203. Voting trusts. Voting trusts are agreement.a
among shareholders to vote all the shares they own in
the way the majority of the parties to the agreement
direct, or in the way some trnstee or outside party shall
direct; when entered into for the purpose, and having the
effect of placing the control in a minority of the shareholders, they have generally been held voidable and unenforceable at the option of any party to the agreement (37).
In some cases, where they serve the purpose of sustaining or preserving rights that otherwise might be in peril
they have been upheld (38); and they are generally upheld in California and New York, the latter having expressly legalized them by statute.
§ 204. Cumulative voting. This is a method authorized by statute, which allows the minority of shareholders
a chance to obtain representation upon the directorate.
If A owns ten shares of stock in a corporation having five
directors, he would have the right to vote ten shares for
each director separately, and this is the usual and the
only way unless some other method is expressly provided.
The cumulative method would permit A, instead of casting 10 votes for each of five directors, to cumulate them
and cast the entire 50 votes for one and none for the others, or 25 for each of two directors to be elected, or in any
other way to divide his votes, not exceeding 50 in all (39).
(86)
(87)
(88)
(89)

Cook, Stock and Stockholders, H 610, 622.
Hnrvey v. Llnvflle Co., 118 N. C. 693.
Smith v. San Francisco, etc. Co., 11CS Callt. Ci84.
Pierce v. Comm. 104 Pa. St. 100.
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Under the reserved power to amend, a corporate charter
can be amended, and the amendment can be accepted by
a majority of shareholders against the protest ci the
minority, authorizing cumulative voting ( 40).
§ 205. Dividends. A dividend is a sum set aside out
of the corporate profits to be divided among the shareholders in proportion to their holdings; dividends must,
in order to be valid, be declared out of the corporate profits- that is, the balance after all current expenses of operation are paid, and fixed charges and losses in capital are
provided for. When the corporation has earned profits
which could be applied to the payment of dividends, and
also has the power to increase its shares of stock, it may
keep the money and declare a stock dividend by issuing
shares instead, to an amount in face value equal to the
profits to be divided ( 41). Before dividends belong to
the shareholder and cease to be the property of the
corporation, they must be declared by the board of directors, and the funds set aside to pay them; from that time
the shareholder is considered part owner of the fund so
set aside, though not yet due ( 42) ; without this setting
aside of a particular fund or amount, out of which payment is to be made, the shareholder is a mere creditor to
the amount declared, and must share with the other creditors in case insolvency afterward occurs before payment
( 43). The shareholder must, however, demand payment,
before the corporation is in default for non-payment;
(40)
(41)
(42)
(48)

Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46.
Williams v. W. U. TeL C.0., 93 N. Y. 162.
Le Roy v. Globe IDB. Co., 2 Edw. Cb. (N. Y.) 667.
Hunt v. O'Shea, 69 N. H. 600.
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after that, he can sue the company for refusing to pay,
either in assumpsit or debt. The power to declare dividends resides in the directors, and, so long as they act in
good faith in furthering the interests of the company according to their judgment, a court will not control their
discretion in compelling the declaration and payment of a
dividend; but, where they fraudulently withhold payment
out of funds available, the court may order a distribution
( 44). And where preferred shareholders are entitled
to receive their dividends annually, out of the profits
earned during any one year, which are non-cumulative, a
court of equity will order a dividend to be made, when
there are net earnings properly divisible ( 45 ).
§ 206.

Who are entitled. to dividends? This of course
is a matter of contract between the transferrer and the
transferee; but, in the absence of any stipulation to the
contrary, the owner of the shares at the time the dividends are declared is entitled to them, and it makes no
difference when they were earned or when they are to be
paid. As between the pledgor and the pledgee of shares,
the latter is entitled to the dividends paid during the existence of the pledge, to be credited on his claim against the
pledgor If A is the owner of shares when a dividend is
declared, it belongs to him, though it does not become due
until after A has transferred bis shares to B. So, too,
if A sells to B before a dividend is declared, it of right belongs to B, though it is declared before the transfer on the
books is made to B; in this case, however, the corpora·
(44)
(•CS)

Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167.
Hazeltine v. Railroad Co., 79 Me. 411.
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tion will be justified in paying A, if it has no knowledge of
B's claim; and generalJy the corporation is protected if
it in good faith pays to the registered owner. As between
successive owners of shares, the rules given in the previous subsection relating to setting aside the dividend fund
do not apply. The declaration, not the setting aside, is
the important point.
Thus, where preferred stock was guaranteed a ten per
cent dividend before the common stock, and no dividends
were paid between 1857 and 1863, but afterwards such
dividends were paid regularly and a large surplus accumulated; in 1870, P acquired 40 shares of preferred stock,
and, in 1880, the corporation proposed to declare dividends out of the surplus on the common stock; P claimed
that he was entitled to the dividends that should have been
declared and paid in 1857-1863, and the court so held; since
they were not then declared, the right to them passed to the
successive owners of the stock until declared (47). Bon
April 1 agreed to sell shares to L on or before July 18, to be
paid for on delivery, nothing being said about any dividends; July 3 a dividend was declared, payable August
1; L exercised his option July 16, and paid for the stock.
Held, B was entitled to the dividend as he was the owner
of the shares at the time it was declared ( 48).
§ 207.

Between life tenant and rema.inder man. The
cases are in conflict as to this; one rule is, that if the dividend is a money dividend, it is always to be paid to the
life tenant as income; but, if it is a stock dividend, it is all
(47)
(48)

Jermain v. J... S. & M. ~. Ry., 91 N. Y. 484.
Bright v. Lord, 51 Ind. 272.
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to be paid to the remainder man as a part of the estate.
Another rule is that if the dividend is ordinary; i. e., one
arising from the ordinary operations of the company, it
will all go to the life tenant; but, if extraordinary, such as
declared out of capital when the stock is lawfully reduced,
all of it should be paid to the remainder man. Another
rule is that the intention of the corporation shall govern
-what it declares to be earnings shall be treated as income and go to the life tenant; and what it considers capital shall be so considered and go to the remainder man.
Another rule, and the one having the weight of authority,
is that the courts will investigate when the fund was
earned; if earned before the death of the person creating
the tenancies for life and in remainder, it will go to the
remainder man, as a part of the corpus of the estate; if
in fact it represents earnings accumulated afterward, it
will go to the life tenant, whether paid in money or
stock (49).
§ 208.

Transfer of shares. Right to transfer. The

general method of transfer bas been described. The certificate of stock usual1y says, "transferable in person or
by attorney on the books of the corporation upon the surrender of this certificate." On the back, a blank form of
assignment is usually present, reading, ''For value received I hereby sell, assign, and transfer to - - - - - all my interest in - - - - - - - shares of stock represented by this certificate and I hereby irrevocably appoint - - - - - - my attorney to transfer the same on
(49)
162.

McLouth v. Huot, 154 N. Y. 179. See note, 118 Am. St. R.
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the books of the corporation, with full power of substitution;" when this is signed by the owner, the certificate
will pass by deli.v ery without filling in the other blanks,
and any subsequent holder can fill in the blanks and have
his name put on the corporate books as owner, and get a
new certificate in bis own name to that effect (50). It bas
been said that writing is essential to the transfer of shares,
since they are mere choses in action; but, while a written
assignment is the universal custom, in the absence of special provision so requiring it is not necessary by the
weight of authority. The right to transfer is an incident
of the ownership of the property in the shares-and the
corporation, unless the statute expressly allows, cannot
prevent such transfer, although it may regulate it by reasonable provisions for the protection of the corporation
(51). But at the time the subscription is made, the subscriber may, in some states, agree to offer his shares to
the corporation or other members before selling to outside parties (52). There is no right generally recognized
in this country to transfer shares after insolvency, or to
an incompetent or insolvent person for the purpose of
evading liability.
§ 209. Registration of transfer. There are two theories as to the necessity of the registration of th" transfer
on the books of the corporation; one is that the legal title
does not pass by delivery of the certificate duly indorsed
and assigned- registration being essential to pass the
legal title, and only an equitable title passing without
(50)
(51)
(52)

Keller v. Mfg. Co., 43 Mo. App. 84.
Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129.
Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476.
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(54); the other is that, as between the parties themselves
and all other parties claiming through them, the whole
title passes with the delivery of the certificate duly endorsed, with a power of attorney to have the transfer
made on the books of the company (55). This latter is
certainly supported by the great weight of authority.
As between t.he corporation and the transferror or transferee, until the registration is made on the books of the
company, the corporation may, until it is satisfied of the
right of the transferee, recognize the registered owner
(56 ). The above rules are of importance in the case of
attaching creditors of the transferror, and give exactly
opposite results. As between pledgor and pledgee, registration is unnecessary. But the pledgee, in order to prevent the possibility of loss, usually has the stock registered in bis name. Where P indorsed his certificate of
shares in blank and delivered it to B his broker to secure
a balance of account of $3,000, and B, without authority,
pledged the same shares by delivery of the indorsed certificate to a bank, to secure a loan of $8,000 to B, the bank,
having no knowledge of the wrongful act of B, could hold
the shares as against P, until the $8,000 loan was fully
paid {57). But, if instead of claiming to own the shares
and borru:wr1ng for himself, B had represented he was P's
agent and wished to borrow for him, and had pledged the
indorsed shares to the bank as security, and, after securing the money, appropriated it himself, P could recover
(54)
(55)
(5G)
(57)

Perkins v. Lyons, 111 Ia. 192.
Westminster, etc. Bank v. Electric Works, 73 N. IL 465.
People's Bank v. Exchange Bk., 116 Ga. 820.
McNeil v. Tenth Natl. Bk., 46 N. Y. 325.
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the shares and the bank would lose, since it relied on B's
false representation of agency (58).
§ 210. Transfer upon forged power of attorney. Since
certificates of shares are not negotiable, this bas no legal
effect upon the rights of the original owner-be cannot
be deprived of bis property by the forgery, unless be is
chargeable with negligence (59). If the corporation accepts and cancels a forged certificate, and issues a new
one in its place, a bona-fide purchaser of the new certificate is protected, and, as against the corporation, may
claim membership, unless the corporation bas issued all
the shares it can; but, if the corporation has issued all the
shares it has a right to issue, the purchaser bas an action
for damages against the corporation. The certificate is a
continuing representation of the validity of the shares,
when made to an innocent party; the original owner can
claim the rights of membership; the forger or the person
who induces the corporation to act is liable to it for any
loss it sustains. The same rules apply to lost certificates
not due to the fault of the owner. Thus, where a certificate was issued to D and by him sold and indorsed in
blank to P, from whom it was stolen without bis fault by
an unknown person, who transferred it to brokers who
sold it to M, P can recover the shares and M and the
brokers must look to the thief (60).
§ 211. Transfers in breach of trust. vVhen A bolds
shares in trust for B, and there is nothing in the certificates or on the register to show that a trust exists, a bona
(58)
(59)

(60)

Merchants' Bk. v. Livingston, 74 N. Y. 223.
Telegrupb Co. v. Da,·enport, !Yi U. S. 3GO.
East Birmingham Land Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565.
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fide purchaser from A gets a good title as against B, and
B must look to A. If the certificate or register shows a
trust exists, the purchaser takes it subject to the trust
(61); if the corporation has knowledge of the existence
of the trust and of any limit on the power of the trustee
to transfer, and it negligently allows him to transfer contrary to his authority, the corporation is liable to the
party injured (62).
§ 212.

Gift. A gift of shares may be made by delivery

of the certificate for that purpose, without indorsement.
Registration is not essential to the validity of the gift,
though perhaps the full legal title is not complete, until
indorsement on the certificate or transfer is made on the
corporate books (63).
§ 213.

Effect of transfer. The general rule is that the

transferror is no longer a member, and is no longer in any
way liable to the corporation or its creditors, even though
the shares are not fully paid; the purchaser, on the other
hand, assumes, if he has knowledge of the facts, all the
obligations and is entitled to all the rights of the seller
(64). If he has no knowledge that the shares were not
paid up, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, he
is not liable to the corporation or to its creditors-he has
a right to presume they are paid up, though the certificate
does not so state, and he is not obliged to inquire into the
matter ( 65). In such case it would seem the transferror
(61)
(62)

(63)
(64)
(~)

Winter v. Gas T,fgbt Co., 89 Ala. 544.
Loring v. Salisbury Mills, 125 Mass. 138.
First Natl. Bk. v. Holland, 99 Va. 405.
Vfsalfa, etc. R. R. Co. v. Hyde, 110 Cal. 632.
West Nasbvllle, etc. Co. v. Nasbvllle, etc. Bank, 86 Tenn. 262.
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would remain liable to the corporation, at least so far as
necessary to protect creditors. The matter is regulated
by statutes in many states.
§ 214. Remedyforrefusal to transfer. This is an action
to recover the value of the shares, as damages-usually
at the time of refusal, but, by some decisions, the value at
the time of trial or the highest value at any time between
the refusal and the trial (66); under some circumstances,
where shares cannot be obtained, a court of equity, or a
court of law by mandamus, will compel a transfer (67).
The reason why the courts will not ordinarily compel a
transfer is because there is no necessity of possessing
the identical shares ; by recovering the market value of
them, they can usually be replaced.
§ 215. Right to inspect books. At common law a shareholder had the right to inspect the corporate books, whenever there was a real matter of controversy between him
and the corporation, or its officers, or shareholders, which
made it necessary to see the books ; now, by statute generally, he has the right at reasonable times to see the
books and take copies of the entries by himself or his
agent, without there being an actual controversy existing; it must be exercised at a reasonable time; if refused,
an action for damages will lie, or the custodian may be
compelled by mandamus to permit inspection. Recently,
even without statute, the courts have applied a much
more liberal rule than formerly. Thus where a shareholder was simply "desirous of learning the true condi(66)
(67)

Burdick, Torts, p. 205.
Cushman v. Thayer, etc. O:>., 76 N. Y. 366.
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tion of the affairs of the company and the value of his interest therein," the corporation was compelled to allow
the inspection ; the reason being that the shareholders are
in substance part owners of the corporate property ( 68) .
§ 216.

Right to share in increase of stock Where the

corporation has the right to increase its capital stock,
each shareholder has a right to subscribe at par for such
proportion of the new stock as his holdings are of the old
stock, in preference to outside parties. Thus, where the
corporation voted to increase its stock and offer it to
shareholders at twenty-five per cent premium, in proportion to their holdings, and, if it was not taken by a certain
date, to sell it to new stockholders; and the plaintiff offered to take bis proportion at par, tendered the money,
and was refused; he was entitled to a mandamus to compel
the company to issue him bis proportion of the new stock.
The reason is that the shareholders are really the owners
of the corporate concern, and any other rule might diminish the value of each share of old stock by letting in
other parties to an equal interest in the surplus and good
will of an established business (69).
§ 217.

Right to sue for wrong done the corporation.

The general rule is that shareholders have no such right,
the corporation being the proper party-but in some cases
there would be a failure of justice if they were not allowed to sue. Whenever the corporation is unable to sue
for a wrong done it, then a bona fide shareholder may,
upon behalf of himself and all others, sue to have the
(68)
(69)

State v. Pacific Rrewing Co., 21 Wash. 451.
Hammond v. Bdlson Illuminating Co., 131 Mich. 79.
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wrong righted. The wrongs for which suit may be
brought are the ultra vires acts of the agents, resulting in
damages to the corporation; the fraudulent acts of the directors, or their acting in their own instead of the corporate interest; and oppressive or fraudulent acts of a
majority of the stockholders. The plaintiff must allege
and show that he tried to have corporate action taken
through the proper corporate agencies to have the wrong
righted, and that they refused, or that the wrongdoers
were the corporate officers themselves who had authority
to have the corporation sue. If the offense charged is one
that the shareholders could ratify, the courts will not interfere until they have been called to pass upon the matter, unless delay would be perilous if a right existed (70).
SECTION

4.

CREDITORS OF THE CORPORATION.

Creditors and the state. As a general ruh~, the
state, unless it has reserved the power to repeal or amend
a charter cannot repeal or change the statutory contractual liability of shareholders, so as to impair the security
of existing creditors; but the penal liability of shareholders may be repealed or changed, and, if the state bas reserved the power to repeal, the contractual liability may
be changed. Dissolution by the state does not affect creditors' rights; they are enforceable against the assets of
the corporation. Remedies may be modified, provided
they are not substantially taken away. Contractual and
penal liabilities are defined below.
§ 218.

(70)

Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 400.

Vol VIII-19

268

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 219.

Creditors and the corporation. Creditors have
all the ordinary rights to enforce their claims against the
corporation in the usual way in courts, that they would
have against individuals; except that such property as is
necessary for the corporation to perform some public
duty cannot be taken on execution; but the income from it
may be sequestrated in equity or otherwise to pay the
claims (71). Creditors have no right to interfere with or
dictate the manner in which the corporation is managed
(72). The reason for this is that they have no interest in
the matter, other than to be paid what is due them when it
is due.
§ 220. Preference of creditors. The corporation, by the
great weight of authority, has the same right to prefer a
creditor in case of insolvency that an individual bas;
where this rule applies, a bona fide shareholding creditor
or a director-creditor can be preferred also (73). In some
of the states it is held that, as soon as insolvency occurs,
the assets of the corporation become a trust fund for distribution among all the creditors in proportion to their
claims, and the corporation can give no preferences (74).
§ 221. Assets as a trust fund (75). The general doctrine is that the capital of a corporation is a fund set
apart for the protection of creditors, and cannot be given
away or distributed among shareholders, until creditors
are fully paid; that there is included in this fund not only
(71) Loulsvllle, etc. Ry. v. Boney, 117 Ind. 511.
(72) Pond v. Framingham, etc. Co., 130 Mass. 194.
(73) Corey v. Wadsworth, 118 Ala. 488.
(74) Rouse v. Merchants' Bank, 46 O. St 493.
(76) Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 008; Hospes v. Car Co.. 48 Minn
174.
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any property the corporation has, but the sums unpaid
by the shareholders upon their stock subscriptions, so far
as necessary to pay creditors who have relied thereon;
also all claims due to the corporation from whatever
source can, in some form of proceeding, be recovered and
applied to the payment of creditors ' claims ; al so all capital of the company distributed to the shareholders, that
has the effect of reducing the property below the amount
of capital stock that the corporation is to have, can be
recovered so far as necessary to pay creditors who have
relied thereon before extending credit, and provided the
shareholders did not innocently receive it. A creditor,
who becomes such before an increase of stock is made,
cannot complain of its non-payment-for he does not
rely on it; so a subsequent creditor can not complain of a
previous improper disposition of the corporate property,.
if he did not extend credit in reliance upon the corporation still having such property.
§ 222.

Right of creditor to prevent dissipation of funds.
:As has been stated, the creditors have no right to interfere in the corporate management; but the cases have
generally recognized the right of creditors to enjoin
threatened wrongs which would destroy the creditors' security, or enjoin waste of the corporate funds, or have
conveyances in fraud of their rights set aside. In such
cases the creditor must first establish his claim by a judgment at law, or in some other way obtain a lien upon the
corporate assets, before a court of equity will give him
euch relief, and he must usually sue in such form as will
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allow other creditors to join him, and have the asset!
administered for the benefit of all (76).

Oreditors and officers. So long as officers keep
within their authority, they do not make themselves
liable to creditors upon contracts they make for the com.
pany; if they exceed their authority, they become liable
to those with whom they contract; if they commit a tort
while acting for the company, they are liable therefor to
the person injured, although the corporation may be also;
the directors may be liable for tort for permitting such
managemeBt of the corporation as creates a nuisance;
under some circumstances, if they are negligent in managing the corporate affairs so the corporation would have
an action for damages against them, upon insolvency,
such a claim for damages is an asset which the creditors
have a right to have enforced against the officers, if necessary to pay their claims.
§ 223.

Statutory liability of officers. In some of the
states where officers fail to make certain reports, or make
false ones, or incur debts in excess of a certain amount,
they are made liable for the debts of the corporation; in
such cases the statutory method of recovery, if any is
fixed, must be followed; but courts will allow recovery
in some of the ordinary forms of proceeding, if no special
form is provided.
§ 224.

§ 225.

OrediU>rs and shareholders. Creditors have no
rights against shareholders, in the absence of a special
statutory liability, provided the corporation is de jure,
(76)

Holltns v. Brlerfleld Coal Co.. 160 U. S. 37L
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the face value of the stock has been fully paid in, and
there has been no distribution of the capital stock before
creditors are paid. The liability of shareholders arises
in one of two ways: (1) From the common law; and, (2)
under special statutes. The common law liability arises
principally under three circumstances: (a) Imperfect organization; (b) failure to pay in the full amount subscribed; (c) payment of dividends out of capital instead
of profits.

Common law liabilities of shareholders to creditors. The first of these, arising out of imperfect organization, is based upon the rule that, when a number of persons undertake a business transaction and fail to become
incorporated, the common Jaw partnership liability results; as we have seen, if the corporation is de facto, the
weight of authority bolds that there is no other than the
corporate liability, and not the partnership; and so too,
where there is an estoppel against a particular creditor,
he cannot hold the members to an individual partnership
liability.
§ 226.

Second, since the capital stock is a fund for the protection of the creditors, it is in the nature of a fraud for the
corporation or its shareholders to claim to have a capital
stock up to a certain amount, which it has never received;
the courts say that, for the protection of creditors and
when necessary for the payment of those relying upon it,
the shareholders will be required to tnake this representation good by making payment-this is what is usually
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meant by saying that such subscriptions are a trust f·a nd
for the creditors' security (77).
In the third place, if the shareholders divide the corporate assets among themselves, before paying the creditors, the result is the same as if the capital bad never
been paid, and creditors who became such before the division have a right to have the sum so distributed paid
back, so far as necessary to pay their claims. But share...
holders who have innocently received dividends paid out
of capital instead of profits, before insolvency, will not be
required to refund (78 ).
§ 227. Same: Procedure. In these last two cases the
creditor's rights arise only after he has established his
claim by judgment against the corporation, bas taken
out execution against the corporate property, and has
had it returned unsatisfied or partly so. Then be has the
right to sue the shareholders in equity to have the sums
due the corporation paid in to discharge bis claims; be
must usually bring a creditor's bill in such a way that the
other creditors can come in and share in the proceeds in
proportion to their claims (79). Judgment against the
corporation is conclusive as to the debt of the corporation, and an assessment against the shareholders by the
court cannot be questioned by the shareholder; but be
can contest bis liability on the ground that be is not a
member, or that the judgment was fraudulently obtained.
A receiver is usually appointed by the court, who can sue,

u.

(77) Hospes v. Car Co., 48 Minn. 174.
(78) Davenport v. Lines, 72 Conn. 118; McDonaJd v. WllUams, 174
s. 897.
(79) Lawrence v. Greenup. 97 Fed. ~
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by himself or by an ancillary receiver, any shareholder
who owes the corporation, in any state to recover the
amount so due; the liability of the shareholders is several,
but it is usual in the suit to join all, though some are out
of the jurisdiction of the court (80).
§ 228.
., ~

.

t

I
I

Non-payment of shares. Under (b) in § 225,

above, difficult questions arise as to the liability of shareholders who have an agreement with the corporation by
which they are not to pay in full for their shares. Such
agreements are valid as between the corporation and the
shareholders, but are generally invalid as against creditors, so the creditor can require full payment for bis
protection.
There are four exceptions : ( 1) When the shareholder
has purchased from another shareholder, in good faith,
shares that were not in fact fully paid but which be supposed were, he is not liable to creditors for the unpaid
amount. (2) When the corporation is in failing circumstances, but bas the power to increase its stock, and it
does this under stress of circumstances and in good faith
to re-establish itself, it may sell such stock at its market
value, or issue it as a bonus along with bonds issued, to
tide over its difficulties; and those who take the stock or
bonds or both, in good faith at their market value then,
will not be held to any further liability in favor of subsequent creditors (81). (3) It is held in New York and
Illinois that a corporation like a railroad company may
issue its shares below par, or at their market value, in
(89)

(81)

~toddard v. Lum, 159 N. Y. 265.
Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417.
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payment of a construction company for the construction
of its road, and such company is not liable to subsequent
creditors for the difference between the face value of the
shares, and the price at which they were taken (82). (4)
In case shares are paid for in property, it is generally
held that, so long as there is no actual fraud in valuin1~
the property, whatever price it is taken at, even if it is an
over-valuation, shall be final and creditors cannot complain; other states, notably Missouri, hold that l\ny overvaluation, though made in good faith, must be paid back
to the company by the person receiving the shares upon
that basis, if necessary to pay creditors who have relied
on the company having the capital it pretends to have.
Many cases also hold that an excessive over-valuation
is prima facie fraudulent, and the discrepancy will be
required to be satisfactorily explained, or made up (83).
Perhaps good will is property with which shares can be
paid, if it really exists in the particular case; labor, services, patents, franchises, etc., are property within the
rule.

Statutory liability of shareholders to creditors.
This is a liability placed upon shareholders, over and
above their common Jaw liability, for the protection ot
creditors; it is not generally a part of the corporate funds
for the purposes of carrying on its business, but it is a
security for creditors alone; as to its legal character, it
is either ( 1) contractual, or (2) penal. The contractual
may be either (a) a joint and several, unlimited, primary
§ 229.

(82)
(83)

Van Cott v. Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535.
State Trust Co. v. Turner, 111Ia.66f.
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liability; (b) a joint and several, unlimited, secondary
liability; or, (c) a limited, primary or secondary liability.
If primary, the liability arises at the time the liability
of the corporation does; if secondary, only after the corporation is unable to pay; if unlimited, it is substantially
that of a partner; if limited, then it extends only to the
limit, which is usually a sum equal to the amount of the
subscription in addition thereto, or such a proportion of
the debts as the shareholder's shares are of the total
shares. If it is primary, the statute of limitations would
run at the same time it does against the corporation. If
secondary, only after it was established that the corporation could not pay. It may be provided in constitutional
or statutory provisions; if it is provided in constitutions,
it will be self-executing whenever it is fixed in amount,
and no special machinery for its enforcement is necessary.
§ 230.

Contractual and penal liabilities. A penalty is
a punishment for doing something that is forbidden, and
is to be recovered by the state; it can be changed or modi·
fied at any time, and it is not enforcible outside of the
state; some of the statutory liabilities are similar in form
to penalties, but, if they are designed for the protection
of creditors in such a way that the offender becomes a
debtor to the creditor by his failure, they will be considered contractual in nature, so as to allow suits to be
brought in other states for their enforcement in favor
of the creditor. If the liability is contractual, subsequent
creditors have a vested right in it for their protection,
such as cannot be taken away from them without their
consent; such a liability also survives and attaches to the
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estate of a deceased shareholder, and may be enforced
against it, or the representative of a deceased creditor
can enforce it against shareholders (84). If a true penalty, such rules do not apply.
Enforcement in other jurisdictions. If a special
remedy is provided in the state creating the statutory
liability, of such a nature that the right cannot be separated from its accompanying procedure, and this is different from the procedure in the state where it is sought
to be enforced, it will not be there enforced (85); but, if no
special remedy is provided, or if it is of a kind that can
be enforced in a foreign jurisdiction according to the ordinary procedure there, it will be enforced there. The usual
method is through a creditor's bill or receiver, as described above ( § 227) in connection with the c-0mmon law
liability (86). The same rules also apply as to the effect
of judgments. The true penal laws of one state, however,
are not enforced by the courts of another state (87).
§ 231.

(84)
(85)
(86)

Huntington v. Attrlll, 146 U. ~. Gt>7.
Marshnll v. Sbermnn. 148 N. Y. 9.
Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179.

(87)

Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265.
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